CONTENTS
Thursday 20 August 1992
Review of the Office of the Ombudsman
Delbert Dupré
Graham White
STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE OMBUDSMAN
*Chair / Président: Morrow, Mark (Wentworth East/-Est ND)
*Vice-Chair / Vice-Présidente: Haeck, Christel (St Catharines-Brock ND)
*Akande, Zanana L. (St Andrew-St Patrick ND)
Drainville, Dennis (Victoria-Haliburton ND)
*Duignan, Noel (Halton North/-Nord ND)
Henderson, D. James (Etobicoke-Humber L)
*Johnson, Paul R. (Prince Edward-Lennox-South Hastings/Prince Edward-Lennox-Hastings-Sud ND)
Miclash, Frank (Kenora L)
Murdoch, Bill (Grey PC)
*Perruzza, Anthony (Downsview ND)
*Ramsay, David (Timiskaming L)
Witmer, Elizabeth (Waterloo North/-Nord PC)
Substitutions / Membres remplaçants:
*Curling, Alvin (Scarborough North/-Nord L) for Mr Miclash *Jackson, Cameron (Burlington South/-Sud PC) for Mr Murdoch
*Kwinter, Monte (Wilson Heights L) for Mr Henderson
*Mammoliti, George (Yorkview ND) for Mr Drainville
*Wilson, Jim (Simcoe West/-Ouest PC) for Mrs Witmer
*In attendance / présents
Clerk / Greffier: Carrozza, Franco
Staff / Personnel: Murray, Paul, committee counsel and research officer, Legislative Research Service
The committee met at 1008 in room 151.
REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN DELBERT DUPRÉ
The Chair (Mr Mark Morrow): I'd like to call this to order. Good morning, everyone. I'm Mark Morrow, Chairman of the standing committee on the Ombudsman. Today we are reviewing the Office of the Ombudsman.
Our first presenter this morning is Delbert Dupré. Good morning, sir. I want to welcome you this morning. You have a half-hour for your presentation. The committee would appreciate if you would leave some time so it can have some questions and comments for you. Begin when you feel comfortable, and when you begin could you please read your name into the record for us. Thank you very much.
Mr Delbert Dupré: Thank you, Mr Chairman. My name is Delbert Dupré. I don't know how many questions will be asked, but I'm prepared to answer whatever questions I can of course. I have prepared a rather short initial statement and I'll proceed to read that.
First let me say that I appreciate your acceptance of my request to appear before this committee. My request included some basic information which will have given you an understanding of the background of my concerns. These concerns had caused me to make a request for an Ombudsman investigation which was filed under date of February 20, 1991. It was acknowledged under date of March 14, 1991, under file 82109.
I had asked for an investigation into the role played by the Ontario Securities Commission in authorizing the amalgamation of two companies in 1987 which had resulted in serious losses to preferred share owners in one company and corresponding substantial financial gains to the other company. Those gains were augmented by substantial income tax credits to the second company, which had been contingent on completion of the amalgamation.
At the time of filing, I acquainted the Ombudsman with the mandate of the Ontario Securities Commission, as published in its brochure, An Introduction to Investing in Securities, under the heading, "What is the Ontario Securities Commission?" It reads as follows:
"Its mandate, as part of the Ontario Ministry of Financial Institutions, is to ensure that the financial community operates with efficiency and integrity and that the interests of Ontario's investors are protected."
I questioned the Ombudsman as to whether the OSC had acted in accordance with that mandate. If not, I believe that the victimized shareholders should be able to obtain restitution from the company which had benefited.
More than 16 months have elapsed since filing, and the latest communication from Ombudsman investigator Blackwood, under date of July 29, 1992, states, "I should be able to provide you with a summary of the investigation shortly."
My concern is not only about the length of the turnaround time being taken, but a fear that the Ombudsman staff is insufficient in numbers or expertise to cope with a situation where the beneficiary of that amalgamation is benefiting from the expertise of a legal firm which has close to 100 lawyer members.
The Chair: Thank you very much, sir. Any comments or questions? Mr Mammoliti, please.
Mr George Mammoliti (Yorkview): Welcome, Mr Dupré. Good morning. Thank you very much for taking the time to come out. The first question that I'd like to ask is pretty straightforward, and that is perhaps to tell us about any of the problems that existed with the Ombudsman's office when you dealt with them, and to what extent.
Mr Dupré: No. Everyone has been sincere and anxious to be helpful. No problems whatever. I have enjoyed --
Mr Mammoliti: Okay.
Mr Dupré: My only concern is that I would have liked to have a little better service.
Mr Mammoliti: Okay. How long ago was this?
Mr Dupré: I filed my complaint on February 20 of last year.
Mr Mammoliti: February 20 of last year. When you mean "better service," can you be more specific?
Mr Dupré: I would like to have had my problem addressed and answered --
Mr Mammoliti: A little quicker perhaps?
Mr Dupré: -- a little quicker, right.
Mr Mammoliti: What, in your opinion, would be sufficient, then, if it's a little quicker, in terms of turnaround time? I know it's a little unfair because of your particular problem, but what would you say would be fair in terms of a turnaround time a little quicker?
Mr Dupré: Really I have no preconceived idea. I know this is an extremely involved situation, but I would have appreciated being contacted perhaps every month or so to be advised of what was happening. But there was a great hiatus of time before I --
Mr Mammoliti: So it would be safe perhaps to say you may want a little bit more communication in terms of an update on your case and that sort of thing.
Mr Dupré: Yes. I did hear from them from time to time, and on one occasion they sent me 130 pages of documents to analyse and I did my best for them. I got it back to them in a week or 10 days, but then there was quite a time gap before there was any further word.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr Mammoliti. Mr Ramsay, please.
Mr David Ramsay (Timiskaming): Good morning, Mr Dupré. Thank you very much for coming before us this morning. As you know, we're taking a look at the legislation that establishes the Office of the Ombudsman to see if there are any changes needed to bring it into the 1990s.
Mr Dupré: Right.
Mr Ramsay: We appreciate your input. Your last comments I took as being a question that you weren't really aware why there was a delay and you weren't sure whether it was a lack of staffing or a lack of expertise of the staff.
Mr Dupré: Right.
Mr Ramsay: I don't know that either right now, but they are two interesting questions to ask, for sure, and I'm glad you've posed them. Have you received any explanation -- I presume you probably have asked -- why it's taken so much time since your first request? Have you received an explanation as to why it has taken 16 months so far and you still don't have a summary of the case to date?
