Committee Transcript 1997-Mar-18 | Legislative Assembly of Ontario

Consideration of Bill 105, An Act to renew the partnership between the province, municipalities and the police and to enhance community safety / Projet de loi 105, Loi visant à renouveler le partenariat entre la province, les municipalités et la police et visant à accroître la sécurité de la collectivité.

OMBUDSMAN OF ONTARIO

The Chair (Mr Gerry Martiniuk): This is a meeting of the standing committee on administration of justice and its consideration of Bill 105, An Act to renew the partnership between the province, municipalities and the police and to enhance community safety.

Our first presenter is the Ombudsman of Ontario, Ms Roberta Jamieson. Welcome, Ms Jamieson. I'd ask you to proceed.

Ms Roberta Jamieson: Good morning, bonjour, sago, in my language. Nice to see you all here this morning. I am very pleased to be able to participate in the hearings. As Ombudsman for the province of Ontario, I was very pleased to have a chance to present my concerns about Bill 105 to this committee.

The bill, as you know, explicitly excludes the Ombudsman from reviewing complaints about the manner in which investigations of police conduct are handled. In the context of other provisions of the bill, this gives me cause for concern.

As Ombudsman, as you know, I deal with a broad range of complaints from individual members of the public who believe that they have been treated unfairly in the administration of public services. As such, I have a responsibility to speak out when there is any threat to the continuing existence of the public's right of recourse to effective complaint procedures.

As you may know, I have recently commented on the need to preserve this right of complaint when public services are restructured. The effect of Bill 105 on independent civilian oversight of the police is one of several government initiatives where I believe there is cause for very serious concern.

What do I mean by an effective complaint procedure? At a minimum, I think there are three essential elements.

First, every organization that provides public services should have an internal complaints process that is designed to deal with problems as they arise.

Second, for complaints not resolved at the initial stage, individuals should have the right to have the complaint dealt with by an independent and impartial person or body that is equipped with the appropriate investigative powers.

Third, clear, accurate and accessible information about the complaint process should be publicized.

Bill 105 does not meet these minimal standards, because it proposes to eliminate the existing independent and impartial process of last resort. If the final resort for complaints is not genuinely independent and is not seen by the public to be independent, then people will not trust the complaint process and they would have good reason to question its integrity.

It should not go without saying that policing is not just a public service like all the rest. Police have extraordinary powers. We entrust them with the responsibility of exercising authority on behalf of the state. We give the police a lot of power and authority, and we have to, or they can't do their job. But there is an inherent potential for error as well as abuse of power, and therefore the system of policing must be accountable. That surely is a fundamental reality of our democracy.

Living in a relatively peaceful and democratic country as we do, we may take for granted that the police are held accountable to civilian authority. In many other countries in the world, such assumptions are not valid. In many places, there continues to be a struggle to establish mechanisms that build public trust and enforce police accountability, and these two have gone hand in hand. Many of these jurisdictions have looked to Ontario as a reference point for their own efforts. Despite certain limitations that we may ourselves identify in the existing system we have, time and again we have been recognized internationally as a model to be emulated.

Unfortunately, Bill 105 as currently drafted represents a step backward; one that cannot be supported if we are to uphold basic standards of accountability through structures the people of Ontario can trust. Let me be more specific.

Bill 105 continues the Ombudsman exclusion from the public complaints provision of the Police Services Act, and extends this exclusion to discipline matters raised by police officers, while at the same time significantly weakening the effectiveness of the independent complaints process. Without going through the bill in detail, there are two critical areas that I do want to comment on.

First, in my view, the most significant deficiency of the bill is that the OCCPS, the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, will have no power to conduct an independent civilian investigation but is essentially limited to reviewing investigations conducted by the police. Under the current system, the police complaints commission, the PCC, has the power to conduct its own investigation when, for example, there are questions about the adequacy or impartiality of a police investigation into any complaint. In such cases, the PCC investigator may make a search of police stations and may obtain documents if that's necessary. Under the proposed bill, the OCCPS may only direct another police force to conduct an investigation, with the result that ultimately it will always be police who are investigating police. I do not believe we can expect the public to have confidence in such a process.

The other important flaw in Bill 105 is that the OCCPS will not be provided with the necessary flow of information to ensure effective oversight. For example, under the current system the police chief must send the police complaints commission notice of all complaints that he or she has decided to dismiss as frivolous or vexatious or made in bad faith. Under Bill 105, this will not happen. OCCPS will not be advised unless someone complains about the treatment of their complaint. Furthermore, at present the PCC must be sent copies of interim and final investigative reports by police of complaints. With the changes, the OCCPS won't receive this information unless a complainant specifically refers the matter to them. This will make it extremely difficult for OCCPS to identify systemic problems in the complaints process and to recommend appropriate measures to strengthen procedures.

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In conclusion, it seems to me self-evident that, over time, we have established in this province a system of complaint procedures as a means of ensuring public confidence in the police. I think most people would agree that while this system may not be perfect, it does have at least the right elements. But if we now move to a process that does not include an impartial last resort with independent powers of investigation, there is no reason for the public to trust the outcome of investigations. In such circumstances, it would also be very difficult for the police to be seen to be cleared of suspicion when their actions are investigated and found to be justified. This is a very clear value of an independent review. It inspires confidence when it finds that public officials behaved fairly.

In my view, if Bill 105 proceeds as drafted, it will not be long before there is a lack of public confidence in the policing system, and without public support the system will break down and need to be fixed again. I would urge the committee to get it right in the first place.

I'd be very pleased to answer any questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms Jamieson. We have two minutes per caucus, and we'll start with the opposition, Mr Ramsay.

Mr David Ramsay (Timiskaming): Welcome, Roberta. Nice to see you here. I'm very pleased that you've been able to take the time to make your presentation before the justice committee of the Ontario Legislature.

I think you've got a good handle on what the problem is with this bill. What I found interesting on the first day is that I guess you could say both sides of this issue are not happy with this legislation. It deals with some of the very first elements you talked about on your first page, that is, about originally how the complaints are dealt with.

