Legislative Assembly of Ontario

The House resumed at 8 o’clock p.m.

UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT (CONTINUED)

Mr. Chairman: On adjournment we had an amendment by Mr. Renwick, I believe, that Mr. Drea was speaking to. Has that been concluded?

Mr. J. A. Renwick (Riverdale): I don’t know whether it has been concluded. I assume that over the dinner adjournment the parliamentary assistant has had a chance to think about it and is now prepared to accept it. Would that be --

Mr. F. Drea (Scarborough Centre): The parliamentary assistant has had a great deal of time to contemplate it over the dinner hour, as he did in committee, and the parliamentary assistant is not going to accept it.

Mr. Renwick: You’re very gracious.

Mr. P. D. Lawlor (Lakeshore): Yes, the parliamentary assistant has had a great deal of time.

Mr. I. Deans (Wentworth): I wonder where the minister who deals with these things is?

Mr. Chairman: Shall the vote be stacked? Okay. The hon. member for Lakeshore.

Mr. Lawlor: You know, Frank, you did a great job in taking over midway and so on, but you didn’t move the engine forward one inch. Your minister showed a great deal more imagination and sense of what it’s all about than you are at this moment indicating.

May I say, and these are the only two points I want to make, under your definition of services and under the clause on consumer representations with services as first mentioned, by any stretch of the imagination my colleague is perfectly right. I mean if services are services, whatever they happen to be, you can’t, my argument is, impose your own subjectivist and personal definition upon what services mean.

There’s nothing showing in this legislation saying that professional services as such are ruled out. It’s quite possible, I would suggest to you, for a judge of the county court of the county of York to determine that services, in connection with the first clause provided in respect of goods or of real property, very well might mean that if a lawyer is sitting in his office advising with respect to the impact of a mortgage, first, second or fifteenth, or with respect to the handling of personal property, he is rendering a service vis-à-vis personal property. And it goes this much further, saying that -- well let me just pause there.

The professional skill involved in any element -- surveying, architecture or anything that might touch on personal property -- very well might be considered a service, unless you put in a specific clause saying that services do not encompass this area. If you exclude it explicitly and deliberately then it can be interpreted as not including the range of professional services. Personally, and this is where I disagree with my friend on the thing, I don’t think it should include all those services. I’ll come back to that in just a moment.

I don’t think it was the genius, the drive, the focal point of the legislation initially, to begin with; nor has it been in any other jurisdiction. It’s not what this bill is all about. However, I have to give credence to the brilliant imaginative genius of a renaissance type such as my friend over here, who sees the world caught up in an omnibus notion. If it were so, and I have no doubt in my mind in 10 years it will become so, the diapason, the range of this Act will cover all these services; I have no doubt at all about that.

So why not be a progenitor of one’s time; why not a bit in advance of the cause so to speak; prophetic and vain, Vatican impetus; why not?

But you, as a member of the government, always hang back a bit. You’re terrified of the future and hung up on the past, so that we wouldn’t expect you to move that quickly. I say to you not only are professional people very possibly, unless you specifically exclude them, caught within the definition of services. As I see it, there’s nothing that prevents it. They are dealing with real estate and with goods and with giving advice vis-à-vis particular problems associated therein. When you say services provided in respect of real estate property, obviously that encompasses real estate agents. Aren’t they the very ones who give plenary, immediate and necessary services with respect to real property? But you come along at a subsequent date and exclude that.

The reason we didn’t use various other wording as we went through committee, was because your erstwhile minister, the minister of the day, kept on talking about moving vans and various forms of moving services, and the definition we had before us wouldn’t have covered that. It would cover all kinds of installations of TV, and people who approved property in various ways -- it left out moving vans -- we ended up with this because of that.

With that in mind, I am suggesting to you that that clause, literally interpreted, would impart to me, or to any person sitting as a judge, that real estate people were involved in this thing, whether, my friends, you exclude them or not subsequently. You see they can’t read what goes on in this Legislature. They are excluded by law, by the law that they respect and observe, from knowing anything that goes on or anything we say here. That is ruled out.

The Act speaks for itself. Its literal wording as presented to them, in front of them on the page, is what guides them, solely and entirely, and I would think that any judge reading that would say, “Well, among the first people who would fall under designation of people providing services of real property, would be, precisely, the real estate agents.”

Mr. V. M. Singer (Downsview): Is that going to determine whether one per cent or 10 per cent is eluding the book industry?

Mr. Lawlor: That doesn’t determine that; it nevertheless leaves the full amplitude of section 2, and particularly section 2(b) on unconscionable transactions, open to the courts -- exactly the problem that he is seeking to avoid --

Mr. Singer: Don’t be so pedantic about something that is so absolutely irrelevant.

Mr. Chairman: Order, please. The member for Lakeshore has the floor.

Mr. Lawlor: Not absolutely irrelevant, only slightly irrelevant.

Mr. Singer: I accept that as a victory.

Mr. Chairman: We are still speaking on section 1 of the bill.

Mr. Lawlor: Yes, we are speaking of services, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman: Yes, on section 1 of the bill.

Mr. Lawlor: Right. With that in mind, therefore, I think that it is fatuous for members of the Legislature, in the white heat of controversy, to sit downstairs and while the bill is in the furnace seek to go altering it, amending it, without being able to envisage the full implications of what they are doing. I think that that is a fatuous type of legislation. I think we take too much upon ourselves in that particular process.

The arrogation of the legislation originally wasn’t that way. I thought we’d leave well enough alone up to that particular point. Having branched out, we must recognise the penalties, what we breed into the cause, and what we breed in are a whole host of victimizations. It is not my purpose this evening to spend several hours in colloquy, not with you -- who are a diminutive figure in my eyes, may I say -- but with my colleague here, for heaven’s sake, who is a formidable son of a pup, and with that in mind I am going to silently vacate this chamber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Singer: Not bad, not bad.

Mr. Chairman: Does the parliamentary assistant wish to reply? We have an amendment here. I don’t know whether you want to carry it or not; we will put it and see whether you do or not.

Moved by Mr. Renwick that clause 1 of section 1 be amended to read as follows:

“‘Services means services of every nature and kind, including, without limitations, services invited in respect of goods or real property.”

Shall the amendment carry?

Some hon. members: No.

Mr. Chairman: All those in favour of the amendment please say “aye.”

All those opposed please say “nay.”

In my opinion the “nays” have it.

Do you want the members called in or do you want to stack it?

Mr. Deans: We will stack it.

Mr. Renwick: I think we can stack it.

Mr. Chairman: Okay, we will move on to section 2 of the bill. Any comments on section 2?

On section 2:

Mr. Renwick: I think it deserves a brief comment since this is the section which establishes the unfair practices that are to be prohibited.

Interestingly enough, and perhaps for no other purpose than to put this on the record, section 2 simply establishes what are unfair practices. The unfair practices are false, misleading or deceptive consumer representations and unconscionable consumer representations. Those are the areas which form the substantive part of the bill, for which the balance of the bill is mainly procedure for enforcing against those kinds of unfair practices.

I don’t think that there’s any need, because those practices were dealt with at some length in the committee, for us to deal any longer on section 2 and we have no amendments to it. I believe section 2 and one or two others are about the only ones that we don’t want to amend. But section 2 is the substance of the bill and I think that we concur in it at the present time.

Mr. Chairman: Shall section 2 carry?

Mr. Drea: Mr. Chairman, for the sake of the record, I would like to point out section 2(c) to the member for Riverdale. There was some concern about the enforcement of that self-destruct regulation, and there is a provision in section 2 now that there can’t be a prosecution under that regulation until it is confirmed by the assembly, which is the reference to section 17.

Mr. Renwick: I noticed that, and I was pleased to see it.

Mr. Drea: I think it is worth mentioning for the sake of the record, because it was very important in committee to the substantive content of section 2.

Mr. Chairman: The hon. member for Lakeshore.

Mr. Lawlor: Mr. Chairman, this is a truly fantastic section in both parts, but particularly in part two. What we wrote in section 2(b), you’re perfectly right, we didn’t want unconscionable transactions in that particular section as distinguished from deceptive representations. We didn’t want to give the ministry plenary power to add to that list by regulation, because the impact of that, and what may be drawn out of “unconscionable representations,” could be very dire indeed. We heard in committee from the other party.

I’m wholly in favour of the section, but I sometimes wonder why. From the strictly legal, precise point of view, the range of these clauses, the subjectivities involved and the interpretations that may be lent to these sections can be really very horrendous indeed.

Mr. Drea: Only if you are a crook.

Mr. Lawlor: Gosh, it’s nice to have a black and white universe: on one side the devil himself and all the holy angels over here -- and you, I suppose, are on the side of the holy angels --

Mr. Drea: That’s right.

Mr. Lawlor: That ain’t necessarily so, as the song once said. The fact of the matter is that there are grey areas, an enormous amount of colour in here --

Mr. Chairman: Will the hon. member for Lakeshore stick to the principle of the bill?

Mr. Lawlor: -- when you say, under the heading of unconscionable practices, for instance, that a representative, a salesman, possibly a lawyer, or even possibly a doctor, who makes a statement to an individual patient, a client, a person to whom he intends to sell some goods or a customer, either knows or ought to have known that the consumer is not reasonably able to protect his interest because of physical infirmity, ignorance -- really! Ignorance is a pretty broad quality.

We all share in that to an extent we wouldn’t want to admit openly, in ignorance, illiteracy and inability to understand the language of an agreement or similar fact. That fact alone, just not understanding, is sufficient in itself to avoid the transaction. He can simply say: “I didn’t understand the word that you said, or I didn’t understand it sufficiently. You put it over on me, you hoodwinked me, you misled. That is the end of the road, boy. The deal is finished and out we go.”