Mr Dupré: Not really, no.
Mr Ramsay: Have you asked that questions?
Mr Dupré: No, I haven't asked why there's a delay. I knew it was a complicated situation and I felt it was probably necessary to do a lot of research work, and perhaps there hasn't been a day wasted. I don't know. But I would have felt better if I'd been kept informed as to what kind of a timetable there might be.
Mr Ramsay: So what you would like then, regardless of the amount of time that it might take to give you satisfaction that there's been a full investigation, is to be informed as to an approximate schedule of when you might expect some answers, whatever they may be, from the investigation.
Mr Dupré: That's it. Exactly.
Mr Monte Kwinter (Wilson Heights): Mr Dupré, I was interested to hear your case. I'm not familiar with it. As a former Minister of Financial Institutions, I had a similar situation with the Astra/Re-Mor investors where they went to the Ombudsman and, after a very lengthy investigation, the Ombudsman made a declaration in favour of the investors.
What I really want to get to, and I felt strongly about it at the time and I still feel that way, is that you sort of gave the preamble as to the mandate of the Ontario Securities Commission and you stated what its role was. You felt that they hadn't honoured that responsibility and, as a result, you've gone to the Ombudsman.
Mr Dupré: Right.
Mr Kwinter: I'm just curious, and I'm trying to sort of deal with the process, whether or not that is the proper venue for this kind of complaint and whether it should have been a judicial review. You stated that you felt they didn't have the staff or the expertise to deal with this particular situation.
Mr Dupré: I brought that up as a possible reason for taking a considerable amount of time.
Mr Kwinter: Oh, I see. I don't want to get involved in the case; I'm just trying to find the process. When the securities commission made a ruling, it made a ruling on the basis of information it had.
Mr Dupré: Yes.
Mr Kwinter: They have a commission which is made up of people who are knowledgeable in the industry and they either approve or disapprove particular initiatives of various investors or companies offering investments. They made that decision and you disagree with that decision.
Mr Dupré: Excuse me, I don't follow what you're saying.
Mr Kwinter: What I'm saying is that the Ontario Securities Commission agreed that these two companies could merge. As I say, I'm not familiar with the details of the particular case.
Mr Dupré: Yes, they approved the merger.
Mr Kwinter: They approved the merger, and they did that on the basis of their best information. You, as an investor, were not happy with their approval and you've gone to the Ombudsman.
Mr Dupré: Right.
Mr Kwinter: The question I'm asking is whether that is the role of the Ombudsman when you have a body such as the Ontario Securities Commission whose responsibility is to oversee the investment community. They are made up of people who are supposedly knowledgeable and they make that decision. You are going to the Ombudsman, who then has to say to them: "Did you make the right decision?" as opposed to the process. The question I have is, are you objecting to the decision or are you objecting to the process?
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Mr Dupré: When you get involved in the process, I don't know just what I should be looking for, but if you have to say one or the other, I would say I faulted their decision. Because of the fact that the Ombudsman shows the Ontario Securities Commission as being one of the government organizations that it has some jurisdiction over, I felt it was appropriate to take it to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has accepted the responsibility, but they're taking a long while to perform.
Mr Kwinter: The reason for my question is to get to the heart of the role of the Ombudsman. It would seem to me that if you're having difficulty accessing the Ontario Securities Commission, or if you couldn't get a hearing, couldn't present your concerns to it, I would see that as the role of the Ombudsman. I have a problem, when they make a decision which they are empowered by legislation to make, in asking the Ombudsman to question that decision as opposed to a judicial review where a judge can look at both parties, look at the issue and make a decision. I'm just wondering whether we are putting an onus on the Ombudsman to make a decision, as you have suggested, they are not equipped to make or probably shouldn't make. I'm just curious to know what your reaction is.
Mr Dupré: I don't know anything about this judicial review. What is a judicial review? How do you get a judicial review?
Mr Kwinter: You go to court. You, as a shareholder in a company that you feel has disadvantaged you, go to court. You ask a judge to determine that.
Mr Dupré: Yes, but is this practical for a man who has 1,000 shares in a big company and doesn't have much money to spend on court costs? I kept in touch with my MPP throughout the problem and he recommended that the Ombudsman was the appropriate venue to approach the problem through, so I have done so. I think I've exhausted all the alternative -- I forget just how it's worded --
Mr Mammoliti: On a point of information or clarification, Mr Chair: Who would the gentleman's MPP be?
Mr Cameron Jackson (Burlington South): Of what importance is that?
Mr Mammoliti: I'd like to know, that's all. Is there anything wrong with that?
Mr Jackson: You're interrupting the gentleman. It would be more polite if you waited, if it's that serious a question.
The Chair: Mr Mammoliti, can I ask that you wait and possibly ask that question --
Mr Mammoliti: Okay, no problem.
Mr Dupré: To sum it up, I kept my MPP informed throughout and he suggested that the proper approach to get a solution to the problem was the Ombudsman.
Mr Paul R. Johnson (Prince Edward-Lennox-South Hastings): Thank you for coming before the committee, Mr Dupré. Certainly one of your concerns is timeliness, or lack of timeliness I guess, in the response from the Ombudsman with regard to your concern. If, as the Ombudsman's office felt it wasn't within its capacity to deal with this particular problem in a timely manner, it had at least responded to you and given you appropriate direction as to how you could resolve your concern, would that have been -- I'm surmising here -- an alternative that would have been more acceptable?
Mr Dupré: No, I'm happy with the Ombudsman. I have great confidence in the Office of the Ombudsman, something I think the government of Ontario needs. As I mentioned earlier, I have been pleased with the reception I've gotten and the cooperation I've had and the attitude of the people, but it's just that it's taking so long. It seems to me that in 16 months more progress should have been made.
Mr Johnson: I understand your concerns. I'm sure people come before the Ombudsman with concerns that can be handled in other venues and I thought, and indeed Mr Kwinter has suggested, that possibly a judicial inquiry into your concerns with the Ontario Securities Commission may have been the right avenue to take. I wondered if, had the Ombudsman made you aware of this earlier, it may have expedited a resolution of your concerns.