The police are very concerned about the lack of transparency of how the chief will handle the complaint initially and are very upset that the chief has been given this new power to discipline at this initial stage without some sort of, as you go on, independent and impartial person really starting to look at this. People or community groups that represent complainants are very concerned about this too.

Do you have any sense of how an initial complaint could be dealt with internally by the police? How would you anticipate we would start with an independent and impartial person looking at it in the next stage? Do you have any ideas on how we could redraft this?

Ms Jamieson: I think the key point, Mr Ramsay, is that I didn't come with my own blueprint to offer this morning, except to say that it is important that internal mechanism be there so that the people involved initially have an opportunity to solve the problem, but if it doesn't happen, people must have recourse to an independent and neutral body. That body needs to be equipped with powers: powers to obtain documents; powers to initiate investigations; powers to make their report, I would suggest, public if it's not taken seriously.

When we created the office of the police complaints commissioner in this province, it was a dramatic step forward. If anything, movement should be going to enhance that independence. In some parts of the world, there's a police Ombudsman who is responsible to the Legislature, and that may commend itself to your review. But I think this bill goes in the opposite direction by making the complaint ultimately to be reviewed by a body that answers to a minister. It essentially will be seen by people to be part of government.

I think the independence, the appointments process, who they're answerable to and equipping it with appropriate powers are all elements that I would commend to the committee's attention.

Mr Peter Kormos (Welland-Thorold): Thank you, Ms Jamieson. Your views appear to be very much in line with those of the International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, which wrote to the Premier on March 13 indicating that the Ontario complaints oversight model was one which other jurisdictions look to for leadership, and now it very much appears to be being abandoned, the civilian oversight aspect of it.

There's been concern raised in a Toronto Sun editorial on March 10 and by others who appeared, obviously, yesterday, and both police officers and social justice advocates and other advocates have raised concerns about the failure of this bill to address subsection 113(9), which is the duty of a police officer to cooperate, and that's arisen of course primarily in SIU investigations.

Some police officers have -- and we received information about that yesterday -- inevitably after receiving advice of counsel, cooperated by way of submitting to interviews by the SIU; others have similarly declined to. There appears to be concern about the lack of clarification about the duty to cooperate. Do you think that's an important consideration?

Ms Jamieson: In answer to the member's question, I can only say I've not turned my mind specifically to that issue but would say that there's an important provision in the Ombudsman Act that obliges public servants to cooperate, and if they don't cooperate, it's an offence. The penalty is not great, but it is an offence, and it's a very important feature of the act. You can't do your job as an independent investigator if people won't cooperate with you. If people aren't obliged to cooperate with you, they then have the choice not to, and it really would make for a very frustrated and out-of-balance investigations process. I think it's key.

Mr Gary Carr (Oakville South): Thank you very much, Roberta. It's good to see you again.

Ms Jamieson: Good morning.

Mr Carr: I've been around here a long time, and now you seem like a regular when you come through here. We always enjoy your presentations.

On page 2, you talk about the power of OCCPS. As you know, the power that OCCPS has comes through section 23 of the Police Services Act, and it's very detailed on what their powers are. On page 2, you talk about them not having enough powers. Were you able to review section 23, which outlines specifically the powers the commission has? It seems to me we aren't changing that. Is some of the criticism you have relating to that section and the power they have? If so, how do you see it changing to give them the power they need? There are many who believe that section 23 has enough power. Would you like to comment on that?

Ms Jamieson: One of the main areas of concern for me in the powers area has to do with the fact that at the moment the system allows the PCC to raise a complaint themselves. Under the bill, as I understand it, the OCCPS will not be able to complain or raise a complaint. Under the bill, they do not have express investigatory powers. Those are some of the key areas. Also under the bill, they won't have the information coming to them that will allow them to get a sense of systemic issues, which is another area.

As the Ombudsman, one thing I find I'm increasingly spending time on is looking at systemic problems or problems throughout the system. Unless you're getting reports on a regular basis throughout the province, you don't know if a problem is isolated, if there's a general improvement one could put forward that everyone could benefit from; that's missing. If one had that information and the ability to initiate an investigation, that's a very valuable aspect of a complaints process and would benefit the policing services agencies tremendously.

We're always looking for systemic reviews; we're looking for systemic efficiencies; we're looking for ways of streamlining procedures. That's a key way of accomplishing it. Those are the areas that trouble me greatly.

The Chair: Our time is up, Ms Jamieson. Thank you very much for attending and helping us with our deliberations here today.

Ms Jamieson: Thank you very much. I wish you well in your deliberations.

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519 CHURCH STREET COMMUNITY CENTRE

The Chair: Our next presentation is 519 Church Street Community Centre, Alison Kemper. Welcome, Ms Kemper.

Ms Alison Kemper: Good morning. How are you?

The Chair: Very well. We have 15 minutes allotted for you, including questions, so let's proceed.

Ms Kemper: I'll be brief. I am here today to speak to Bill 105 and its impact on the communities we serve.

First, some background: The 519 is three blocks east of here, at Church and Wellesley. We provide a meeting place and services for the neighbourhood around us. We have a summer camp for kids, a family resource centre, seniors' programs and programs for developmentally disabled adults.

Our neighbourhood is predominantly gay in its businesses, culture and residents. The most significant program we provide to the gay community is the victim assistance program. In 1990, we started to take calls from persons who had been attacked solely on the basis of their perceived sexual orientation. Since then we have provided assistance, referral and advocacy to victims of hate-motivated crime and same-sex partner abuse. We have also worked extensively with police in our division and across Metro to improve police awareness and service in these areas.

In 1996, we received reports on 129 hate-motivated assaults on 159 victims and 24 reports of partner abuse. This reflects an increase of 142% over 1995. For many reasons, it is far higher than the number of reports logged at the Metro police hate crimes unit.