I say it balances the cards. For too long under our free enterprise system the surveyor of goods has put it over, hoodwinked and pushed down the throat of the consumer all kinds of misrepresentations. Finally, there’s a slight reversal.

By George! did we ever hear it in front of our committee from all the representatives of industry, the boards of trades, etc., that this is iniquitous socialist legislation. They said: “You are really putting the business community on the spot. You are making it difficult. What about caveat emptor? Let the bloody buyer beware.”

Now you’re saying and we’re saying for the first time in this province at least -- it has been done many places elsewhere -- that the buyer has to beware, but not all that beware, thank you. We don’t have to be taken.

With that in mind, when you extend it out and say in clause (ii) that where a representation is made such “that the price grossly exceeds the price at which similar goods or services are readily available to like consumers,” you are playing with fire. There is a vagueness about all that. There is a vagueness that does affect the somewhat perjured soul of the ordinary lawyer in this particular regard. How in blazes is that to be interpreted? How is that to be construed?

And in the next one when you say “that the consumer is unable to receive a substantial benefit,” what do you mean by that? What do you mean by a substantial benefit in this particular regard? Or, when you come down and say “that the proposed transaction is excessively one-sided in favour of someone other than the consumer,” isn’t that glorious? We’ve entered the new Jerusalem almost. We are in the ante-chamber to the temple.

Mr. Drea: Just remember the Conservative Party took you to the new Jerusalem.

Mr. Lawlor: Too one-sided, eh? Isn’t that sweet? All right, I say that under some legislation we’ve had before us and which is on the books of this province -- the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act -- in legislation of that type, the equities prevail and a gut sense of justice, not a rationalized sense up here, where they all balance figures out. The fact of the matter -- who is getting taken in this particular situation? -- becomes predominant. That’s great and that’s what they hated in the committee and what we’re for and for which I give you, to this extent, credit.

The trouble with your wretched legislation is you don’t go far enough in this particular. During the evening, put a halo around your head, as we will be moving numerous amendments to fortify you in your stance, in your pretended accolades to consumers of this province.

I’m saying, on the other hand, that we heard almost ad nauseam from the business community about what this means in our terms as to the construction of contracts, etc. We have, I trust, sufficient faith in the tribunal that’s in existence and, if not, then in the courts themselves to construe what conscionabiity is and where good conscience resides in these transactions. A lot of it over a period of time will develop a jurisprudence, a series of precedents and a series of interpretations of this thing, which is not your wretched interpretation which you seek to impose from on high in this assembly but the interpretations rationally and slowly arrived at by the courts of the province to bring some sense into otherwise terribly amorphous sections of the Act.

That’s what we depend upon. We depend upon morality, believe it or not. It’s the most moral piece of legislation I’ve ever seen. It’s saying that people must be honest and must have goodwill. There must be a generosity in the interrelationships between human beings. It can’t be all fetched to one side. The business community can’t predominate. It can’t rule the roost, It can’t put people over a barrel every day of the week. And that’s the meaning of all this stuff.

If it works that way -- fine. And to the extent that you’ve gone -- okay. But it has been pointed out to you by consumers’ representations and others -- may I just read the last sentence of a letter which you recently received from Ruth Jackson and M. J. Trebilcock, the professor who attended throughout these hearings. This is the last paragraph of the letter:

“We do not think that Ontario should take any particular pride in the possibility that it will enact the weakest Business Practices Act in this country.”

And that is what you are in the process of doing, despite what you are trying to do. Why don’t you buckle on your armour of righteousness, so to speak, as the representative of the ministry in this regard, and go along the line during the evening with respect to the numerous amendments. How about class actions; representation for individuals who have to pay out of their own pocket the costs of court cases; substantial issues that have real meaning to the public, where somebody is taking somebody else? Why don’t you give that thought? You’ve resisted that all along the line.

These are only two things among the many that will be brought forward. There is ill will on your part. It shows a purblindedness and a stupidity and a digging in of heels which you make take pride in. I’m not sure about you yet.

Interjection by an hon. member.

Mr. Lawlor: But I’m watching -- and you know this is your baptism of fire. This will tell which side of the fence you are really on, because you have been trumpeting horns and playing mandolins to the consumer of the province as the Great White Father. All right, we’ll test you. We’ll see. We’ll see how far you are prepared to go on this one, boy.

My prediction, for what it’s worth -- and I’m Nostradamus with the green light -- you won’t take a single one of them all the way through.

In terms of the several clauses that we have before us, they can have enormous impact on the province. This is new stuff and it’s good stuff. Once in a while one gets a lift in this wretched place, full of dullness and dudgeon, various miasmas and stinking smells and various other things, etc. Very often there is not too much light comes into the total darkness. But when you read a section like that, you think there may even be hope for you fellows.

Mr. Drea: Well, Mr. Chairman, I just want to -- just so anybody isn’t led astray by that brilliant whatever it was.

Mr. W. Ferrier (Cochrane South): Nobody would ever be led astray by your brilliant talk.

Mr. Drea: It is all very well to read the various sections out of here, both under (a) and under (b). It’s all very well to do that; and I’ve heard that a number of times. I have never really understood, when it came from the member for Lakeshore, whether it was a soliloquy for lost crooks or it was a pay-in on behalf of some consumers. However, there is one thing I am sure of --

Mr. Lawlor: You think there is a contradiction?

Mr. Thea: -- in no case have you ever read both section (a) and section (b). Just so we don’t take all of these subjections wildly out of context -- this thing about ignorance and the other things that you brought up --

Mr. Lawlor: Yes?

Mr. Drea: -- they must be “part of a false, misleading or deceptive consumer representation.” I think that those words in both section (a) and again, “an unconscionable consumer transaction” in section (b), put those clauses in their proper perspective. I would have thought that certainly so astute a solicitor --

Mr. Lawlor: Do you know that the Social Credit legislation is better than yours?

Mr. Drea: What Social Credit legislation?

Mr. Lawlor: You’ve heard of that; the Alberta legislation.

Mr. Drea: If our legislation is so bad --

Mr. Lawlor: The Alberta stuff has far more guts in it than anything you’ve got here.

Mr. Drea: I see. It wasn’t Social Credit legislation in Alberta, it was Conservative legislation.

Mr. Lawlor: It has far more meaning. Whatever is good in your bill, you borrowed from the poor beggars.

Mr. Drea: Indeed, if this is the genesis of the new consumerism in Ontario, you can’t have it both ways. On the one hand, you are saying it’s the genesis and the beginning of light, and on the other hand you are saying it’s a wretched bill -- and then you read out of context. I read that letter. You read it out of context, that particular thing. You are going to read something else out of context in less than two minutes.

Mr. Lawlor: I will read the whole bloody letter, if that is what you want. It’s even worse than that.

Interjections by hon. members.

Mr. Drea: The point is that these clauses --

Mr. Chairman: Order please. Would the hon. member for Scarborough Centre --

Mr. Lawlor: He’ll never make a minister --

Mr. Drea: That’s what I am talking about. Now section 2 of this bill was --

Mr. Chairman: Order.

Mr. Lawlor: This man will never make a minister of the Crown, he is too provocative.

Mr. Chairman: This has got nothing to do with section 2 of the bill either, I say to the member for Lakeshore. Let’s play the game square.

Mr. Lawlor: Certainly it has. What game are you playing? I am serious.

Mr. Chairman: Proceed.

Mr. Drea: I really think playing the game square would probably be the last thing that would happen here.

Mr. Chairman: Order please.

Mr. Drea: I just want to remind the House that the sections that the member for Lakeshore has read, were read out of context and this is frequently the case.

Mr. M. Shulman (High Park): How can you read a section out of context?

Mr. Drea: I am talking about the sections in this Act. To understand the implications and the purposes and the realities of those sections you must read the preamble that appears in both section (a) and section (b). I think if you had done that, the thrust of this bill and what it is intended to do would have been accurately represented.

Mr. Lawlor: Oh, come off it.

Section 2 agreed to.

On section 3:

Mr. Chairman: The hon. member for Riverdale.

Mr. Renwick: I would like to know if the parliamentary assistant has an amendment to section 3. Section 3 is the prohibition saying that no person shall engage in an unfair practice. In view of his remarks earlier, presumably he would like to make an exception at the end of that, “except the member of a profession.” Is that what he would like to do? So that the clause would read, “No person shall engage in an unfair practice unless he is a member of a profession.”

Mr. Drea: That clause stands. If you want to make an amendment to that effect, I won’t accept it.

Mr. Renwick: No, but I had that feeling that you wanted to make an exception for those in the profession so that they could engage in unfair practices without being subjected to any of the provisions of this bill from the discussion we had before supper designed to ensure the protection of the consumer of those professional services.

Mr. Drea: No, I made it quite clear, Mr. Chairman, before the adjournment for supper that there were no exceptions or no exclusions. If you fitted under the definition of both the goods or the services section, which have already been passed, that you are in.

Mr. Renwick: We haven’t passed the services section. There is an amendment stacked.

Mr. Drea: I think by the time the evening or tomorrow is over, that will be passed.

Mr. Renwick: I understand. I know. I know. The mailed fist of the Tory party will come down and --

Mr. Drea: Oh, I think we will have some other support.

Mr. Renwick: I wouldn’t be surprised.

Well, that is the comment I have on section 3, that if there is any consistency in the parliamentary assistant he would want to make an amendment, rather than to leave it vaguely misunderstood by the public that the lawyers and doctors and architects, and so on, aren’t subject to the provisions of this bill.

Mr. Chairman: Does section 3 carry?