Mr Dupré: I had quite a bit of communication with the Ontario Securities Commission, but this happened five years ago and there was quite a turnover in personnel, as you may recall, and it wasn't satisfactory. So, as I say, I kept in touch with my MPP. You probably know him, Dr Jim Henderson. I don't know whether he still is a member of this committee, but he has been on this committee. He felt it was an appropriate problem to take to the Ombudsman.
Mr Johnson: I would like to add that yesterday the Honourable Judge Morand was here and he suggested that indeed MPPs are, within their capacity, to a certain extent ombudsmen themselves; where they can't find a resolution to particular concerns, they direct their constituents to the appropriate body.
Mr Dupré: That's the procedure I went through. I'm happy with it, outside of the time factor. But I'm bringing up that if they had sufficient personnel and sufficient expertise -- as I mentioned, the company that benefited from this amalgamation, in my opinion at the expense of shareholders in part, has a very large legal staff. Presumably they know all the loopholes and approaches to accomplish their ends. Presumably too if the Ombudsman is going to be able to handle these Ontario Securities Commission problems, he needs to have a knowledgeable staff.
Ms Christel Haeck (St Catharines-Brock): Mr Dupré, thank you very much for coming before us. Basically, as someone who has gone to the Ombudsman's office, you are entitled to have a look at your file and ask questions about the investigation and about how things are proceeding. Have you availed yourself of that possibility?
Mr Dupré: Perhaps not as much as I could have or should have, but I have been in touch with them occasionally; I can't give dates. Perhaps I could have expedited things if I'd kept after them. But I'll tell you, I spent my working life in the business world -- I'm 81 years old -- and I don't necessarily believe that the squeaky wheel gets the grease; I believe that if you become a nuisance to people, they don't work as hard for you as they do if you let them handle it in their own fashion.
Ms Haeck: I don't in any way disagree with what you're saying as far as being on the phone every day or something of that sort. But by the same token, people are entitled to have some information about what is going on. If you have these concerns, you really should avail yourself of that process as well.
Mr Dupré: That's a good point. Perhaps I should have established a rapport that enabled me to call every month and ask what's happening. Maybe I should have.
The Chair: Any further comments or questions? Seeing none, Mr Dupré, I want to thank you very much for appearing before this committee this morning.
Mr Dupré: Thank you. It's been a pleasure indeed.
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GRAHAM WHITE
The Chair: The next presenter is Professor Graham White. Good morning and welcome. You have some time to do your presentation. I would appreciate it if the members could comment or ask questions when you're done. Begin when you feel comfortable, and could you please read your name into the record.
Dr Graham White: My name is Graham White; I'm a professor of political science at the University of Toronto. Lest, however, there be any false apprehensions about why I'm here, I'm not an academic specialist in ombudspeople. I spent four years as clerk of the predecessor of this committee and followed the actions of the Ombudsman and this committee prior to that and subsequent to that. I must say I haven't kept up nearly as well as I used to since I left the employ of the Legislature, but the principles I came to believe in about how the Ombudsman should work and how this committee should work have not changed. I also have read this committee's most recent report and the Ombudsman's special report -- both, I add, with some distress.
What I propose to do is outline what I think should be the principles underlying the whole exercise and then offer the committee some specific suggestions.
Principle number one, and to me this underlines everything about the Ombudsman: The Ombudsman is about justice, about fairness. The Ombudsman is not about legality. All manner of things may be entirely legal, but unfair. That's the whole premise of why you have an Ombudsman.
Accordingly, I have to take issue with the sentiment expressed yesterday by Mr Justice Morand. I do not believe the Ombudsman is like a judge. In some respects there is an analogy, but I think it's a mistake to carry that analogy too far. For starters, I think the Ombudsman has a more difficult task than a judge does. It's far more difficult to sort out fairness than it is to sort out legality.
A corollary of this principle, to me, is that the Ombudsman has been and continues to be overly legalistic in her approach to dealing with complaints that come before her. There are several cases cited in this committee's 19th report that I believe illustrate the overly precise and legal approach the Ombudsman takes. I hasten to add that it's easy for me, as it's easy for this committee, to say the Ombudsman is overly bureaucratic and overly legal. It is not necessarily that easy to change that approach. However, it still seems to me that the Ombudsman has an overriding approach dealing with and premised on legal precision, rather than promoting fairness and justice for complainants. There should be, in my view, more emphasis on problem-solving and on dispute resolution.
When I worked for this committee, I had occasion to read a fair number of decisions made by the Ombudsman, the final decision reports that went to the complainants. They were meticulously researched and they were convincing legal documents, but in many ways, attempting to read these documents from the perspective of the complainants, they often seemed to be stepping sideways from the basic issue: Was this person dealt with fairly?
The easy explanation for why this approach is there at the Ombudsman's office -- and this is very much in keeping with previous ombudsmen, I should add -- is partly because there are too many lawyers. However, it's also partly because of this committee. If you look at the origin of this committee, if you look at the way it conducted its business in the early days and continues to, the Ombudsman, quite properly, took it on the chin a number of times from this committee for investigations that were not as thorough as they should have been; the documentation was inadequate.
They are smart people at the Ombudsman's office. They knew what to do. The answer was to document everything with extreme thoroughness in possible anticipation of having to appear before this committee. What I'm suggesting to you is that part of the reason the Ombudsman is a slow operation, part of the reason there is what many would say is excessive documentation and bureaucratization, is because the Ombudsman constantly has to wonder, and the Ombudsman's staff has to wonder, about coming before this committee. In short, you are part of the problem and I think you need to recognize it. This is simply, in my view, a cost that needs to be paid to have this committee in operation, which I think on balance is a very good thing.
The second principle that to me underlines the Ombudsman is that the Ombudsman is an officer of the Legislature, doing work on its behalf that the Legislature could well do on its own in a way that's probably not true of other independent offices like the auditor and the Information and Privacy Commissioner.
In several other jurisdictions in the Commonwealth, in Britain and New Zealand, for example, and I believe still in Newfoundland, the Ombudsman is called the parliamentary commissioner, and to me that's a fairly telling reminder of what this person is there to do.
Those of you who may have suffered through political science courses will probably have had someone natter at you about one of the roles of a member of a Legislature called the ombudsman function. People speak of the ombudsman function of members of the Legislature and the ombudsman function of members of the Legislature was here long before there was an Ombudsman.