We have worked hard with police to help them understand the victims, and we have worked hard with victims to help them report to the police. In 1994, we received a grant from the Solicitor General to work on this issue in particular. We believe that we have achieved a great deal in this regard. However, in spite of all of the work we have done and that which 52 division has done, we still get reports of police mistreatment, police attack and police insensitivity.

Because of these successes and failures, we are deeply committed to civilian oversight of the police. We have experienced good relations with the police when we have gained some measure of accountability from them.

Only with an effective, independent, autonomous civilian oversight agency can police-community relations achieve their potential. Without it, police might too easily forget that they are here to protect the public and preserve the laws of the people.

Civilian oversight allows the interests of the police and the policed to converge as a normal part of the management and quality assurance process. Deferring this process or moving it upstairs to the parliamentary process creates a kind of brinkmanship, solving the problem after it's much too late. One need only to look at the embarrassed and discredited line of defence ministers in Ottawa to see what happens when civilian oversight emerges long after the fact in a public enquiry.

As well, the immediate consequences to the taxpayers and public are often disastrous. To illustrate this, let me take you through the process when a person has experienced a hate-motivated attack on the basis of their perceived sexual orientation. This is known popularly as "queer-bashing."

Typically, one or two men are walking down Wellesley Street in the evening when a group of young men in a car drive up, shout vicious slurs, jump out of the car and assault the pedestrians. It is an unprovoked attack. If they are lucky, they are unhurt. Even if hurt, they may not seek treatment because they fear this will make public their sexual orientation. If they seek help from the police, they may not get a prompt response. When the response comes, it may be accompanied by verbal harassment or even, in the worst case, subsequent physical assault.

The community all know the stories. They know it was not too long ago that gay men and lesbians were routinely carted off to Cherry Beach, beaten and left. They know that calling the police meant revictimization. They will not be willing to call the police chief's office to expose themselves to further victimization and degradation. They are scared.

If there are bad apples in the police barrel, the public and the police's own management need to know this. It is in all of our interest to make the report of these victims come forward.

I think this is a question of how we manage policing. How can we as the people and their elected officials get those reports in order to do quality control? I think you're going to hear a lot of folks saying, as I will say this morning, by offering an arm's-length process. If it is not the police but a different agency, the victims in our story won't be so afraid.

Another way to get the reports that you as the elected officials and we as the people need is by making the complaints process not only fair but transparent. No one will be able to complain that the police are covering up if everyone can see. The community can trust the process. Under Bill 105, if he was that kind of guy, a police chief might be able to bury complaints internally, allowing issues to surface far too late.

Another way is by ensuring that the civilian oversight body reflects the range and diversity of the people of this province. The police and the community must see that they see each other as similar, not alien. If historical differences in demographics between the police and the rest of the community recur on the oversight body, we will be back in the same place. Oversight must be done by people who are like their neighbours.

Finally, on behalf of the folks we work with at the 519, I urge you to allow third parties to come forward. We are often in the position of knowing a problem about the police that the person who has experienced the problem is in no position to make known. People are very afraid of being outed. They are very afraid of being further revictimized in their families, among their friends, in their workplaces and in the press. Some degree of third-party assistance and victim anonymity must be preserved.

All of these suggestions are ways that I, as a manager with some degree of complaint responsibility in my agency -- this isn't in the text, but I'll say that I often call myself the complaints department at my agency. In some way, you are ultimately the complaints department and have some responsibility for the management of the police forces in Ontario.

I don't think this bill will enhance our collective ability to manage policing in Ontario, to turn it into the most positive experience we could all have. You have the legal responsibility to do so. You need to enhance your mechanisms for management, not erode them. I urge you to withdraw Bill 105.

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Mr Kormos: Ms Kemper, on the third-party complaint status -- I think that's very important -- we heard yesterday from some presenters who didn't want third parties involved. We heard from one person from a municipal committee in North York that dealt with racism, among other things, who felt that third parties should be restricted to an advocate; in other words, if I'm your lawyer or I'm your preacher or I'm your doctor. But I trust you're speaking of third party in that if I witness something I believe to be inappropriate, regardless of whether or not the victim of that behaviour is inclined to report it, you're suggesting I should be able to report it, notwithstanding that I was standing across the road and didn't know either of them. Is that your interpretation of third party or is it more restricted?

Ms Kemper: I would think that if we here, with the exception of me, are the management committee of the province, you want to know what's working and what's not working before it blows up on the front page of the Star, is that not right?

Mr Kormos: Or the Sun.

Ms Kemper: Or the Sun. It seems to me that one of the ways you get the quality assurance you need is to invite people to come forward and let you know and to make it as safe as possible for third-party complaints to come forward. They can be dismissed as specious at a later date, but if you tell people they can't even let you know what's going on with your uniformed civil servants, you're not going to get the quality control you need.

Mr David Tilson (Dufferin-Peel): Section 56 states with respect to complaints by the public, "Any member of the public may make a complaint under this part about the policies of or services provided by a police force or about the conduct of a police officer." Are you telling me that section isn't adequate?

Ms Kemper: I think it is worth having third-party complaints about any event, whether or not that's services in general or a particular attack on someone.

Mr Tilson: In my view that's what that section says.

Ms Kemper: There seems to be some debate about that.

Mr Tilson: Can you tell me why that section doesn't mean what I think it does? I say it means that any member of the public, to use the words, may make a complaint about anything.

Ms Kemper: It will be a complaint only to the police chief at that point, not to OCCPS.

Mr Tilson: It goes to the chief of police, and ultimately if that isn't satisfied it can go to the police services board.

Ms Kemper: You caught me here, as I have not --

Mr Tilson: I'm just reading the section. I suppose I have one other question, Mr Chair, if I have --

The Chair: You don't really have time, Mr Tilson.

Mr Ramsay: Just a couple of things here: Before I ask you a question, I'd like to ask the ministry if they could give us their rationale why they don't want to allow third-party complaints any more, what the problem has been and why that's being restricted in this, so we could maybe get that later.