Mr. Lawlor: No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman: The member for Lakeshore.

Mr. Lawlor: I am anticipating a bit, Mr. Chairman, with respect to section 5. If section 5 were subject to this section, then a great deal of justice would be done. This is completely reworked, revamped, a new baby -- the whole section. It’s remarkable what was done in the committee -- and particularly with respect to 1(b).

They say that you can rescind a contract. I just wonder about this too, you know, from a straight legal point of view. You don’t rescind contracts. As my legal training told me, you repudiate the wretched things. If you don’t like a contract, you repudiate it. You may have valid or invalid grounds for doing so, and it’s up to the court to accept or reject your repudiation which is called rescission. It’s done by the courts.

In any event, let’s not become too technical about the language. This is the rescission, where the individual says, “You pulled a deal on me; you have got an unfair practice. However amorphous and vague it may be, the fact of the matter is you have done it to me and I am calling the whole deal off. I am not going to pay another dime, and I want my money back.” But then they are saying in (b) that there are certain circumstances in which this cannot be done.

I mean, everybody knows there are circumstances in which you have got rid of the goods, or they have been lost or you yourself don’t want to restore them; or any number of things may happen where rescission, which means putting people back in the same position they were before the thing ever started, would come into being.

Then when you say: “Where rescission is not possible because restitution is no longer possible”; in other words, you haven’t got the thing to give back or you have damaged it, you couldn’t possibly give back the same goods that you got in the first instance and so on; “or because rescission would deprive”; this is where a certain morality again enters into the legislation, which is a kind of second morality as between the vendor and the purchaser.

Other people are out there who are going to get hurt. When there’s a third party, somebody else is going to get hurt: “which would deprive a third party of a right in the subject matter of the agreement that he has acquired in good faith and for value, then the consumer is not entitled to rescind.” He can’t call the whole thing off, he simply goes for damages.

Now I can’t see why you can’t retain the realistic sections if you word the clause there differently. It excludes the one I am talking about, section 4(1)(b). Why not keep section 4(1))(b)? Protect third parties against the effect of calling off a deal arbitrarily, and retain the full range and full weight of the possibilities of this legislation.

That’s what I thought we were doing in committee; and when I came on the Friday, a week or so ago, and saw this version sitting on my desk, I said “What on earth?” It is not the parliamentary counsel’s fault. He knows what he is doing. It’s just that I misunderstood. I didn’t understand that that was the way it was, the colour of the eyes, that wasn’t the way it was. I thought that third parties were being protected in this; in the way you have set it up third parties aren’t protected. That’s the only thing.

Why should a real estate salesman, for instance, be able to make grotesque misrepresentations inducing people into contracts and so on, and then be excluded from the whole range and ambit of your legislation? He should very well be within the four corners of this bill. There is no reason in the world why he shouldn’t be, as long as you give adequate protection to those who would be victimized otherwise.

So as I understand the position; you very well may be wiping him out of the picture entirely for the faintest of reasons and without adequate justification. If you protect people on the domino theory, that’s what this clause would do. We wrote it in deliberately.

You know, it was kind of a travail to do it. I mean it was real hard work downstairs, trying to get this thing worded and trying to get it in shape. We got it into shape, and now you are, it seems to me, abdicating it; at least in one quarter.

The section as it stands, it seems to me, is valid with respect to the whole other range of transactions if third parties are going to be hurt. Most often where persons are buying a refrigerator or a stove they are not reselling the same article or even another stove in order to purchase the first one, which is not true about real estate transactions. Therefore the possibilities of third parties becoming involved, and becoming in some way injured as a result of the transaction, is very remote indeed in most transactions. Nevertheless, it is wise to write this kind of possible buffering in as a buffer against this if it does happen.

Now I suppose you had a lot of flak, a good deal of flak, with respect to the subsequent wording of this thing, as to how the damages, the monitory recompense, is to be arrived at. We heard a good deal in committee.

Are you satisfied with the distinction, the range of damages and the differentiae between the amount paid under the agreement, to the degree it exceeds the fair value of the goods or services received under the agreement or damages or both? Have you really worked at it? Do you know? Because I wasn’t, to be quite frank with you, completely satisfied in committee, since this thing was born out of clean air, that that was really workable and really sound. Are you really satisfied with this?

It is your responsibility. It is up to you to work these things over. It is not our bloody legislation, and in this particular regard I would like to be assured on that count.

Mr. Drea: Well, I would point to section 4(2). I think that answers all of your problems.

Mr. Lawlor: Have you worked out your measure of damages? There are all kinds of problems.

Mr. Drea: If you refer to the next subsection, you will see that the measure of damages is going to be determined by the courts. I think that properly is their job.

Mr. Lawlor: Yes, but you must give the criteria for doing so. You must set up the lines upon which the courts have to act. Is it clear enough for the courts to operate on?

Mr. Drea: I think it’s absolutely clear. It says: “The court may award exemplary or punitive damages.” They know what to do.

Mr. Lawlor: Well, thank God not all our judges are of the same ilk. I think you’re going to have a great deal of trouble with it.

Mr. Drea: Well, I’m certainly not going to presume to tell the judges --

Mr. Chairman: Shall section 3 carry? Carried.

On section 4, the hon. member for Riverdale.

Mr. Renwick: Mr. Chairman, my colleague and the minister were already debating section 4.

Mr. Drea: I thought we had passed it.

Mr. Chairman: Yes, they debated part of it.

Mr. Renwick: I just want to make this point about section 4 -- there should be no misunderstanding about this -- that it’s not any consumer representation that is an unfair practice that gives rise to the right of rescission or, in the absence of the right of rescission, the right to the damages set out in the section, and in certain cases with permission to the court to assess exemplary or punitive damages where the representation is unconscionable. To claim the benefit of this section, a person must not only establish that there has been a consumer representation that is an unfair practice, he must also establish that it was a representation of the kind that induced him to enter into the agreement.

I think it’s very important that it be clearly understood that there is that second aspect of the requirement of the statute before a person can call in aid the statute to assist him because of an unfair practice.

I think the second point that requires comment is that if it is of the kind of unfair practice which can be called unconscionable, we have given the consumer the potential of the court awarding exemplary or punitive damages. I know of very few cases where the court has ever taken upon itself the power to award exemplary or punitive damages, other than in the law of libel and slander.

Mr. Lawlor: Libel and slander, yes.

Mr. Renwick: I don’t know of any other case. Perhaps my friend the member for Prince Edward-Lennox (Mr. J. A. Taylor) can think of another one, but I don’t know of any others. That in itself is a fairly Draconian provision, and it’ll be interesting to see over the years the occasions on which a court might exercise that particular Draconian power.

The next part that I think deserves very significant attention is a break in one of the major rules of the law of evidence, which provides that parole evidence -- that is, verbal evidence -- or non-written evidence, apart from the written agreement, may be brought in to establish whether or not the representation has taken place. That’s included in section 4(7), and I think it’s worth quoting:

“In the trial of an issue under subsection 1, oral evidence respecting an unfair practice is admissible notwithstanding that there is a written agreement and notwithstanding that the evidence pertains to a representation of a term, condition or undertaking that is or is not provided for in the agreement.”

That, coupled with the next clause, which says, “This section applies notwithstanding any agreement or waiver to the contrary,” is a very substantial extension of the law with respect to what can be brought in evidence for the purpose of establishing an unfair practice of the kind that might have been said to induce the person to enter into the agreement and give him the right to rescind the contract or, in the absence of recission, to claim damages. For lawyers, that is indeed a very major departure from the law of evidence as applied to written contracts.

Mr. Drea: It’s good, though.

Mr. Renwick: I think the last part on which we had trouble was with the whole field of advertising, and that we endeavoured to cover in the way in which subsection 9 of section 4 is worded that says that subsection 3 -- that is, the joint and several liability of persons who are involved in making a consumer representation --

“ ... does not apply to a person who, on behalf of another person, prints, publishes, distributes, broadcasts or telecasts a representation or an advertisement that he accepts in good faith for printing, publishing, distributing, broadcasting or telecasting in the ordinary course of his business.”

I am not certain that that is adequately phrased. I think it is, for the present purpose, the best that can be done until there is some experience about it.

The question obviously arose that if a merchandising house submits an advertisement to the Globe and Mail and the Globe and Mail publishes the advertisement, and the advertisement turns out to have contained a false or misleading representation on which a consumer acted to his detriment, a question that the committee had to determine was to what extent was the medium -- in the illustration I used, the Globe and Mail -- responsible, along with the merchandising house, for any of the effects that might flow from it. We decided, I think correctly, that it was wise to eliminate that liability provided it was done in good faith.

Now I don’t know the limits of that. I think it is very difficult, if there were a grossly misleading advertisement placed -- for example, the kind of advertisements that have been placed by that chap from London, the Coalition of Citizens; that kind of gross, misleading advertisement -- whether or not a newspaper is protected when it knows very well by reading it that it is grossly misleading or deceiving, or contains false or misleading representation to induce someone to join the Coalition of Citizens for the advancement of what could be termed right-wing causes in the Province of Ontario. That’s the kind of problem that we are faced with. I think the section probably is as good as can be accomplished at the present time until we have had more experience as to how it will work out.

Mr. Chairman: The member for Lakeshore.

Mr. Lawlor: Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak on two points further on this and one is the parole evidence rule.

I think it should be clearly understood by the members of this House and the general public -- and this is anticipation again of section 5 -- when a contract is written up and it is in black and white then there is always a clause in there -- and it is a rule of court that that’s it -- that whatever is said in advance of that, or surrounding that, or after that, or in any other way, once the thing is written down, the written word with all its magic prevails. Other things are excluded, and you can’t in the court room bring in evidence that contradicts this written word. There is a rule that you can expand it a bit to explain what it means as long as it doesn’t contradict it.