Having said that, principle number three is that the Ombudsman must be independent of government and politics. However, the Ombudsman does not have, nor should she have, absolute independence. If you think about it, there are already very serious constraints to the Ombudsman's independence. For starters, the assembly can restructure the Ombudsman through amending the act, or for that matter, abolish the institution itself. The Legislature determines the Ombudsman's finances, and quite significantly, to me, the Legislature, through this committee, can make rules for the Ombudsman unlike, I might add, the auditor or the Information and Privacy Commissioner. There are no similar provisions in the Audit Act or the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.
In my view -- and I have a number of good friends who formerly worked at the Ombudsman's office who are diametrically opposed to this view but I persist in it none the less -- every Ombudsman has been overly sensitive to perceived threats about the Ombudsman's independence from this committee. If you look at the historical record under Arthur Maloney, under Justice Morand, there is no question in my mind that it shows that the independence of the Ombudsman is not a fragile, exotic, hothouse plant; it's a hardy perennial. I really see very little reason for the Ombudsman to be worried about the incursions into her independence by this committee, although I do have, for your consideration later, one area in which I believe the Ombudsman is justified in her concern.
I've watched, periodically the last week, some of your hearings and I've seen you wrestle with the question of reconciling accountability and independence as far as the Ombudsman is concerned. I have the answer for you. The answer is that there is no answer, because when you get right down to it, when you're talking about the Ombudsman, accountability and independence are fundamentally incompatible. You grant the Ombudsman independence and by the very act of having done that you reduce accountability. That's the price you pay for the Ombudsman's independence and I believe it's a price worth paying.
Now I should say here that financial accountability is not the issue. That's easy. Audits that can be done, are done. If there are concerns that the Ombudsman has paid too much money for a computer system or whatever kinds of things auditors get excited about, that's easily resolved. The auditor has a handle on it and can go to the standing committee on public accounts. That's pretty straightforward.
The much more difficult question is, what happens when somebody thinks the Ombudsman has done something improper or has conducted an inadequate investigation? That's surely the issue of accountability here.
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We need to stop, I think, though, and ask, "What are we talking about with accountability?" My view would be that there are at least two fundamentally different notions of accountability that are constantly being mixed up, not just with the Ombudsman but any time the word "accountability" surfaces.
The first meaning is that accountability means someone has to respond to criticism and explain his or her actions. The second version is that the same response and explanation takes place and there are sanctions to be imposed on the person or organization if those actions are inappropriate. To me, one of the premises of granting the Ombudsman independence is that you have to be satisfied with that first type of accountability; namely, response and explanation without sanctions.
The fifth general principle is that the Ombudsman has no power to make the government act. The Ombudsman achieves her results through the credibility of her process, her investigations, through the force of evidence and argument, through suasion.
It's important to recognize what results mean here. To an extent, clearly results mean that injustices perpetrated on complainants are rectified. However, there are two other important results the Ombudsman can achieve and does achieve. The first is to satisfy a complainant that he or she had a fair shake. The morning thought du jour in the Globe and Mail today was a quotation from Lord Chesterfield, who in effect said, "A person may not really want so much to have his case won as to be given a fair hearing." To me, in a great many ways, that's what the Ombudsman is about.
In addition, however, the Ombudsman achieves effects in a very similar way to what the auditor does; namely, simply by being there and having credibility and having this committee behind her, the Ombudsman improves the standard of administration in this province. An important corollary of this principle is that this committee is a very important part of the Ombudsman's effectiveness.
This gets to a rather touchy issue that to me is principle number six; namely, the Ombudsman and this committee should be working towards the same goal and there must be mutual respect and open communications between the committee and the Ombudsman.
Let me strongly commend to your attention, if you have not already seen it, an article that appeared in the Canadian Parliamentary Review, 1984, by a former chairman of the committee, entitled "Ombudsmen and Legislatures: Allies or Adversaries?" This, to me, is a very measured review of the issues that arise between ombudsmen and Legislatures, with a particular view to how this committee has interacted with various ombudsmen.
One of the corollaries of my view of open communications and mutual respect being required for the process is that there should be regular, informal meetings between the Ombudsman and representatives of this committee, the Chair, and if there exists an all-party subcommittee -- which I believe there should -- that subcommittee, just to talk over problem situations and keep the lines of communication open. Similarly, the Ombudsman, in my view, should always be prepared to come before this committee to discuss issues of concern to this committee.
Having set out what to me are the principles, let me turn to some suggestions, first about how this committee operates. I guess it's in a way reassuring to see that it encounters the same problems it encountered when I was here, one of which is that it receives profound ignorance and rejection from the House. The House really doesn't take this committee as seriously as it should. Perhaps rejection is an unfair comment, but certainly being ignored is the standard procedure for this committee.
Let me suggest to you one way of dealing with it. I worked here for eight years. I think I have some understanding of the kind of priorities before the House and what makes the place tick. It will be ever thus. One way of improving the committee's lot, therefore, is to change the committee's order of reference, have the Legislature change the committee's order of reference, so that recommendations from this committee are automatically deemed to be accepted by the House unless specifically overturned by the House within a specific time period. This is analogous to what happens in one phase of the public appointments review by the standing committee on government agencies.
It is my view that recommendations from this committee to support the Ombudsman's recommendations about government agencies do not have legal binding force. I presume that's accepted by the committee, which is to say it's not as if this committee can twist the government's arm. This committee, like the Ombudsman, can apply suasion, force of argument in evidence, but cannot make the government do what the Ombudsman or the committee wants.
Perhaps to slip into a fit of naîveté here, it's particularly important to me, given the long history of the Ombudsman's office and the conflicts between this committee and the Ombudsman and indeed the nature of the process itself, that there be continuity in this committee.
Having watched just this last week, many of the faces I watched on TV aren't here any more, and I understand, that's how the place works, but to me it is particularly important that this committee have some continuity, have some kind of institutional memory. That, to an extent, is here with the committee staff, but it also needs to be here with the members.
One of the questions I was invited to comment on -- and I won't comment particularly other than simply to give my view -- is the question of this committee's involvement with the appointment of the Ombudsman. To me, it's crystal clear that this committee should be very closely involved with the appointment of the Ombudsman.
Another question that arises is, should the committee have jurisdiction over the Ombudsman's estimates? The answer to me is yes, for the reasons set out in the most recent committee report. I should add that in my view this will have virtually no effect on anything. It will neither represent any kind of incursion into the Ombudsman's independence, nor will it enhance accountability.