I want to get back to Mr Kormos's question, because I think it's pretty important, about third-party complaints, especially because of the sensitivity of the community you work with. Are you saying you would want it wide open so that if I saw what I perceived as a gay-bashing incident on Wellesley Street I could call the police without the permission of the alleged victims and make that complaint, especially with the sensitivity in this situation that you've alluded to in your presentation, or are you talking about a third-party complaint that you in the community centre, with the permission of the alleged victim, would make on the victim's behalf? Is that what you mean or how open would you want this?

Ms Kemper: I think it's a question of who needs policing. We all need policing, we all need good policing. If I have seen something and I have never been in contact with the victim, I might still feel it was in my interest and in the interest of the province or of my fellow citizens in the province to let people know something had happened, whether or not that was a pothole or a police attack. So on one level we're asking citizens to be responsible for their own services by allowing them to make a report; on another level we are also looking for the ability of advocates to bring forward particular issues of particular victims.

The Chair: Ms Kemper, thank you very much for attending.

Mr Kormos: On a point of order, Chair: Subsection 57(1) says, "A complaint may be made by a member of the public only if the complainant was directly affected by the policy, service or conduct that is the subject of the complaint." Perhaps Mr Tilson should read the whole bill.

Mr Tilson: I am reading the whole bill. Do you want to get into a debate about --

The Chair: No, we're not getting into a debate. That's not a proper point of order, as Mr Kormos realizes.

Mr Kormos: Thank you, Chair.

Mr Tilson: I'll debate it --

The Chair: We're going to debate it through clause-by-clause. That's exactly what clause-by-clause is.

ONTARIO ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE

The Chair: We move on to the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police. Welcome, gentlemen. I must declare a conflict as Chairman. I happen to have a great affinity for the Waterloo police department, as I served on the police services board in the olden days, so to speak. I also have a great affinity, with justification, for our Chief Gravill, who is an excellent chief of our force. With that introduction, you know where I stand.

Mr Trevor McCagherty: Good morning, Mr Chairman. My name is Trevor McCagherty and I'm the chief of police for the regional municipality of Durham and currently the president of our association.

On my right is the gentleman you introduced, Chief Larry Gravill from the Waterloo Regional Police Association, who is the first vice-president of our association, and Chief Kevin McApline is the past president of the OACP. In the audience with us this morning is the executive director of the association, Mr Malpass from Sault Ste Marie, and Chief Bruce Richards from Ingersoll, Ontario.

Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission we believe will be helpful to the committee, at least we hope so.

First, a little about our association. Police chiefs in Ontario had an active role in the Chief Constables' Association of Canada following its inception in 1905. By 1951 Ontario's police chiefs, identifying a need to establish themselves as a recognized police interest group on a provincial level, founded the Chief Constables' Association of Ontario. The association opened its membership to senior officers and police managers, thus changing the name to the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police in 1965.

The association currently has 600 members. They are sworn and civilian police leaders from municipal police services, first nations policing, the Ontario Provincial Police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and private police. Associate members are those who are persons qualified in police or other law enforcement activities or have professional attainments in police science or administration.

The diversity of our membership provides us with a wide variety of viewpoints and we have gone to considerable effort to ensure that our representations to the committee reflect members' views. The OACP strives to strengthen the professionalism and leadership skills of our members, emphasizing a proactive approach to policing and accountability to our communities. Our association played an active role in the police summit process and the post-summit process alongside the other stakeholders who participated.

Ontario's police leaders face significant challenges in maintaining and contributing to the improvement of the quality of life in our communities. Thus the cornerstone of our representation to you is not how proposals affect us as individuals; rather, how the proposals affect the quality of life of our citizens and the members of our services.

It is important to understand that our association takes very seriously its responsibility to play a positive role in managing change. The changes proposed in this legislation are perhaps the most significant changes in recent history. We have a myriad of issues we would like to discuss; however, in recognition of our time limit we will only be mentioning a few. I have submitted a list of technical and substantive changes we are urging the government to consider. It should not be concluded that by not mentioning them today we deem them unimportant.

The issues we will comment on are:

The importance of adequacy as a measurement instrument for the provision of policing services.

The costing process, and more specifically the frequency with which a municipality may seek a costing for alternative police service.

Municipal agreements to share police services, particularly the need to amend or delete section 7(2) which we see as restrictive to the community in selecting a method of receiving policing services.

The development of the revised code of conduct.

The special investigations unit, particularly the establishment of a workable protocol between the unit and the police.

Finally, the Ontario Police College and our concern about the college's ability to meet the training needs of our communities' police services.

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There is unanimity among us that the most important standard to be developed is that which deals with the definition of adequacy. The definition of adequacy is the linchpin of many issues. To be candid, within the constituencies of our association it means many things to many people. To the leaders of large police services, it may be seen as the mechanism by which political interference is minimized. The leaders of medium-sized police services are concerned about emphasis on specialized services and equipment. The leaders of smaller police services fear it is the means by which they will be eliminated. We are prepared to play a significant role in helping to determine the definition of adequacy. Clearly, the final result will have to be achievable, credible and enforceable.

The process of considering alternatives for policing service has been referred to as the costing process. This process, as referred to in the legislation, has no limitation on the frequency with which a municipality may seek a costing. We urge you to consider placing a time restriction on this frequency. This restriction would diminish the opportunity for municipalities to use the costing process as a battering ram in both budget and collective bargaining situations. It would also eliminate annual uncertainty in policing services and the abuse of scarce government resources to respond to requests.

Municipal agreements to share police services may well be the way some municipalities take. There is some confusion in interpreting this section. We suggest that the limitation in subsection 7(2) which prohibits one municipality from providing full police service to another municipality should be removed.

The development of the code of conduct: Conduct and ethics in policing are an important issue. This committee will hear the communities' concerns and need for assurance that the exemplary conduct of our police officers continues. We believe in full and unconditional accountability to our community. The need to develop a realistic and contemporary code of conduct is vital to the integrity of policing. Police chiefs play a pivotal role in the administration of the code of conduct and want to be involved in its development.