But the fact of the matter is in ordinary everyday life, and as a practical matter, salesmen of all kinds tell fibs. It is not just puffing; everyone can excuse puffing; it carries beyond that particular point. When the real pivot on which the whole transaction turns is that he told him something that brought him into the transaction which nevertheless didn’t manage to get itself written down because the salesman knew damn well that if he wrote it down he would be in trouble, so he excludes it and the asininity of British law up to this point is that when you get the people on the witness stand and you are in the court room, you can’t mention that; it is out of court.

This section is a breakthrough in this particular regard. It says that whatever is said in the course of the transaction inducing a person to enter into that transaction is admissible, you can talk about it, you can explain it to the judge, it is part of the deal, it is part of the case, etc. And if it is grave enough and if it is material enough, it very well may bring an end to the whole proceedings.

That’s extremely valid. If, in the next few moments it’s your intention to exclude section 5, then out the window goes that particular parole evidence rule. The parole evidence rule is absolutely critical in this particular context, as you well know, and I want it to apply right across the board to every form of commercial transaction that it could possibly apply to.

As to the second point, on advertisers, Mr. Chairman, we had great, great difficulty with it. Not only did we put in this other clause here, saying that it “does not apply to a person who, on behalf of another person, prints, publishes, distributes, broadcasts or telecasts a representation or an advertisement which he accepts in good faith for printing . . . ” and so forth, but we went on with section 18(6) in a sense to reiterate that, to say it all over again, because we don’t quite know what to do with television advertising and with the press media reprinting things which come to them, which they have no apparatus to investigate as to their truth or falsity and yet print.

We didn’t feel it was necessary; it wasn’t quite just to pin the blame on them, because they would have to have an enormous research staff in order to test the validity of all this advertising on one side of the fence, so we swung it back to the people who make the presentation in the first place. Let them stand the weight of their own advertisements and, at the same time, let them be liable should their advertisements be wrong in this regard.

Mr. Chairman: Does section 4 carry?

The hon. member for Ottawa East.

Mr. A. J. Roy (Ottawa East): I would like to make a few comments on section 4 of the bill and pose a few questions to the parliamentary assistant.

In my opinion, section 4, from a practical point of view, is what I consider to be legislation for the consumer which has done away with a lot of the apparatus of the court and this type of thing. In other words, a summary sort of relief can be given to the consumer.

On the other hand I’m a bit concerned, Mr. Chairman, and I think this was mentioned in standing committee, about the duplicity of the effects of section 4 with section 36(1) and section 37(1) of the Combines Investigation Act. You see, you have a situation here in which, if the consumer feels he’s a victim of an unfair practice, he can rescind the contract and he can get his money back. In fact, he can receive an award from the court for exemplary and even punitive damages.

Over and above this, there’s a possibility that the individual involved in this type of practice might well be charged under the Combines Investigation Act, the federal statute. For instance, if he advertised in the same particular transaction he may well be charged under section 37(1) of the Combines Investigation Act -- a section I’m very familiar with -- which talks about advertisements containing statements which are untrue, deceptive or misleading. Under that particular section, of course, he could be guilty.

Two or three years ago that section was amended and it is now an indictable offence. It has been my experience that, more and more, the courts are getting relatively tough. They weren’t imposing sufficient sentences, when you are talking about large corporations, but some people are, in fact, going to jail and the federal Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs has suggested that he’s looking at an amendment to put corporate people in jail.

The point in this is, in our effort to sort of give the consumer a method of righting a wrong, and a summary method of doing it, I’m just wondering if there’s going to be some sort of duplication involved here, where we have an individual who may well end up losing his contract, paying the money back, suffering punitive damages in court and being charged criminally under the Combines Investigation Act. We have a principle in our law, Mr. Chairman, which states that an individual should not be punished twice for the same offence. I am concerned about that aspect of the legislation.

I’m all for the summary approach taken by this particular Act. I think it was mentioned in committee that it’s unfortunate that the whole range of protection for the consumer is going to end up with part of it under the federal government and part of it under the provincial government and there’s going to be duplication. Somewhere along the way, some individual is going to end up being punished twice.

Of course, we have a Bill of Rights in Canada which says an individual should not suffer undue or harsh treatment under our particular laws. I would like to ask the parliamentary assistant --

Mr. Drea: Do you want me to respond to that?

Mr. Roy: Yes.

Mr. Drea: That’s all very well to say, but what happens to the person who gets into an automobile accident? That person may very well face civil damages through his insurance company because of his negligence. Secondly, he may be tried under a provincial statute -- the Highway Traffic Act, for instance -- for running a stop sign or failing to remain. Thirdly, because of his blood alcohol content, or something that he did, he may very well face the full penalties of federal legislation, which is the Criminal Code.

Now, then, you run risks when you operate a motor vehicle and perform in an irresponsible manner, depending upon the conditions. I’m sure, from your own practice, you’re aware of all those conditions. You can’t go out with the driver and say: “Just because your insurance is going to pay for the accident the charges under the Highway Traffic Act, the charges under the Criminal Code should be dropped because it’s a violation of the Canadian Bill of Rights.” You don’t do it there, and I don’t see one single whit of difference here.

You can get into an automobile accident, and, as I say, there could be a civil remedy. Let’s say, following your analogy, this is the repayment of the money. You can be tried under the provincial statute, which may very well suspend your licence because of the points accumulated and you can go to jail for a criminal offence under the Criminal Code. If that’s good enough for the automobile driver and the person who is irresponsible, I really don’t see any great difficulty in applying it into the field of consumerism.

I agree with the member for Ottawa East that the courts are starting to get tough. I think the courts should have started to get tough on this sort of thing 20 years ago. I don’t think there’s one bit of difference between putting a gun into the side of a bank teller and stealing $200 from a bank, than to stand there with a smile on your face and with a white shirt and tie on fleece a widow out of $2,000. In fact, I prefer the bank robber. At least you know what he’s up to.

Mr. Ferrier: They are not great robbers if that’s all they get.

Mr. Drea: I agree with the member for Ottawa East. It’s about time the courts got tough.

I don’t think the intent of this section is to deliberately put people into double jeopardy. But if they have decided to embark on a course of going out and trying to fleece the consumer, then they might as well know now they face an awful lot of consequences. And if they still want to do it, then I say, with all due respect to the federal Solicitor General, we are going to get a new class of clientele in the penitentiary. They may have to upgrade them just to deal with the new type of prisoner who will go in -- and it’s about time they did.

Mr. Roy: Mr. Chairman, I don’t know if the analogies made by the parliamentary assistant are actually relevant to this. When we talk about motor vehicle negligence, you could not be charged with a similar offence under the Highway Traffic Act as you can under the Criminal Code. He could plead double jeopardy in those particular situations.

Mr. Renwick: But you could be charged with another offence.

Mr. Roy: You could possibly charge him with another offence.

Mr. Drea: That is why there are so many sections under one.

Mr. Roy: What I want to know -- and I did not complete my question to the parliamentary assistant. I notice that the director has a right under this legislation to take action. Is there going to be any communication with the federal level where, in the director’s opinion, misleading advertising has taken place in violation of a section -- for instance, 37(1) -- of the Combines Investigation Act? Is there any intention of referring that type of breach to the federal level?

Mr. Drea: I think the record is quite clear, Mr. Chairman. In the past, under general applications of false and misleading advertising, we have preferred that those cases be tried by the federal authorities under the auspices of the existing Combines Investigation Act. Where misleading advertising was most specific in an industry which we regulate with specific statutes administered by the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations, then we proceeded. But where they were in a general field, in an industry not specifically regulated -- and I’m talking about, for instance, in a regulated industry under our ministry, such as automobile sales -- where it was false and misleading advertising in that regulated industry, we would proceed. If it was in the general sphere that wasn’t specifically regulated, the federal people have dealt with it to this date through the Combines Investigation Act.

I don’t really see that this section is going to change any of the administrative practices. I think that that system has worked out very well. In both cases there have been a number of convictions, but far more important than that is the fact the number of complaints concerning false or misleading advertising in both areas has been dropping. People are much more aware of the consequences of getting into this kind of game.

I agree with you that if there was going to be duplication all the time, with a writ going here and a writ going there from a different authority, and virtually a flipping of a coin as to who was going to proceed, then I think that would be a problem. But I give you the record of the past where I think the system has worked out very very well.

Mr. Roy: Mr. Chairman, I would just briefly comment that I’m all for protection of the consumer and I say it is high time that we got legislation here. You talk about things going on for 20 years and nothing being done and I just ask you, who has been in power in the province for the last 20 years? Why has something not been done prior to this time? This is something that we have talked about for quite some time.

Mr. Drea: Don’t start that bunk now.

Mr. Roy: I am saying very simply to you that in your haste and your enthusiasm for the protection of the consumer, which we agree with, let’s not forget the rights of all individuals in this society, whether it is the vendor or anyone else. I just express this concern that in the haste of several levels of government to get involved in this field, you will have individuals who will be facing, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, different penalties at different levels. I think that is something that we should keep in mind. I would trust that the courts would treat it accordingly. I don’t think any individual in this society should be placed in a position where we are offending one of the basic principles of our justice in this province and in this country, the fact that an individual should not be punished twice for the same offence.

Mr. Chairman: Shall section 4 carry?

Section 4 agreed to.

Mr. Chairman: Section 5.

On section 5:

Mr. Singer: On section 5, has the parliamentary assistant got an amendment? I’d be very happy to hear an amendment.