For the record, yesterday I saw Mr Justice Morand talk about this committee's repeated attempts to obtain jurisdiction over the Ombudsman's estimates, and he indicated that in his term that request was never granted. That may be technically true. I don't know exactly when his term ended, but shortly after, if not at the very end of his term in office, this committee or its predecessor was in fact granted jurisdiction over the estimates, and it made no never mind to anyone.
I have read the Macaulay report, the second dealing with the Ombudsman, and I must say there are some fairly deep issues here that I haven't entirely resolved in my own mind. On initial reading, I find his arguments fairly persuasive and I would commend them to you for serious thought. I'm not sure if I agree entirely. I think he may go a little too far in some places, but I think he raises some very significant issues that this committee needs to consider.
The committee's 19th report recommended that there be a value-for-money audit conducted on the Ombudsman's office. The rationale for this, at least in the report, was not particularly clear to me. In fact, I must say there was a certain element of a fishing expedition here.
My suggestion to this committee would be that you have a chat with the Provincial Auditor -- this is assuming we ever have a Provincial Auditor -- about what exactly a value-for-money audit could achieve. If there's a concern with case flow, with the "efficiency" of the Ombudsman's office, say so. The money that might be spent on a value-for-money audit by the Provincial Auditor might well be better spent on a team of management consultants from an outside consulting firm; I don't know. I'm not sure that a value-for-money audit, unless there's a very clear reason for doing it, is necessarily a good thing.
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The second from final area I want to talk about is an area where I believe, from reading this committee's most recent report, it has gone too far in pursuing communications from the public. In this respect, I believe the Ombudsman has a legitimate, dare I say, complaint against this committee.
Historically, and according to the information in your most recent report, the committee has refused to second-guess or reinvestigate decisions by the Ombudsman, and I fully support that view. However, to me, some of the cases reported in your most recent report come uncomfortably close and in fact cross the line into telling the Ombudsman how to do her job. This gets back to the principle earlier, that a certain amount of accountability has to be given up in order to give the Ombudsman proper independence.
On one side, to me it is unfair that this committee only pursues, looks into -- whatever phrase you care to pick -- complaints against the Ombudsman that someone has had the wit or ability to address to this committee. Most people don't know it's possible to do that, and it seems to me it's unfair that some people get this treatment and some people don't.
There is also, of course, a potentially very large numbers problem once you get to the issue of everyone wanting this committee to review decisions made by the Ombudsman. But much more important to me is the underlying principle there; that is, quite simply, that in my view it is inappropriate for the committee in effect to tell the Ombudsman whom to interview and how to conduct an investigation.
Now, I recognize that the recommendations in your most recent report were done in good faith, with an intention to help complainants, but to me these are unwarranted intrusions on the Ombudsman's independence.
This does not, however, resolve the very difficult issue of what happens when someone comes to this committee with an apparently legitimate complaint about the Ombudsman's actions. I don't mean, "I don't like what the Ombudsman decided here and I think it's unfair." It could be an issue such as was raised in your report that the Ombudsman perhaps should have interviewed X, and maybe the Ombudsman should have interviewed X. Similarly, I heard earlier in the week the account of the complaint of the Georgian College students, where on the surface there seemed to be a reason to wonder what the Ombudsman was doing. These are the tough issues raised by this whole area of communication from the public.
I offer you two suggestions. The first is to look at these areas in terms of general problems. Two of the recommendations in the most recent report involved delays and that the Ombudsman write to complainants explaining why these delays took place.
It seems to me entirely legitimate for this committee to suggest to the Ombudsman and, after discussion, perhaps use its rule-making power to put a rule in place for the Ombudsman that, after a certain point in time -- a year, 18 months, whatever; it doesn't particularly matter -- every complainant receive some kind of explanation as to why things took so long.
That, to me, is acceptable. But looking at the specifics of a case and saying, "Tell this complainant why you did such-and-so or why it took so long" is not acceptable. That won't resolve all the issues. It will still leave some up in the air and unresolved.
My best suggestion to you here is that there be informal communications with the Ombudsman, not an open committee meeting, in which the issues are raised and discussed. In the end -- this is the price -- I believe you have to trust in the best judgement of the Ombudsman to understand those problems and to work towards resolving them.
This presumes that the Ombudsman in turn is open and willing to discuss issues, without, of course, breaching confidentiality. I understand that this is a very significant constraint on the Ombudsman in dealing with such problems, but the Ombudsman has to be willing to be open to discussions from this committee.
With that, I'm prepared to discuss or attempt to answer questions.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor White. Comments or questions?
Mr Ramsay: Thank you very much for coming before the committee today. Speaking for myself, I thoroughly enjoyed your presentation. I thought it was very helpful in our deliberations. I found it very well balanced in defending the rights of the Ombudsman, as we all do, in her entitlement of independence from the Legislature in her decision-making.
Thank you for some specific suggestions as to how maybe we can resolve some of these problems in general as to the previous case that was before us, about communicating with complainants. That might be a good idea, to have some general rules set down so that people know that every six months, or whatever it was, they'd get a notice of the progress of their cases or something like that. I think that's excellent.
I want to talk a little about the financial accountability. You had said you didn't really see that as a problem, that there are processes in place, with the public accounts committee taking on that role and the estimates committee taking on the role of examining estimates for the Ombudsman's office.
However, it's a $9.4-million operation at this time, and it seems to me that sometimes there may be a need for a more thorough investigation. That's why this committee had asked, in its 19th report, for a value-for-money audit, as we have been hearing certain complaints about office procedures and this sort of thing and we want to assure the taxpayers that their $9.4 million is well spent. It really wasn't a fishing expedition. We feel, as you say, that the mere existence of the public auditor keeps government agencies and ministries in line; you're right. But going through the process of thorough examination as to how an office operates can also find deficiencies that can be corrected on all our behalf, which is excellent. So it really wasn't a fishing expedition. When we hear of some things, we like to get them fixed up.
How do you differentiate between wanting to make sure, as legislators, that the office is running well and, through that, that people are served well in their case investigation, and at the same time making sure that as far as the decision-making process goes, we're not interfering in that at all? I guess I'm getting back to the reconciliation question again, but there are some definite concerns we would have about the operation of that, and would like to get involved.
Dr White: Involved with -- ?
Mr Ramsay: Involved with the correction of those perceived deficiencies. The first thing is to investigate whether there are these deficiencies. By the way, we did have a meeting with the public auditor yesterday morning, so we have gone through what a value-for-money audit would entail, and several of the members have made some suggestions about other types of auditing procedures. So we're very confident that we will have a good job done by the public auditor.