The streamlining of the discipline and complaint processes is a step forward. We are mindful of the public's need for assurance that proper action is taken on complaints, and our officers' concern that they be dealt with fairly. In our submission to the police summit we emphasized that the power of the police to fulfil their function and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public trust.

With respect to the special investigations unit, we restate our position that we need a workable protocol and hope that progress can be achieved by building on the work done in the past. We believe for any new protocol to be successful, a foundation needs to be laid in the act.

Continued confusion exists as to the definition of "serious injuries," the responsibility of a subject police officer to provide a statement to unit investigators, and the role of the director in commencing criminal prosecutions. These are serious concerns which require reconciliation.

The Police Services Act requires the government to operate the Ontario Police College. The college provides recruit training. We are constantly reminded of the fiscal situation; however, we take this opportunity to remind you that the current intake for recruit constables cannot meet the needs of our communities. If funding is not available, alternative delivery methods for recruit training will be required.

The bill does not deal with a number of issues related to auxiliary policing, part-time police personnel, and prisoner transportation. We hope they will be addressed in the future.

The proposals to give the municipality the balance of power on police services boards is a disappointment to our members. We recognize the politics involved, and while we are grateful that boards remain, we are concerned that this decision will lead to greater political interference in the day-to-day operation of police services. Historically, Canadians have enjoyed the knowledge that the power given to their peace officers is used impartially, without bias and without political interference.

We have provided the committee members with copies of our submission and also our submission to the summit.

The changes brought about by this legislation create new duties and responsibilities for police leaders and police personnel. Transition training will be required and we urge the government to provide the training at the earliest opportunity. There is a serious concern about crime within the community. Each of you must hear this concern from your constituents and your local police leaders. The Police Services Act must be a catalyst to success in preserving life and property in our community. We ask you to consider our recommendations favourably.

The Chair: Thank you, Chief. Mr Tilson, we only have one minute per caucus.

Mr Tilson: A number of delegations have come to us and talked about the independence of the investigation of complaints, that chiefs of police in particular are not -- I don't want to use the word "competent," but certainly not independent enough to make investigations. Do you agree with those allegations or those comments?

Mr McCagherty: In response, may I say that we take very seriously our responsibility to the community and we take very seriously our responsibility to the citizen who complains. I believe you're correct. There are times when it may be said that we're not trusted by individuals, but we work very, very hard to ensure that complaints are dealt with promptly and fairly to the citizen and to the officer.

Mr Tilson: It's not a new concept, of course. The medical profession and the legal profession investigate their own and are very hard on their own, particularly the discipline committee of the law society. I tell you, if you cross those people, you're in big trouble, and I would suspect that if you cross the chief of police you're in big trouble.

Mr McCagherty: That can be said.

Mr Bruce Crozier (Essex South): Good morning. I was looking through the recommendations you referred to, and since you didn't cover this point, I wanted the opportunity for you to do that. There is a proposed amendment that: "Any member of the public may make a complaint under this part" -- that's subsection 56(1) of the act -- "about the policies of or services provided by a police force or about the conduct of a police officer while in the performance or purported performance of his or her duties." Does that mean that someone who is an off-duty police officer working with the police chief's permission at another venue would not be able to be complained against?

Mr McCagherty: We believe that a complaint about the police officer should be with respect to their performance as a police officer.

Mr Crozier: During on-duty hours?

Mr McCagherty: The distinction being that if it's a personal issue, if it's a neighbour dispute, if it's a domestic dispute, if it's a civil matter, a complainant could not use the fact that the person is a police officer to invoke another investigative mechanism as a remedy. If it does involve their conduct as a police officer, then that's the position we would take, that it should be investigated, but if it's an event that anyone else in the walk of life could have, we take the position that they ought not to be subject to a separate investigation.

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Mr Crozier: Would an example of that be -- I'm trying to recall -- I think it was an OPP officer who was dismissed because of a domestic matter, wife battering, I think.

Mr McCagherty: I'm sorry. I'm not familiar with the case to which you refer.

Mr Crozier: I just wondered whether that would be an example, but I guess it would be, if it's a domestic matter. You're saying it couldn't affect his employment as a police officer.

The Chair: Thank you. We have to move on now. Mr Christopherson?

Mr David Christopherson (Hamilton Centre): Hi, Chiefs. It's good to see you all again. There's only one minute, so I don't have time to comment on a lot of the issues you raised, but I want to ask you to expand on what I consider to be an extremely powerful statement and one that should make an awful lot of Ontarians stand up and take note. When you're talking about the new makeup of the police services board, you make the statement, "we are concerned that this decision will lead to greater political interference in the day-to-day operation of police services."

That is a very dramatic thing to say. I agree with it, which is why we never supported the concept of shifting the balance of power away. Could you expand a little on why and how this could show itself in communities across Ontario?

Mr McCagherty: First, as I said, we recognize the way things are, but we are hopeful, with the balance of power resting with the municipality, that the priority of the police services board remains a commitment to public xsafety and not establishing priorities according to municipal budget priorities; that we continue to have police services that are rigorously involved in protecting the community and not preoccupied with addressing fiscal issues.

Mr Christopherson: Is it fair to say, though, that that's a real concern in some communities, where that shift in power may indeed have policing be lower on the priority list than it otherwise would be under the current system?

Mr McCagherty: Our concern is there, but we're hopeful that doesn't happen.

The Chair: Chiefs, thank you very much for assisting us in our deliberations.

SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT

The Chair: Members of the committee, as I mentioned, you've had an opportunity to review the subcommittee report now in regard to Bill 84, and I would ask for a motion adopting the subcommittee report dated Monday, March 17, 1997.

Mr Gary L. Leadston (Kitchener-Wilmot): So moved.

The Chair: Is there any discussion regarding this?