Mr. Drea: I may send you home early. Mr. Chairman, there have been some references made already in anticipation of section 5, particularly by my friend from Lakeshore.

Mr. Renwick: What they couldn’t do in open committee, they did behind the closed doors of the ministry.

Mr. Drea: Are you suggesting the real estate industry got to me? If that is what you are suggesting, say it.

Mr. Renwick: I just said it. I said what they couldn’t do in open committee --

Mr. Drea: Well, I will tell you something. You put forward a proposal in that committee regarding this section that was so nonsensical that your friend from Lakeshore even turned his back on you and you couldn’t even get a vote in there. You are the last person to criticize any single subsection of section 5 as it stands now or as it is going to stand in a couple of minutes.

Mr. Chairman: Order, please.

Mr. Renwick: Do you want me to repeat what I said?

Mr. Drea: Yes, go ahead.

Mr. Renwick: What the real estate industry couldn’t --

Mr. Chairman: Order. Order.

Mr. Renwick: -- get in open committee, they got behind closed doors in the ministry.

Mr. Drea: That’s bunk and you know it.

Mr. Chairman: Order. Do you want to proceed.

Mr. Ferrier: We are waiting with bated breath.

Mr. L. C. Henderson (Lambton): Take it easy now.

Mr. Drea: Mr. Chairman, it is quite true that section 5, as it now stands in the Act, is the result of the feelings of the majority of the people who were in the standing committee at the time Bill 55 was being discussed. Mr. Chairman, it is a fair representation of the feeling then by the committee members regarding --

Mr. Singer: Who were there.

Mr. Renwick: That’s the committee you know, those who are there constitute the committee.

Mr. Drea: I didn’t say that, fight with him, the member for Downsview.

Mr. Renwick: Sure you did.

Mr. Drea: No, I didn’t say that.

Mr. Renwick: You did; who were there at the time, you said that.

Mr. Drea: I said the committee members who were there at that time.

Mr. Renwick: That’s right, that was the committee.

Mr. Drea: That’s right. All right the committee, it was the feeling of the committee.

Mr. Singer: At that time.

Mr. Drea: At that time, that’s right. Now did I get the comma in correctly for you? It was the feeling of the committee --

Mr. Henderson: It still is.

Mr. Drea: Yes; it still is the feeling of the committee that really --

Mr. Renwick: You weren’t on the committee. How would you know what the committee felt?

Mr. Drea: -- an Act that was going to serve as the basis for a general code of business standards, really had to attempt to come to grips with the service and the agency relationship in something as significant to the consumer as a real estate transaction.

Mr. Chairman, the difficulty with that is that Bill 55 as it stood originally, and Bill 55 as it will stand, quite clearly deals with selling practices. It does not deal with particular products nor does it deal with industries.

Mr. Ferrier: Mr. Chairman, could you get some progress in this House?

Mr. Drea: Its original purpose --

Mr. Chairman: Would the hon. member for Scarborough Centre, if he has an amendment, present the amendment to the Chair and then we can discuss it?

Mr. Drea: If I could just say a few more words, Mr. Chairman, you will get the amendment.

Mr. Renwick: He wants to keep the suspense up.

Mr. Chairman: If you are going to amend the section --

An hon. member: If you are going to present an amendment, do so and then let’s discuss it.

Mr. Drea: All right, Mr. Chairman, I am going --

Mr. Renwick: This is high drama.

Mr. Drea: All right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Drea moves that section 5 be deleted in its entirety.

Mr. Singer: I don’t know why everyone is so --

Interjections by hon. members.

Some hon. members: Carried?

Mr. Renwick: Well, well, well! Did you get a letter from anybody, or did they come and see you?

I just got a baleful look.

Mr. M. C. Germa (Sudbury): Don’t tease the bear.

Interjections by hon. members.

Mr. Renwick: The consumer certainly is getting the double shuffle here.

Mr. Shulman: Double shaft!

Mr. Renwick: Yes, the double shaft; called bait and switch.

Mr. Drea: You know, you open your mouth one more time and I am going to tell everybody the ludicrous proposal you made down there that nobody would even vote for.

Mr. Chairman: Order, order.

Mr. Renwick: Are you going to cross the floor?

Mr. Chairman: Mr. Drea moves we delete section 5 as it is now in its entirety.

All those in favour of the motion please say “aye.”

All those opposed please say “nay.”

In my opinion the “ayes” have it; the amending motion is carried.

Mr. Singer: That is even without Lawlor.

On section 6:

Mr. Renwick: Yes, section 6; but if I could just put a little addendum in here, you know, I’d just like to repeat, rather by way of interjection but actually on the record, that of course the vested interest got to the ministry. It’s just that clear.

Mr. Singer: All the members except one tonight.

Mr. Renwick: That’s right.

Mr. Singer: Insulting us all, eh?

Mr. Renwick: That’s right. You know, it’s a very interesting thing --

Mr. Chairman: Order. We have dealt with section 5.

Mr. Renwick: If you buy an automobile -- Interjections by hon. members.

Mr. Chairman: The hon. member for Riverdale is out of order and he knows he is out of order. We are dealing with section 6 at the present time.

Interjections by hon. members.

Mr. Renwick: On section 6.

Mr. Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Renwick: Well, as I was saying, on section 6 --

Mr. Chairman: Any particular subsection?

Mr. Renwick: -- I wanted to propose two amendments. One of them is quite lengthy and it will be necessary for me to read it into the record. The other one is quite short, but it is essential, Mr. Chairman, that under section 6, where the director is permitted to do certain things, that he be able in certain cases to take an action on behalf of a consumer in order that the consumer will not be subjected to the expenses that would be involved in taking a meritorious case to the court. It’s known colloquially -- and there was substantial discussion of it in the committee -- as the substituted action.

Mr. Renwick moves that section 6 be amended by designating the present section 6 as subsection 1 and adding thereto the following subsections:

“(2) Subject to this section, the director may, where it is in the public interest to do so,

“(a) commence and maintain an action under section 4 where a consumer has a cause of action under that section; or

“(b) maintain an action under section 4 after it has been commenced; or

“(c) bring and maintain an appeal in art action under section 4.

“(3) Where pursuant to subsection 2 the director brings or maintains an action or an appeal under section 4, he shall do so in the name of and on behalf of that consumer and he shall be entitled to take the same steps in and have the same control over the action or appeal including the right to settle the action or appeal or any part thereof as that consumer would have had in respect of that action or appeal.

“(4) The director shall not bring or maintain an action or an appeal under this section without first obtaining the written consent of the consumer in whose name the action is brought.

“(5) Upon the consumer giving written notice under subsection 4, the director may, without consulting or seeking any further consent of the consumer, conduct the action or appeal in such a manner as the director considers appropriate and proper.

“(6) In any action or appeal commenced, brought, or maintained by the director pursuant to subsection 2,

“(a) any moneys recovered, excluding costs of the action or appeal, shall be paid to the consumer where reasonable and practicable,

“(b) any moneys payable by the consumer, excluding costs of the action or appeal, are not recoverable from the director or the government of Ontario,

“(c) the costs of the action or appeal shall be paid to or borne by the director.

“(7) Nothing in this section abrogates or restricts any right of set-off that a person has or may have against a consumer on whose behalf the director is acting under this section.

“(8) Where the director, while acting on behalf of a consumer under this section, releases a supplier from a liability or an obligation arising out of the cause of action, that release shall extinguish that claim to that liability or obligation referred to in that release which that consumer may have against that person.

“(9) Where money is paid to the director in an action referred to in subsection 2 and

“(a) it is not reasonable or practical to pay the money to the consumer; or

“(b) the consumer to whom the money is payable cannot be located, the director may apply to the court for directions respecting the payment of the money and, upon complying with the directions of the court, pay any remaining balance into the consolidated revenue fund.”

Mr. Renwick: Mr. Chairman, unfortunately I only have one copy of it. No, I have two. I take it that it would not be necessary to --

Mr. Chairman: It’s quite a long amendment and I imagine the parliamentary assistant would like the amendment to look over.

Mr. Renwick: I think I can give him one.

Mr. Drea: No, Mr. Chairman. I have listened to it. I understand the thrust of the hon. member for Riverdale’s amendment and I don’t think I need to look at it. We’re not going to accept that.

Mr. Renwick: The reason and the purpose for the amendment is that there are obviously situations in which a consumer would be subjected to a substantial burden in taking a meritorious case or a test case to the court. The purpose of this amendment is to provide that, with proper safeguards and spelling out the procedures to be followed in achieving those safeguards, the director can take the action in place of and in lieu of the consumer.

It is not unique. It is a procedure which is available under the British Columbia legislation, and is probably available under the code in the United States, although of that I am not certain. But the substituted action has very real merit if the director is, in place of the consumer in a test case situation or in a meritorious case, able to bring the action in the place of the consumer. I would submit that the amendment should be carried.

I have another amendment to this same section.

Mr. Chairman: Do you want to place it?

Mr. Lawlor: I would like to speak on this particular one first, because it’s lengthy and difficult. It’s called a representative type of action. It introduces the director into the midst of the marketplace and makes him play a dynamic and central role, the kind of role which I thought, listening to the parliamentary assistant at Osgoode Hall and other places, he would be most anxious that his director occupy. I suspect at the end of the day he’ll bow his head, albeit in somewhat stern approval of the legislation as it stands.