It's interesting that in the report that you may have seen, the special report of the Ombudsperson, she now is wondering whether the public auditor is the appropriate official to be looking at her jurisdiction and her office. That's an interesting question she puts forward.
Do you feel that it is the right and the obligation of the Legislature, through this committee or some other committee, to ensure that the office is well run?
Dr White: Absolutely. However, what does that entail? It entails audits. One of the reasons I was a little sceptical of the value-for-money audit was that it seems to me, knowing a little how value-for-money audits work, that there is only so far they can go in this kind of an exercise.
Certainly if there is a more efficient way to manage the paper flow at the Ombudsman's office, allocation of staff and so on, that can be turned up through a value-for-money audit. So far as I know, all previous auditors have welcomed anybody's suggestions about how to make the place run more smoothly in that mechanical, administrative way.
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But again, the more difficult issue is the spirit in which you approach an investigation. How do you do an investigation? A value-for-money audit will not tell you anything about that. Value-for-money audits are very good at looking at inputs and outputs that are easily quantifiable. Unfortunately, what we're dealing with here is justice and fairness, which are about as far from being quantifiable as you can imagine. So you're still back in the dilemma of trying to keep tabs on and hold the Ombudsman accountable for the way she goes about her investigations.
My view is that it's perfectly legitimate for you to raise questions, and one of the great traditions of this committee is to give the Ombudsman a hard time about why it takes so long to get anything done and why so many cases took so long. This is an inevitable aspect of the process, in my view. Not that it can't be improved, but it will always be there. But after a certain point I think you have to trust that the Ombudsman has heard what you're saying and has the best interests of justice in mind; that she was placed there in an independent position for a long period of time and you simply have to accept and trust her judgement.
The way the act is constructed, the way the philosophy of the Ombudsman works, you have given up some of that normal accountability process in order to gain independence for this officer of the assembly.
Mr Ramsay: A value-for-money audit, though, could potentially identify problems that might be systemic to the office that are then causing problems with the performance of that office in serving the people the Ombudsman is sworn to serve.
Dr White: Quite so, sure.
Mr Ramsay: For instance, if, as we're starting to hear, there are major turnovers of staff, there are obviously tremendous inefficiencies there, as new people now have to be trained for a highly specific task. If you start to hear that there is disagreement between those people who have now separated, either by themselves or by the Ombudsman's office, from that office and lawsuits and this sort of thing are going on, not only is there money being eaten up but also a lot of time and attention being focused on trying to patch the place up, if that's what's happening -- I'm just giving this as an example -- rather than serving the public. So I think from time to time it is beneficial to have --
Dr White: I don't disagree. My point was simply that I thought the committee needed to be clear on what a value-for-money audit might achieve. So long as that's the case, sure, go do it.
Mr Mammoliti: I want to touch on the accountability aspect again. It's something I'm very confused about. As a new member, I think I have the right to be confused from time to time.
If the public continually believes that their MPP should intervene -- that's not to say that the MPP should, but that they believe that the MPP should -- does that not warrant accountability to the Legislature and to this committee to a degree?
Dr White: I think not. Let me offer what, to me, is an analogy. I'm not sure if this will make sense to you. Both in talking to people, the public, about the Ombudsman's office when I worked here and in my current guise in talking to my students about what an Ombudsman does, one of the most difficult things to get across is that the Ombudsman does not simply look at a case and decide on its merits and say, "If it were up to me, I would give this guy compensation because I really think he hurt his back, even though the board didn't." That's not what the Ombudsman is about. The Ombudsman has to be satisfied that a Workers' Compensation Board decision or a similar decision was unreasonable; not that the Ombudsman would have come to a different conclusion, but that it was unreasonable.
What I'm getting to is that almost no one in the public understands that. I can't get my students to understand, so similarly, the public will not understand. Listen, it's a price; it's one of the bruises I think you have to accept as a member, that your constituents will not always understand the independence of this office.
Mr Mammoliti: Frankly, a lot of the public doesn't even know what an Ombudsman is, and I recognize that as well. But let's try it from this angle: The eyes of the public, the eyes of the average Ontarian, see the staff in the Ombudsman's office as civil servants. As civil servants, wouldn't that warrant accountability by the Legislature and by this committee? If so, and if you agree with me there, and I'm not even sure if I agree --
Dr White: No, I don't.
Mr Mammoliti: Okay. Some of the recommendations that have come into my office -- and I'd like to know how you feel on this -- are to keep them totally separate, a hands-off approach, and as well, to get them completely away from the civil service. How do you feel about that?
Dr White: I think the current setup, the current structure, is working adequately and it's the way you want things to be structured. You have to be sensitive to it, but I don't think you can set up and amend the Ombudsman Act on the basis of public misperceptions.
We all live with misperceptions about what we do and we try to correct them. But I think you have to look at what an Ombudsman is supposed to do and you make a decision as to how much independence she has and how much accountability she has, and what you think is the right thing to do. You try to explain that to your constituents and to the public, as does the Ombudsman.
I know the Ombudsman always has lots of people who are greatly aggrieved that this wasn't, in effect, the public defender approach where the Ombudsman would take a person's side no matter whether the Ombudsman was right or wrong. The whole office is very unusual.
Mr Mammoliti: I just have a hard time defending when a constituent comes to me and says, "Yes, George, I hear what you're saying. This office is supposed to be independent, a hands-off approach, yet the pensions are the same as the civil service. They are civil servants," and the question that comes from a constituent is: "If that's the case, if they're not supposed to have anything to do with government except report to the Legislature, then why is this happening? Why are they civil servants?" That, I think, is a question that is valid. I think it's something we may have to take a look at.
Dr White: At the risk of going back on what I said earlier, I suppose it is at that juncture where one invokes the analogy of the courts, and to say that in some ways, and I agree that in important ways, there are court-like elements to the Ombudsman. Perhaps that's the best answer to your constituents.
Mr Mammoliti: Okay. Last question, I promise.
Staffing, internal problems: A question I've asked everybody, and we haven't gone out to seek these letters and this opinion from the public, they voluntarily have come to this committee: Should we just ignore them? Shouldn't we deal with the fact that some people are saying 80% of the staff in the Ombudsman's office is looking to leave?