Mr Kormos: Yes, Chair. I spoke with you informally about this yesterday. Bill 84, as you know, has significance across the province. There is some travel, but because of time constraints, among other things, not as much travel across the province as many would prefer. I'm requesting that the Toronto hearing dates of April 7 and April 8 be conducted here in room 151 so that people can access them via legislative broadcast. I appreciate that you told me that wasn't within your domain, that it is a matter for House leaders, but I'm asking the committee's recommendation, and I'll be moving an amendment to the subcommittee report to that effect so that the Chair would be empowered to request that of the three House leaders.

The Chair: Move your amendment.

Mr Kormos: I just did, an amendment to that effect, to wit: that the April 7 and April 8 hearings be held in room 151.

The Chair: A motion has been made to amend the subcommittee report of Monday, March 17. It does not say that you're authorizing me to request this of the leaders. You do it as an affirmative motion, and I don't believe this committee has the power to do that. All we can do is request it. If you would amend it, I think it would be more proper, but that's up to you.

Mr Kormos: Clearly, the Chair indicated to me yesterday that the Chair didn't have the power to unilaterally determine that.

The Chair: I understand that's up to the House leaders, yes.

Mr Kormos: I'm requesting that the committee indicate that as a desire, and that's the effect of the amendment.

Mr Carr: Mr Chair, what was your point again? I missed it. I apologize.

The Chair: We're not in charge of the scheduling of rooms.

Mr Carr: So you want to amend it to --

The Chair: I didn't want to do anything, no. Mr Kormos has moved an amendment to the subcommittee report in which this committee requests of the House leaders that they consider having the two meetings, April 7 and 8, scheduled for this room.

Mr Carr: I have no problem with that.

The Chair: Is there any further discussion with regard to the amendment? If not, all those in favour? The amendment carries.

We now have a motion of Mr Leadston for the committee report to be adopted, as amended. All those in favour? Carried.

OLIVIA CHOW

The Chair: We can then move on to the next matter of business: Olivia Chow. Ms Chow is a Metro councillor. I take it you are here on your council's behalf.

Ms Olivia Chow: Metro council has not discussed this matter yet. The Metro police services board, however, has discussed it, and I believe they're coming to you with some recommendations, but I'll leave that for the chair of the police services board, Maureen Prinsloo, to talk about that. I'll speak as an individual Metro councillor.

The Chair: You have 15 minutes, including time for questions, so please proceed.

Ms Chow: Thank you this morning for having this hearing.

I just want you to picture this situation, maybe the honourable member Ed Doyle, for example. Imagine yourself in this situation. I don't know you, but I just want you to imagine this situation. You're driving home one night, maybe after dinner, after the theatre or something, you and your partner, your wife, and maybe your grandson or your son, you're driving along and you forgot to put on your seatbelt. You got stopped, and for some reason there is a bit of an argument, and hard to believe, but you got roughed up a bit and you got some bruises, maybe even your neck got twisted a little bit and you've got a neck brace. You went to the hospital and there is nothing wrong, but you got roughed up a bit.

You decide: "This is not quite fair. I haven't done anything wrong other than not putting my seatbelt on. I don't deserve this kind of treatment from police. This shouldn't happen. This doesn't happen often. Surely the police need to at least apologize." You decide that under this new rule now you'll go to the police station and file a complaint. You're a bit apprehensive, given what just happened to you, and you still have your neck brace, but you say: "All right. I'll go there, however, because I trust them. I'll to the police station and I'll file a complaint and see what happens."

You wait for a while and you finally get your complaint filed, and then you don't hear for a long time. The chief then makes a decision, does the investigation and says, "Actually, no action is warranted, because we don't think our police officer has done anything wrong." You say, "Wait a minute, that can't be true, because I know what happened to me." You say, "Okay, there has to be a civilian body somewhere." You go to the police complaints commission or some civilian body you know is out there. You go there and say: "I want to file a complaint. Can you please investigate? At the bare minimum, I should get an apology of some kind."

The police complaints commission right now, under this new law that is passed, has to go back to the police chief and say, "Can you look at this again?" It doesn't have the power to investigate. It can't investigate.

You say: "Well, if you can't investigate, the chief just said no action is warranted. If you go back to the chief and ask him to look at it, the chief is going to come back to the police complaints commission saying, `I'm sorry, we don't really believe there is any action that should be warranted.'" Even if the complaints commission, let's call it the PCC, says, "We believe your story, we believe there should be a hearing, we believe you are right, that you shouldn't be roughed up like that" -- you go and they say: "We should have a hearing. There should be an impartial hearing, an independent hearing, an independent review." They say, "All right, let's have that," but guess what? Under this new bill, you can't. If the chief said that there is no hearing, even if the PCC is on your side, sorry, you can't have a hearing, so you can't really have that kind of justice.

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Then you say: "Wait a minute. Why don't I go to the police services board?" I hope I'm wrong, but let's talk about that. That's my reading of the bill. You say, "Why don't we go to the police services board?" because you find out the chief has ruled many cases saying that no action should be warranted. You say, "The police services board probably should review this chief; maybe there's something wrong," except the police services board now has to send the case back to the PCC, and the PCC then will have to ask another police services board to look at it. The police services board will get a response from another police department. The other police department is not going to contradict the police chief.

At the end of the day you wouldn't really get much justice, because what the PCC can do, even if they investigate, they cannot have a hearing if the police chiefs say so. They could send it to another police department, but they still cannot have a hearing, they still cannot have a review. At the end of the day, I believe this is clearly a mockery of democracy.

I'm familiar with the OMB, not that I've ever gone there. I know in zoning if you don't believe in something, you can go to the court and you can challenge, you can go to the OMB, whereas in this case you really don't have an impartial hearing.

There's a much better scenario. If you're in that situation, imagine this new scenario. You can go to a separate agency, a police complaints commission, rather than walking into the police station. You can ask a third party, because you still have your neck brace maybe, and you can say: "Why don't I get my colleague or a friend to go? I don't have to go myself. I would definitely be investigated, they would get the statement from me, but perhaps I don't have to go myself." A better scenario is you allow a third party to go for you, that you don't have to go into the police station. Perhaps you can just go to the PCC directly and the PCC can investigate and direct the chief to take action. That I believe is the ideal scenario.