I would like to refer in this regard to the Consumers’ Association of Canada brief to the committee of the Legislature:

“We are strongly of the opinion that Bill 55 should include a provision similar to section 24 of the British Columbia Trade Practices Act, permitting the director to sue on behalf of the consumer where the public interest would be served by this. Such a provision would add considerable muscle to the department’s general mediation functions in consumer complaints and would provide an avenue for getting test cases on important issues of principle before the courts. Such a provision has existed in south Australian consumer legislation for two years now, and reports indicate that while it has been used sparingly, its presence has proved an invaluable lever in mediation activities.”

That’s the basic thrust of the thing. It’s lengthy, I admit, but it’s simple in concept and in prospect and I would seek to prevail very much upon the minister, if he wants to give efficacy to the legislation, and why shouldn’t he? He knows better than most members of this House, with long experience, that for most people, however good the legislation might be on the books of the province, one way or another the taking of action in courts is an inhibitory sanction whether you win or lose in a case, because you end up paying your lawyer regardless; you have two sets of costs and you’re out of pocket at the end of the day, no matter what you want to do.

Second, most people simply will not venture into the arena of the courts on the hazard that’s involved in those proceedings. Third, there is the straight convenience of the thing, taking a day off work, maybe two days, particularly if it’s a small claims court situation -- although I would think that most of the cases the director would take would either be at the county court level or the Supreme Court level, because these are important cases. They are, so to speak, test cases to test what the law is in the application of the courts in this branch of industry, which has a wide aspect to it and which is affecting a lot of people in the province.

Why should the private citizen bear the burden for the common weal? There is the weird notion that we are all aristocrats with endless amounts of money to be expended upon the various court functions and to put into the pockets of lawyers. That is simply outdated; not a 20th century concept any more. The role of government is at least that. It has a kind of paternalistic function in this particular regard. Consumer legislation would be impossible if that weren’t the central conception of it.

So I am asking the minister and the parliamentary assistant to move in this particular regard, adopt this particular amendment. It is in all the other legislation. Why on earth isn’t it in yours?

I think the only reason we have to argue about the matter at all tonight is because your minister took sick at the time. It wasn’t his fault. He was amenable, as I understand it; and I suspect that you very well might be amenable too. I really wait on tenterhooks on what you have to say on this one.

Mr. Chairman: The member for Ottawa Centre.

Mr. Roy: Mr. Chairman, if I might make a few comments on -- Ottawa East.

Mr. Chairman: Ottawa East, I am sorry.

Mr. Roy: Damn it all, Ottawa East. It is the centre of Ottawa, but it is Ottawa East.

Mr. Chairman: The Chairman apologizes.

Mr. Roy: Mr. Chairman, I am surprised at the response given by the parliamentary assistant to the amendment proposed by the member for Riverdale. You rejected the amendment out of hand, and yet you were up on your feet not more than 10 minutes ago arguing vigorously that you were serious about giving the consumer protection under this legislation. In fact you were prepared to go as far as to trample on some of the rights of the vendor or other people in the marketplace, in other words, in order to give the consumer full protection when I was expressing some concern about double jeopardy.

Mr. Drea: That is not what I said, get the story straight.

Mr. Roy: Yet, when an amendment is offered like this amendment, which exists in the BC legislation and various states of the US in their consumer legislation, it is rejected out of hand.

I am surprised, because, as the member for Lakeshore mentioned, one of the main reasons people will not go to court is because of the expense involved. We know that a percentage of small claims are not processed because often it costs more money to submit the claim than you are going to get back.

You could have a situation as well where you could have a whole ream of consumers, for instance, a sort of class action. It would be an ideal situation in which the director, on behalf of all these consumers, could take this action and process it through.

I would be very much surprised, for instance, if a consumer got into a situation where he wanted to sue and went down to legal aid. We may well expect some amendments to legal aid regulations, for instance, a class action, because there were briefs presented to legal aid and we don’t have the report yet. But I would be very much surprised if you went to legal aid and you could, in fact, get legal aid to get you to support your claim.

In the light of this situation where you say you want to do everything possible for the consumer, I can’t really understand why you would not accept an amendment as valid as this one.

What can possibly be wrong with giving power to the director to institute an action on behalf of the consumer, or to substitute on behalf of the consumer in one of these actions?

It exists in other legislation in this province. As you know, under the Crown Attorneys Act, the Crown attorney can take over the prosecution of a private prosecution if he wants to. He has that jurisdiction. It is not precedent-setting, even in this very conservative jurisdiction.

So I would suggest to you that this reasonable amendment will not cause panic, let’s say in the financial community or in the business community, and would really be something that would give evidence of this government and this Legislature’s intent of protecting the consumer. Because no matter how good your legislation is, if the financial impediments or other aspects of it make it difficult for the consumer -- whether he’s got to take time off or whether he’s going to go in the hole paying a lawyer to go to court to see his claim through -- this would be a situation which would help the consumer in fact.

I really can’t understand your attitude towards this amendment.

Mr. Chairman: The member for Downsview.

Mr. Singer: Mr. Chairman, I find no difficulty whatsoever in supporting the amendment moved by the member for Riverdale. For far too long we’ve enshrined in our system of law the so-called majesty of the adversary system.

The adversary system is fine, presuming the people who go before the courts are equal and have resort to equal opportunity for representation, equal opportunity for talent that can represent them, equal opportunity for familiarity with the laws that affect them. But as we move into the type of statute that we can call An Act to Prohibit Unfair Practices in Sales to Consumers, surely we have to begin to look at a somewhat different concept.

We think it’s good that the government moves away from the idea of caveat emptor -- “only the rich shall prevail; only the strong shall win”. As the government moves away from that, as we change our concepts of law, then we have to provide the mechanics, the tools and the ability to call to account the people who might have committed the kinds of sins that we’re legislating against. And, since we’re going to have a director who is a public official, then we should give him the responsibility of initiating action and calling to account those people who are apparently committing the sins that the Legislature has seen fit to delineate. As I understand it, and I’ve just read it again, that is the thrust of the amendment moved by the hon. member for Riverdale.

My colleague from Ottawa East said that he is surprised at the parliamentary assistant’s opposing it. I haven’t heard the parliamentary assistant speak on this amendment. I would hope when he does speak that he will be able to accept the kind of thinking that we’re applying to it. He shakes his head “no.” Well, if he can’t, then I feel very sorry that he isn’t able to bring the government along to this kind of concept. It’s the sort of thing that we’ve been moving to.

It’s the sort of thing we’ve been moving to in our fair employment practices; we’ve been moving to in our anti-discrimination legislation -- some of us have been trying to move to it in our concepts of what the public trustee should be doing. I’ve been trying to move to it in what my concept is of what an ombudsman might be doing. This is the kind of thinking that I think Legislatures have to do.

At the time when we’re considering an Act such as this one, Bill 55, an Act to protect the public against unfair practices in sales to consumers, then we have to cloak the public official who is setting it up -- the registrar, the man in charge -- with the power to go out by himself in appropriate cases, and to take the necessary action at the expense of the public, the expense of all of us, to make sure that these things are looked after.

Therefore, as I say, Mr. Chairman, I have no hesitancy whatsoever in supporting this amendment moved by the hon. member for Riverdale.

Mr. Chairman: Does the hon. parliamentary assistant wish to comment?

Mr. Drea: Yes, Mr. Chairman. First of all I would like to disabuse the hon. member for Ottawa East of his remarks that I’ve rejected this out of hand. Had you ever condescended to appear in the standing committee it would have been very apparent to you that the member for Riverdale and the member for Lakeshore have, in one form or another, advanced this proposed amendment throughout those committee hearings. It has been discussed over and over again. And I think it would have been most unfair not to indicate to the member for Riverdale that there had been no change in government thinking. So I wasn’t rejecting it out of hand without reading it or anything else. This went on many an evening and many an afternoon in the committee session in public. And I know full well the intent of that amendment. I would also like to point out, Mr. Chairman, that there is a kind of suggestion here that the director without this amendment is going to be left relatively impotent. First of all I would draw the members’ attention to section 7 where he can order an unfair practice to cease.

Mr. Lawlor: That is not the same thing.

Mr. Drea: He can order that. When the order is not complied with, he can prosecute. That takes care of one aspect of it. What the particular aspect of this amendment would have the director empowered to do is to start, I think the words that are used are “representative actions,” on behalf of perhaps one but with implications for many. I much prefer the more honest statement that some of the people made, or the more honest description, a class action under another name.

Mr. Renwick: It is not really a class action.

Mr. Lawlor: It is not a class action.

Mr. Renwick: This is a substituted action. Couldn’t you be accurate?

Mr. Drea: Mr. Chairman, philosophically, I am not really opposed to the principles that the member for Downsview advanced.

Mr. Lawlor: Don’t become a philosopher. You will get lost.

Mr. Drea: However, I seriously question it in this bill. This is a very specific regulatory bill. It deals with specific, unfair practices which are defined in such a way that they cover the broadest spectrum possible, unconscionable transactions as specific and anticipatory as anybody could make, but nonetheless in the whole ambit even finally giving the right to have an unfair practice, although within substantial limitations, particularly in regard to prosecutions. Therefore, I rather resent the implications that we trample on people’s rights.

Mr. Roy: You are certainly going to, if you reject the amendment.

Mr. Drea: Look, if you ever came to the committee you wouldn’t be bothering us tonight. I’m speaking in reply to the member for Downsview.

Mr. Roy: I can make representation wherever I want.

Mr. Chairman: Debate the amendment.

Mr. Drea: It would be nice if you came. I see you so seldom it’s really a thrill.

Mr. Roy: The less I see of you, the better.

Mr. Chairman: Debate the amendment.

Mr. Drea: If I was a Liberal I’d say that too.

Mr. Chairman: Order, please.