I think this committee has a valuable role to play, if in any capacity, in that capacity itself to look into the internal problems and what we can perhaps suggest to try and solve them. I think that investigating this particular issue is valid and is warranted. How do you feel about that?
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Dr White: I agree that the morale and the administrative effectiveness of the Ombudsman's office are legitimate concerns for this committee. It's a legitimate topic for discussion in this committee with the Ombudsman.
The question is, having discussed this and if you're not satisfied with what the Ombudsman thinks or proposes to do, what then? It seems to me you can only go so far. You draw this problem to her attention, you talk about it with her -- perhaps not in an open session; that's at your discretion -- but in the end, if it gets so bad that it's such a total disaster, there is provision for removing an Ombudsman.
That's a pretty stark, ultimate weapon the Legislature has, but short of that, it seems to me that one has to work on a basis of good faith here on both sides. You hear of problems, you bring them forth openly to the Ombudsman, she responds as openly as she can, and you have to trust in her judgement to deal with these things.
Mr Anthony Perruzza (Downsview): I'm a new member on this committee. This is my third day, and I don't have the kind of experience that some of my colleagues around this table have. I've been trying to grapple with some of the frustrations that have been expressed over the past three days about this committee's inability to be able to talk to the Ombudsman that we now have.
I've never been familiar with the office, but I'm beginning to understand it a little bit, and I'm not quite clear about some of the things that you said. I really enjoyed your presentation because it cleared up a number of issues that have been floating around in my mind now for the past three days, but I'm not quite clear on the advise you're giving this committee on how to proceed with the issue that's before it now.
Irrespective of what the role of the Ombudsman is or the role of the office as you see it, in terms of its arm's-length status and its ability to function as an independent office within a government structure, the issue that's before us now is whether or not we should be talking to the Ombudsman.
I'm not quite clear on what the committee's intentions are in terms of a review or in terms of an investigation. What I've been reading about in the papers, that's something I'm still trying to clear up in my mind as well. I don't know how far the committee wants to proceed with that. Given that, what are you telling us we should do?
Dr White: With respect to what?
Mr Perruzza: To the issue that's before committee now, our inability to meet with the Ombudsman.
Dr White: I don't know the ins and outs of what sort of invitations have been put forward, but one of the things I did indicate earlier and I believe in quite strongly is that the Ombudsman should always be prepared to come when this committee asks her to come. She may sit here and tell you that certain questions you ask are inappropriate and none of your business, and depending on the circumstances, it may or may or be fair ball, but she should always be willing to come.
Mr Perruzza: If you invite the Ombudsman and the Ombudsman refuses to come, then what would you do?
Dr White: I think it would depend on the circumstances. I find it hard to imagine an Ombudsman refusing to come.
Mr Perruzza: What if you repeatedly invite the Ombudsman to appear before the committee and the Ombudsman refuses to appear?
Dr White: I'm not really comfortable dealing with hypotheticals, but it seems to me that there's a clear duty for the Ombudsman to come.
Mr Perruzza: But if the Ombudsman doesn't come, then what would you do?
Dr White: In the end, there is a provision in the act for the committee to ask the Speaker to issue a warrant, but I can't imagine things going that far.
Ms Haeck: Thank you, Dr White. We must have been on the same wavelength this morning, because at about 9:30 I was making a comment to a fellow legislative researcher about the regular contacting of complainants, or basically constituents, by not only the Ombudsman's office but I think by government in general.
Having been a librarian for many years and dealing with the public on a very one-to-one basis and now in this office, my sense is that people just like to have the sense that somebody's actually working on their file. They like to have that, maybe not every week, but they would like to have it on a fairly regular basis, that somebody is doing something, that it isn't lost in the bowels of government, never to be seen again. So thank you for that recommendation.
I guess also, for someone who has been on this committee for a little over a year, I have sometimes wondered at its value and whether we're really doing a job. So I'm interested in your statement that we do support the Ombudsman.
I had to leave for a minute to deal with a constituent problem. Could you just repeat for me how you see this committee being helpful to the Ombudsman and how we can, publicly even, have a role? So far it has been for most of us an exercise in frustration as to not really being able to help the complainant or seeing ourselves being supportive of the Ombudsman, because the communication lines have not necessarily been functioning as well as they might.
Dr White: I don't know whether this is a function of a significant change over time or whether it's simply happenstance, but as I understand it, the last two Ombudsman reports had no recommendation-denied cases.
Ms Haeck: That's right.
Dr White: The whole genesis of this committee -- and when I worked for it, the vast majority of time it spent was having the Ombudsman's staff here in the morning and the ministry staff here in the afternoon going over in gruesome detail the specifics of cases in which the Ombudsman's recommendation to a government agency had been denied. It had gone to the Premier, and turns up in the Ombudsman annual report.
That, to me, both in the specifics of an individual case -- and if you look back over previous committee reports, you see that the vast majority of their recommendations are about, "In case X, the Workers' Compensation Board should do such-and-so" or what have you. They were of that nature. You have those specific cases, on which usually this committee would support the recommendation of the Ombudsman, although, as I said earlier, this has no binding legal force, but to me it had a significant moral and political force to it.
At the same time, and this may be the explanation for why there are fewer of them, it became obvious to the bureaucracy that once the Ombudsman made a report on a recommendation in a denied case, that would not be the end of it. There would be a public forum where those bureaucrats had to come and justify their turning down what the Ombudsman recommended.
This is something one cannot possibly quantify, but I have a fairly strong feeling that this in itself, just the knowledge that the Ombudsman was there and this committee was here, changed the way bureaucrats would operate. They would therefore be more willing to accede to a recommendation of the Ombudsman, properly supported of course, knowing there was the possibility of coming to this committee.
Sorry, that's kind of long-winded. That, to me, is the most important way in which this committee fits into the process and supports the Ombudsman.
Ms Haeck: Actually, that's most illuminating, because it also fits into some of the comments that Justice Morand made yesterday with regard to how the cases should diminish, basically, over time. Certain cases should diminish for the simple reason that somebody in the ministry would finally figure out that they should change their procedures to reflect the decisions.
I guess I just never felt that perfection has been achieved or is even possible. So I guess having no recommendation-denied cases over two years again is sort of hard to fathom, since obviously the cases haven't stopped being seen by the Ombudsman, and we're definitely not perfect.
I would just follow up another line of questioning, which I did ask Mr Morand. It relates to performance evaluation of the office, and not just strictly individuals, but whether the office is doing the job.