Let me tell you that the case I give you as an example is actually real. In April 1990, a 60-year-old man and his wife and three-year-old grandson were driving home after dinner and got stopped for a seatbelt violation. He went to hospital after that, got several bruises and a swollen testicle and went home with a neck brace. This fellow then filed a complaint to the police complaints commission. It was referred to the Toronto police in a normal fashion for initial investigation, and then the chief said, "No action warranted." That's what the chief said.

The PCC then said: "Wait a minute. We don't quite believe that. Let's have a hearing. We want to review it." In December 1992 to January 1993 there were hearings and they found the constable guilty of unnecessary violence and unlawful arrest and demoted him for one year. At the end of the day, this gentleman got a very large settlement paid out by the police force.

All of that probably would not happen because the chief would have said, "There is no action warranted," as in this case the chief said there was no action warranted, and the PCC would not be able to call a hearing. Fundamentally, at the end of the day, a review which is not independent is not a review, a hearing that is not impartial is not a hearing, and in a democracy everyone should have a right to a review, everyone should have a right to an impartial hearing.

That's for the less serious case. The more serious case in terms of the SIU, the special investigations unit, you need to somehow make sure that the officers must cooperate. The Police Services Act now says that the police must cooperate with the SIU. However, in case after case -- in the recent shooting, for example, of Edmond Yu -- the officers still have not been interviewed by the SIU. You need to fix that a little bit just to make sure the Police Services Act, which is what you have now, is very clear that the officers must cooperate with the SIU.

Those are two areas where I believe you must make some amendments. If not, the bill probably should be called the civilian subservience to the police bill or the police oversight of police bill, because certainly it is not civilian oversight of police.

Mr Crozier: Good morning. As a Metro councillor, what do you think of the bill in the instance where the local municipality can now appoint or will have a majority of the members of the board?

Ms Chow: I believe that's long overdue because, to use the case in Metro Toronto for example, we pay 90% of the police bill and we have three members out of seven, which means it could happen that Metro council really has no direct -- it has some say over the police but it's not a majority. I would prefer the one extra appointment would be a councillor. In your bill I think it says that it could be either a councillor or a civilian. It's not the most important part of the bill. Having a majority makes sense given that the present council, in Metro anyway, pays for most of the bill, 90% of the funding.

Mr Crozier: It may not be in some people's view the most important part of the bill, I agree. We're dealing to a great extent with the complaints portion of the bill. It was just that since you are a Metro councillor and since others have appeared before the committee yesterday and today saying that the local majority will politicize the police services board, I merely wanted your point of view on that issue.

Ms Chow: I actually think that we should take it one step further and make it a standing committee of the local council.

Mr Kormos: Ms Chow, please, on the issue of third-party complaints, because what will be subsection 57(1) of the amended act prohibits third-party complaints, it says, "A complaint may be made by a member of the public only if the complainant was directly affected by the policy, service or conduct that is the subject of the complaint." Some of the Tory committee members don't understand the impact of that piece of the bill and how it restricts section 56. But I'm going to work on that over the course of the next couple of weeks and will educate them. How important is it, in your view, to have third-party complaints, which are currently being restricted?

Ms Chow: Let me give you two examples. If you've just been roughed up, you're scared. You have to go back into the police station, and you have to do it yourself. That's really difficult, especially in cases of sexual assault. I know of two instances. One is Robin Garner Voss and the second case is Fiona Stewart. Both of these two young females were sexually assaulted by the police. Fortunately, they both got justice at the end, but both of them at the end of the day committed suicide because they just couldn't handle the anguish and the procedure. So it's really important to have a third party, especially someone who can support you -- it could be a counsellor in the case of sexual assault or it could be your friend, your partner -- to go with you or for you, at least at the beginning part. That's really important.

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The second thing that's really important is walking into a police station itself. It used to be that you could go to the PCC. Now you have to go to the police station. That's hard. It's very difficult.

Mr Carr: Thank you very much, Olivia. I appreciate your coming in and giving the presentation. I know your time is valuable.

Just to correct you on that, you do not have to go to the police station to do it. I'll give you an example of what can happen with a third party. We had a lady in earlier from the 519 Church Street Community Centre, and if she was counselling somebody and they came to her with any range of complaints, she could advise them, counsel them, as a third party and in fact could send a fax to OCCPS, which is the new civilian commission, to register a complaint. You do not have to go in. The complainant would have to sign it, but, unlike now where it has to be done on a certain form, it can be simply a letter. A written letter explaining what happened will trigger an investigation. If there are situations of a language barrier, for example, somebody in that community could assist them, any third party, and there are a number of groups out there and we've had some of them appear.

Under that system where you could go to somebody like the group that appeared, the 519, where they could assist somebody and then fax OCCPS to trigger it, what is wrong with that system? Why wouldn't that system work?

Ms Chow: Right now, even if that occurs, wouldn't the file still go back to the chief?

Mr Carr: But it's triggered through OCCPS. The file goes back to --

Ms Chow: OCCPS? How would I, as an ordinary citizen, know to get someone to go to OCCPS?

Mr Carr: The same as you would with the police commission. How would you know to go to the complaints? You've got one commission now. I thought it was very confusing before, because we had all these different oversight bodies. I didn't understand it, and I was actively involved. Now we've got one commission that you go to and if an average person --

Ms Chow: So let's say my partner got roughed up. I can actually walk into the new commission and I could say that I need to file a complaint on behalf of so-and-so.

Mr Carr: It's actually easier. You don't need to go through forms, which you do now; you can write a letter just outlining --

Mr Kormos: Answer the question --

Mr Carr: I thought she was asking me the question.

Ms Chow: I could do that? If that is the case --

Mr Carr: Yes, that's my understanding.

Interjection.

The Chair: Thank you for your assistance, Mr Kormos.

Ms Chow: Anyway, I'll leave it for -- the act doesn't say that. I don't know the interpretation.