Mr. Drea: There is a section in there in which an unfair practice, even in anticipation of something that is slowly coming, before it can even be defined by legislative statute, can be done by regulation. That is the so-called self-destruct clause, by which unless that unfair practice or whatever it is is not confirmed by the Legislature by statute at its next sitting, it therefore does destruct. I say it can with some limitations, because it has been agreed there will be no prosecutions until that specific section is confirmed by statutes. I think that, philosophically looking at it from the other side, the member for Downsview would agree with that.

Mr. Lawlor: Are you trying to say in your roundabout way that you are not prepared to accept the amendment?

Mr. Drea: I have listened to you all night.

Mr. Lawlor: Is that what you are seeking to get to?

Mr. Drea: I listened to one speech of yours and I didn’t know whether you were here or whether you were outside. Just for once, you are going to have to listen to me.

Mr. Chairman: Order, please.

Mr. Lawlor: Why don’t you have the bloody honesty to get to it? If you reject it, reject it and sit down. Then we will know where you stand.

Mr. Chairman: Order, please, let’s return to debate the amendment.

Mr. Lawlor: That’s what I said to you earlier. It’s all palaver. You haven’t even kissed the blarney stone. How do you get away with it?

Mr. Chairman: Order, please.

Mr. Drea: I can assure the member for Lakeshore, much to his discomfort, I have kissed the blarney stone.

An hon. member: You must have kissed Patrick.

Mr. Drea: No, I draw the line at that one.

Mr. Lawlor: You do.

Hon. A. Grossman (Provincial Secretary for Resources Development): I must have walked into the wrong place.

Mr. Chairman: Order, please. Shall we return to debating the amendment?

Mr. J. E. Stokes (Thunder Bay): He wasn’t hanging from his heels, though.

Mr. Drea: This is declaratory legislation. The whole thrust of this is that unfair practices will and can be stopped. There are specific remedies for consumers in a great many areas -- the right of rescission. We’ve already agreed, by the fact it was almost unanimous, that section 5 be deleted, that the act of rescission in itself is net a total thing that goes all the way across the board. It is my concern that the director, since he already has the powers to order the practitioner of an unfair practice to cease and desist and, if the person does not, to have the prosecution, the very fact of ordering a practitioner to cease and desist an unfair practice is a declaration that an unfair practice has been going on.

Mr. Lawlor: That does nothing for the already injured consumer.

Mr. Drea: It enables them to go to the courts --

Mr. Lawlor: Come off it.

Mr. Drea: -- with a very straightforward proposition. If it didn’t enable them to go to the courts with that straightforward proposition, I would really be inclined --

Mr. Lawlor: Good.

Mr. Drea: -- even within the strict confines of this bill, to support, perhaps not the wording but certainly the general intent of the member for Riverdale. But I think in view of the fact that by virtue of the fact that he can declare a thing to be an unfair practice and order a practitioner to cease and desist --

Mr. Lawlor: How does that help the poor consumer who has been bilked?

Mr. Drea: -- and there are specific remedies spelled out for the consumer --

Interjection by an hon. member.

Mr. Drea: -- which can come about in two ways; first, there can be a voluntary compliance, and I think that would be all to the better, but second, if there is not a voluntary --

Mr. Roy: You don’t understand your own legislation.

Mr. Drea: I understand my own legislation.

An hon. member: I’ll explain it to you.

Mr. Germa: You don’t understand it yourself; you really don’t.

Mr. Drea: Well, once again, that party is divided.

Mr. Chairman: Will the hon. parliamentary assistant continue?

Mr. Drea: By virtue of the fact that there is a very specific remedy for the consumer that will be applied by the courts and, indeed, even when the service is consumed -- and a great many of these educational, instructional, recreational, social, what have you, are going to be consumed -- there are specific references to the courts -- I really feel at this time that the consumer --

Mr. Singer: Yes, but only at the behest of an individual consumer and at his expense.

Mr. Drea: Pardon?

Mr. Singer: Only at the behest of an individual consumer and at his expense.

Mr. Drea: The behest of the consumer, yes, if he is involved at all in an unfair business practice --

Interjection by an hon. member.

Mr. Drea: -- but surely when he has a declaration from the government and there is not a voluntary compliance, which means that the rescission in itself is not the remedy, there has to be a turnback of funds --

Mr. Renwick: Of course it is. Of course it is.

Mr. Drea: -- all right, well that’s not voluntary -- there is an almost instant movement into the courts. It is not going to be a long, involved, terribly expensive case for the solicitor.

Mr. Lawlor: Of course it is.

Mr. Renwick: Of course it is.

Mr. Drea: He’s not going to have to do all kinds of extensive research. The thing is almost decided before it goes to court.

Interjection by an hon. member.

Mr. Drea: Yes, it is the matter of the case.

Mr. Lawlor: It’s a black day when Peter Lougheed has a lot brighter view as to what it is about than you do.

Mr. Drea: I’m not so sure that Peter Lougheed, if he took a look at our bill, would feel that he would prefer ours.

Mr. Lawlor: Look at it.

Mr. Drea: -- would require all the things that he has in his own.

Mr. Lawlor: Take a look at his bill.

Mr. Chairman: Order, please. Let’s debate the amendment.

Mr. Roy: You are not comparing yourself to Peter Lougheed, are you?

Mr. Singer: Let’s not stack this.

Mr. Drea: Do you want to vote on it? Fine.

Mr. Lawlor: Let’s not stack it.

Mr. Drea: I suggest to you that the ministry is not prepared to accept this amendment. I say, in particular response to the member for Lakeshore, I have discussed not only this proposed amendment but a number of others with the minister of that day, and the minister of that day assures me that he wouldn’t act any differently than I am acting now.

Mr. Lawlor: Today his mind is on other things.

Mr. Drea: I have consulted with the minister of this day, who has been fully informed --

Mr. Lawlor: -- my blue-eyed friend, absorb a bit of knowledge around you.

Mr. Drea: -- and I am informed by him that he wouldn’t act any differently than I am acting now.

Mr. Lawlor: We expected you to reject all the other points, but we didn’t think you would throw this out. We thought you would go for this.

Mr. Drea: So let’s just put that down. There was no change in government policy despite the illness of the former minister.

Mr. Lawlor: We thought you bad enough; you haven’t. You are just dreadful.

Mr. Chairman: The hon. member for Riverdale.

Mr. Renwick: Mr. Chairman, I want to make one point for the record, and make it very clear; the parliamentary assistant again was rewriting history. It is very clear that this particular amendment found very strong sympathy with the former minister, now the Attorney General (Mr. Clement). In the hearings of that committee he was empathetic toward the arguments which were put forward on behalf of the Consumers’ Association of Canada about this amendment. I have the feeling that, had he not taken ill, this amendment would quite likely have been accepted. But from the moment the parliamentary assistant moved in on this bill it has become rigid, closed-minded and restricted; more restricted than it would otherwise have been. We were making very substantial progress on this particular issue.

The minister doesn’t understand that when you move from the criminal field to the consumer field, you must provide a broad range of remedies through the administrative procedures, through administrative law and through the civil court suit. One of the ways that you ensure justice in meritorious cases is to provide a power in the director to select those typical cases which require to be tested in the court and which no individual plaintiff is able to maintain in a court because of the time, the cost and the work involved in it.

The argument need not be repeated. The member for Downsview indicated that it was about time we divided on one of these matters of principle. This is a matter of principle, and I would suggest that we call the vote on the amendment and divide.

Mr. Drea: Just before you do, Mr. Chairman, I just want to reiterate this about the former minister’s empathy and sympathy. I have discussed this with him on several occasions after his recovery from his illness. I specifically directed to him that there have been certain statements made that he was sympathetic, on the verge, teetering on the brink or ready to go ahead with an amendment or a clause similar if not identical in intent to this.

Mr. Chairman, I want to tell the House that I am told by the minister of that day, who is the present Attorney General, that while he found some of the concepts interesting, at no time then or now would he be prepared to accept such an amendment. I say that to specifically clear the record.

Mr. Lawlor: That’s great news for those who are most concerned.

Mr. Renwick: That’s great news for the consumer. Another defeat for the consumer.

Mr. Chairman: The member for Ottawa East.

Mr. Roy: I just want to make one comment in support of the amendment to bring to the parliamentary assistant’s attention that even in the criminal field, the Law Reform Commission is suggesting that you get away from the punitive measures -- jail, fines and orders. To them, the most helpful deterrent is that when an individual has been wronged, you make restitution to him. It’s all very well to send someone off to jail, to have an order against him to have him in contempt of court or something else, but if the fellow is out $200, $300 or $400, it’s not helping him very much. This is where this type of an amendment would be important.

You would be following the trend of modern law today in trying to say that when a consumer has been wronged and if he faces another wrong and doesn’t have the finances to carry on his own action, a director can act on his behalf. You would be following the trend. You wouldn’t be setting a precedent. I can’t see why you can’t accept this amendment.

Mr. Chairman: All those in favour of the amendment as proposed by Mr. Renwick will please say “aye.”

All those opposed will please say “nay.”

In my opinion the “nays” have it.

Shall this vote be stacked?

Some hon. members: No.

Mr. Chairman: Then we shall deal with all the stacked amendments to this point.

The first amendment was moved by Mr. Renwick that clause (f) of section 1 of Bill 55 be amended by deleting the words “chattels personal” in the first line and substituting therefor the words “tangible personal property,” and by deleting the word “chattels” in the third line and substituting therefor the words “tangible personal property.”

The committee divided on Mr. Renwick’s amendment, which was negatived on the following vote:

Clerk of the House: Mr. Chairman, the “ayes” are 10, the “nays” are 53.

Mr. Chairman: I declare the amendment lost and section 1 (f), carried.