I know we really generally deal with it in a hands-off manner, no matter what kind of questions we're asking now. Most of us have not been somehow inducted into the mysteries of that office. But in these, as you say, hands-off, arm's-length situations, how does one determine, how do we deal with developing a performance evaluation and determining if the office is doing the job? It follows up somewhat on Mr Mammoliti's question about you get a sense that things are not necessarily going well, but you're also told to stay away. Having the final responsibility I think in the public's eye, how do we achieve, not nirvana, but some sort of good administration?
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Dr White: I think you use the normal tools. If you think it useful or the auditor thinks it useful, a thoroughgoing value-for-money audit could well reveal some ways of improving the office. But fundamentally I think it comes down to, you talk to the Ombudsman. Perhaps I'm being naîve here, and nirvana, but it seems to me that you and the committee are in the same business as the Ombudsman; namely, trying to rectify injustices.
Doubtless you, individually and collectively, will have different views on particular cases, but you're all in it together and it's incumbent on you to be reasonable, having pointed out some problems in areas you're concerned about, to trust the Ombudsman. It's incumbent on the Ombudsman to be reasonable in accepting your criticism, suggestions and concern.
Ms Haeck: I guess sometimes we feel we're rowing in different directions.
Dr White: This is not unknown in the previous history of the committee.
Ms Haeck: I suspect so. Just another question which is something we've had to wrestle with in looking at this review is, do you feel the jurisdiction over which the Ombudsman now has sway should be expanded? I know children's aid societies was one that came forward under Bill 80, but there are a lot of other agencies out there which the government funds where people would really like to finally have a chance at being heard. Any comments?
Dr White: A couple. I'm a little twitchy about offering any kind of definitive opinion on things like children's aid societies and hospitals, because I don't really know much about how they operate and I don't know much about the accountability mechanisms they have. Certainly, to me, bodies like municipalities should not be included. There is a whole other level of accountability. If the local politicians want to have an ombudsman, well and fine. Most universities, including my own, have an ombudsman. I wouldn't like to see the Ombudsman investigating my university. I'm quite happy to have my ombudsman investigate my university, or me.
However, there are a few of the specific agencies that were listed in the committee's report about should jurisdiction be expanded. To me, agencies like the law society and the home warranty -- I live in the past. I don't think it's --
Ms Haeck: The Ontario home warranty plan.
Dr White: Right -- should be. The principle, to me, should be that a body that is exercising governmental powers, like the law society does, that doesn't have other clearly public accountability routes -- the law society is accountable but essentially to the profession. It should be accountable to somebody else, and I would suggest that it would be appropriate to be through the Ombudsman. Those kinds of bodies should be.
When you get to children's aid societies and hospitals, there are very deep issues there I just haven't thought through. I think on balance I'd tend not to.
Ms Haeck: That's great and I really appreciate all your comments.
Ms Zanana L. Akande (St Andrew-St Patrick): You've been very clear about what you think about the committee's possible involvement in terms of budget and how accountability there may be affected. I'm wondering, though, about process. Many of the concerns we receive from people who have been before the Ombudsman and have been less than satisfied really relate to process, their feeling -- not necessarily knowing, but their feeling -- that it had not been adequately investigated because certain people hadn't been asked or certain people hadn't been questioned or there had been no communication between certain groups.
That brings me to my point. Would you feel that it would be appropriate for this committee to define a process that should be followed by the Ombudsman, not to the point of outlining exactly where to step but to the point of making sure that all bases were covered before a decision was made?
Dr White: On balance, I think not. I'm not sure what a rule formulated by this committee about the Ombudsman process would look like that wouldn't be either so vague as to be useless or so precise as to triple the paper burden they already have.
I'm interested that you refer to, in effect, inadequate investigations. The experience I have to offer is somewhat dated, but certainly when I was clerk of this committee, from 1980 to 1984, I had a fair bit of involvement with ombudsmen in other provinces, and every contact I had showed me that this office was far more thorough, far more detailed in its investigations than any other office. The other offices simply didn't have the resources to pursue cases the way the Ombudsman did here. If anything, the criticisms one heard were that they were too bureaucratized, too slow, because of all the specific steps they had to go through, all the reports that were required, all the things that had to be put on paper.
Again, perhaps the bottom line, given the expertise at that office, given the expertise in the international ombudsmen committee, is that I think you have to trust the Ombudsman to know how to run an investigation. If you have evidence of systematic problems, then you might want to talk to the Ombudsman about it and pass a rule perhaps on this business about how long it takes to process cases. Ms Akande: Actually, Professor White, I was referring to perceived inadequate investigations by those people who receive the judgements, not actually implying that this was my opinion, but concerned about being in a position to respond to or at least feel that the process followed had been sufficient and had been adequate and had been such that the decision was not spurious, being put in that position by receiving the presentations of those who were dissatisfied. You would not see that route as being appropriate?
Dr White: No, I wouldn't. As I said earlier to Mr Mammoliti, I think in some instances it's just one other area where we have to take some lumps from your constituents because of their views of how government should or should not operate. Similarly, from my experience when I would receive communications from the public, the vast majority of them, although they would often cloak -- that's unfair -- they would often phrase their complaints about the Ombudsman in terms of process, what it really came down to was: "I don't like the Ombudsman's decision and I will never accept it. What other avenue do I have here?"
Ms Akande: In view of that and in view of some of the comments you made earlier -- I promise this will be exactly the very last thing I say -- do you really feel that the office is justified?
Dr White: Yes, I do.
Ms Akande: Why?
Dr White: Because it offers redress of specific grievances and it offers a non-governmental, highly professional way of assuring people that they were fairly treated. There are doubtless lots of problems there -- there will also be lots of problems in any ombudsman operation -- but on balance I think it's unquestionably a good thing to have.
Mr Ramsay: Just a very short question, Professor White: In helping us examine the legislation, I was wondering if you have any recommendations as to the length of tenure of the Ombudsman.
Dr White: It's currently 10 years.
Mr Ramsay: Yes, that's correct.
Dr White: I haven't thought it through terribly hard. I think I would be inclined to have a somewhat shorter tenure; 10 years is a very long time.
The Chair: Seeing no further comments or questions, Professor White, I want to thank you for appearing before us this morning and for that awfully thoughtful presentation.
Dr White: You're very welcome, Mr Chairman.
The Chair: This committee now stands adjourned till next week.
The committee adjourned at 1131.