In the second amendment, Mr. Renwick moves that clause (i) of section 1 be amended to read as follows:

“Services means services of every nature and kind, including without limitation services provided in respect of goods or of real property.”

Mr. J. R. Breithaupt (Kitchener): Take the same vote.

Mr. Chairman: Is it the wish of the House that we take the same count? Agreed.

The committee divided on Mr. Renwick’s amendment to section 1(i), which was negatived on the same vote.

Mr. Chairman: I declare the amendment lost and the subsection carried.

Section 1 agreed to.

Mr. Chairman: The last amendment we are dealing with at the present time was moved by Mr. Renwick. It is quite a lengthy one. Shall we take it as previously read?

The committee divided on Mr. Renwick’s amendment to section 6, which was negatived on the following vote:

Clerk of the House: Mr. Chairman, the “ayes” are 21, the “nays” are 42.

Mr. Chairman: I declare the amendment lost and section 6 carried.

Section 6 agreed to.

Mr. Chairman: Are there any other comments, questions or amendments to any other section of the bill? The hon. member for Riverdale, which section?

Mr. Renwick: Section 7.

Mr. Chairman: Let the hon. member proceed.

Mr. Lawlor: Don’t go too far. There will be another vote.

Mr. Renwick: I did have a further amendment to section 6, but that has gone now. Is that right? I will have to put it into section 7. I will put it into section 7. I have three amendments for section 7. I think I had better put each of them in so that I am certain to get the vote.

Mr. Chairman: Order, please. The Chair is having difficulty hearing the hon. member.

Mr. Renwick: The first amendment could be succinctly called a corrective advertising order.

Mr. Renwick moves that section 7 be amended by adding thereto subsection 8 as follows:

“Where the director or tribunal makes an order under this section or where the court grants relief under section 4, the director, tribunal or court, as the case may be, may make a further order requiring the person to advertise to the public particulars of any order, judgement or other relief granted, and any order made under this subsection may prescribe:

“(a) the methods of making the advertisement so that it will ensure prompt and reasonable communications to consumers;

“(b) the content, form or both of the advertisement;

“(c) the number of times the advertisement is to be made; and

“(d) such other conditions as are considered proper.”

Mr. Renwick: The second amendment to section 7 could be referred to as an ad substantiation power.

Mr. Renwick moves that section 7 be amended by adding thereto subsection 9 as follows:

“Where a person makes or has made a consumer representation, the director may order that person to provide him material possessed by that person at the time the consumer representation is or was made, substantiating or purporting to substantiate the truth or accuracy of that consumer representation and may order disclosure of the substantiating material.”

Mr. Renwick moves that section 7 be further amended by adding thereto the following subsection 10 as follows:

“Where a consumer believes on reasonable and probable grounds, that any person is engaging or has engaged in an unfair practice and the director refuses to make an order under subsection 1, the consumer may serve notice on the director requiring a hearing by the tribunal of the refusal of the director, whereupon the tribunal shall appoint a time for and hold the hearing and may, by order, uphold the refusal of the director or direct the director to make the order provided for in subsection 1.”

Mr. Lawlor: You have to accept that one. That’s sheer equity.

Mr. Ferrier: That is as clear as the clearest water.

Mr. Chairman: The member for Riverdale has moved three amendments to section 7. I assume that we should deal with them in the order they were placed.

Is there any further discussion on amendment No. 1?

Mr. Drea: Mr. Chairman, in light of the considerable discussion in the standing committee, the proposed amendment is totally unacceptable to the ministry. I would point out to the House that it is redundant. It is already covered by subsection 6. Indeed, this would be a limitation of section 7(6) in view of the fact that subsection 6 reads: “The tribunal may attach such terms and conditions to its orders as it considers proper to give effect to the purposes of this Act.” That is all-inclusive and broad. The impact of this proposed amendment would be to severely limit what is already in subsection 6.

Mr. Renwick: That’s ridiculous.

Mr. Drea: It is absolutely accurate.

Mr. Chairman: All those in favour --

Mr. Lawlor: No. Mr. Chairman --

Mr. Chairman: The hon. member for Lakeshore.

Mr. Lawlor: The parliamentary assistant can’t get away with that type of persiflage and harassment, or whatever the devil it is that he’s trying to pull off here tonight.

Mr. Drea: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order --

Mr. Lawlor: You haven’t got a point of order. Sit down!

Mr. Drea: On a point of order --

Mr. Lawlor: Sit down, blandishment.

Mr. Drea: Mr. Chairman, in the course of this debate tonight --

Mr. Lawlor: Don’t play games with this House!

Mr. Ferrier: No more persiflage.

Mr. Drea: No, I’ve got a point of order.

Mr. Stokes: Nothing is out of order.

Mr. Chairman: Order.

Mr. Drea: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order --

Mr. Lawlor: Mr. Chairman, he seeks to cut somebody off in mid-flight --

Mr. Drea: I am not cutting anybody off, Mr. Chairman. I have a point of order and I would like to speak to it.

Mr. Chairman, during the course of this debate tonight I have been called several adjectives and a number of nouns. I have been called a beggar, my ancestry in Ireland has been substantially questioned -- and, Mr. Chairman, I am hardly a person who has a thin skin.

Mr. Stokes: You are mortally wounded.

Mr. Roy: That is not a point of order.

Mr. Drea: And I would respectfully suggest to the Chair that if the member for Lakeshore is going to continue on with these antics that he raise the level of the debate back to the particular sections of Bill 55 that he has some cause to dispute.

Mr. Chairman: The Chair does not contend that that is a point of order. The hon. member for Lakeshore will continue.

Mr. Lawlor: That is an objective, considered judgment, if I may say so. Talk about thin skinned! The other word for it is known as paranoia.

Mr. Chairman: Order, please. I wonder if the member for Lakeshore would confine his arguments and debate to the amendment?

Mr. Lawlor: No, the member for Lakeshore won’t -- I’ll be damned.

Mr. Chairman: Order.

Mr. Lawlor: Listen, you dunce.

Mr. Chairman: Order, please. I would ask the hon. member to withdraw that comment.

Mr. Lawlor: Last week --

Mr. Chairman: I would ask the hon. member to withdraw the comment.

Mr. Lawlor: Last week at a very private low-brow meeting on the island of Mozambique, which is just off the coast of West Africa, they had had this particular recommendation about advertising, supplying the particulars and making them correct in public print, their misrepresentations which induced all the buying, etc. This has been a long accepted and perfectly cognizable feature of the culture of Mozambique. Now why in blazes in Ontario -- the people are still living largely in the stone age. People like him have reached the brazen -- they are in the brass. They haven’t reached the age of iron.

Interjections by hon. members.

Mr. Lawlor: Really! We thought that this at least would be acceptable.

Hon. Mr. Grossman: Mr. Chairman, how about getting that in English? Only two languages are allowed here; French and English.

Mr. Lawlor: Are you so intransigent, so purblind, so iron-heeled, so woebegone --

Mr. Breithaupt: So torn.

Mr. Lawlor: Torn? Son of a puppet. If you could tear him you might move him. No, no -- there is no torn.

Mr. Chairman: Order, please. The Chair finds the hon. member’s comments most interesting; but let’s return to the principle of the debate.

Mr. J. F. Foulds (Port Arthur): You have no sense of style.

Mr. Lawlor: Mr. Chairman, the attempt is not to be interesting, but only to get some decent legislation on these books. I mean, I am dead serious. The only time I joke is when I’m dead serious. This is the end of the road. You, as the apostle, carrying your damned little cross up and down Bay St. in front of the court house. I have listened to you for three years now. You have represented to the lawyers and to every assembly I have attended, to the board over here at the University of Toronto --

Mr. C. E. McIlveen (Oshawa): You are off the section.

Mr. H. C. Parrot (Oxford): Two minutes warning.

Mr. Lawlor: The Province of Ontario, you said, was culpably negligent and totally abstentious with respect to consumer legislation. And what do you do? As soon as you get an iota of power --

Mr. Drea: I will tell you what I do. I have had about enough of you.

Mr. Lawlor: What do you do? You sell out. You don’t do a damn thing when you are asked to attend upon it. Here is your opportunity; do something!

Mr. Drea: Don’t you ever use those words about me.

Mr. Chairman: Order.

Mr. Lawlor: Make a tiny tinpot hero of yourself, do something. But what do you do?

Mr. Drea: I have just about had enough of you. If there is one thing I am, it is consistent. The bill is entirely consistent with government policy.

Mr. Chairman: Order, please.

Mr. Lawlor: I had some hope for you.

Mr. Chairman: Order, please I would say the Chair has had enough too. Let us continue in an orderly fashion.

Interjections by hon. members.

Hon. Mr. Grossman moves that the committee rise and report.

Motion agreed to.

The House resumed, Mr. Speaker in the chair.

Mr. Chairman: Mr. Speaker, the committee of the whole House begs to report one bill with certain amendments and progress on a second bill and asks for leave to sit again.

Report agreed to.

Mr. A. J. Roy (Ottawa East): It didn’t get much progress.

Mr. J. R. Breithaupt (Kitchener): Mr. Speaker, can we be advised if we are intended to continue with this bill tomorrow morning?

Mr. F. Drea (Scarborough Centre): The reply comes tomorrow morning.

Mr. Roy: Reply.

Mr. I. Deans (Wentworth): We can hardly wait. Wow!

Hon. E. A. Winkler (Chairman, Management Board of Cabinet): This bill will be continuing tomorrow until its conclusion, and then we will proceed to order No. 3.

Hon. Mr. Winkler moves the adjournment of the House.

Motion agreed to.

The House adjourned at 10:30 o’clock, p.m.