Mr Carr: I'm giving the clarification now. That's what it is, Peter.

Ms Chow: Mr Chairman, I actually just read the bill. I'm not a lawyer, so I'll leave it for your lawyers to make the interpretation.

The Chair: We understand that, Ms Chow.

Ms Chow: Let me tell you, though --

The Chair: Your time is also up, Ms Chow. So I thank you very much --

Ms Chow: Okay, but the reading of it says you can't.

The Chair: -- for taking the trouble to assist us here today.

Mr Crozier had a question.

Mr Crozier: We seem to be debating this, and I think we could save ourselves a lot of time. We have, I assume, experts here who can at least give us their opinion of whether a third party can do that or whether they can't. I'd just like to get it clarified somewhere.

Mr Carr: If I could help with the clarification --

Mr Crozier: No, I'd like to hear someone who drafted the bill who has a legal --

Mr Carr: We'll do that, but when we do both. We will get that. But what it is is that the third party cannot file but they can assist somebody in filing. All you need to do is simply write out a letter of what happens and you don't even need to go to the police station. It can be faxed to OCCPS. You can have somebody counselling and assisting, whether it be a doctor or any individual, so that it goes --

Mr Kormos: But that's not a third-party complaint.

Mr Carr: That's my understanding. If you want it clarified -- but that's how it works. Frankly, I think that is what people expect.

The Chair: If we want to get into that, we can do so after 11:45, our last presenter. It does raise a few questions and we seem to be at cross-efforts on it.

DURHAM REGIONAL POLICE ASSOCIATION

The Chair: The next presenter is the Durham Regional Police Association, Mr Brian Curtis, president. Welcome, Mr Curtis.

Mr Brian Curtis: Thank you and good morning. I am a sergeant with the Durham Regional Police service. Presently I serve as president of the Durham Regional Police Association, representing 553 uniformed and 149 civilian personnel. Assisting me today during this presentation are two members of the Police Association of Ontario whom I believe you have met, but I will reintroduce them: the president of the Police Association of Ontario, Mr John Moor; and a member of the board of directors, Mr John Miller.

The Police Association of Ontario and other police association colleagues have previously made representations to this committee with regard to the proposed changes to the Police Services Act contained in Bill 105. As it presently stands, Bill 105 will lower the standards of policing in Ontario by removing many of the legal safeguards presently in place in the Police Services Act.

No doubt many areas of concern will be addressed during your hearings with regard to these proposed changes. I'd like to take this opportunity today to address a specific area, that being the municipal control of police services.

The members of the Durham Regional Police Association are particularly concerned with the effects of these changes in the area of adequacy and the issue of unsatisfactory work performance.

Under section 31 of the present Police Services Act, it is the responsibility of the police services board and its members to provide an adequate and effective police service. This is done at arm's length from the local municipality to ensure a fair and equitable service provision that guarantees a safe environment for the police and the general public with limited political interference.

Article 18 of Bill 105 effectively alters the composition of the police services board by reducing the number of members appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council and gives the balance of power to the municipalities. That is, a provincial appointee to the police services board will be replaced by "a person appointed by resolution of the council, who is neither a member of council nor an employee of the district, regional or metropolitan municipality." It remains to be seen whether the allegiance of a municipal appointee will reflect that of community commitment to policing or that of financial positions adopted by the local council.

Local councils are driven by financial responsibilities and, as such, may reflect a greater responsibility towards the public purse at the expense of the protection of the public itself. Policing could effectively become just another financially driven service at the cost of public safety.

An example of this occurred recently in Durham region, and we experienced it personally. It was proposed by regional council that the 1997 budget be reduced by $4.2 million. As approximately 90% of the budget reflects salaries and benefits and the remaining 10% is actual operational costs, this reduction could only be met by a reduction of approximately 100 members of the 750-member service. This would have represented an unprecedented reduction in staffing and policing services for the municipality of Durham. Fortunately, this did not happen and the budget was eventually approved by local council. However, it is to be noted that the approval rate was a margin of 16 to 12, with five people absent. This example clearly demonstrates the rationale and thinking of local council when it comes to providing policing.

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The Durham Regional Police Association would recommend that in order to ensure police and public safety is maintained, the current structure of the police services boards remains in place. However, if you support the proposed changes in the amendments of Bill 105, there must be further amendments to the act and prescribed regulations to prevent abuse.

The Durham Regional Police Association in conjunction with the Police Association of Ontario could conditionally support the amendments to the budgeting section of the act contained in section 39. Let me explain. As it currently stands, there is little chance, in our opinion, that a police services board will request a hearing before the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services if they feel the budget is inadequate. It is for this reason we strongly recommend that the commission should have the discretion to hold a budget hearing at their own motion or at the chief's request or at the respective association's request. Also, to prevent any drastic cuts to service provision prior to the hearing, the previous year's budget should be used.

The Durham Regional Police Association would further submit to you that in order to strengthen the safeguards and to protect the integrity of policing in our communities, police associations should be added to section 25 of the Police Services Act. This would give associations the ability to request an investigation by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services into the respective police service. If the board and/or the council are not properly funding the police service to the point where policing needs are not being met, then they are not likely to make a request of the commission.

These recommended amendments to sections 39 and 25 of the Police Services Act would provide a fail-safe mechanism to prevent any reduction of adequate and effective policing while the process is being reviewed.

The Durham Regional Police Association would also request, as you may have already heard from some of our colleagues previously, that section 75 of the proposed amendments be deleted in its entirety. We have no idea where this provision came from, but we have many fears as to what it means and how it will be interpreted by municipally controlled police services boards and chiefs of police.

This provision could result in the removal of the discretionary powers of police officers in that work performance might be translated into a quota-system method of evaluating an officer's performance. This is a very scary concept indeed as fairness and discretion of police officers could be eliminated. There would no longer be officers involved in crime prevention. Officers would no longer be involved in community policing. Officers would no longer assist victims of crime. Officers would no longer be apprehending criminals. Officers would no longer be representative of the communities they serve. They would simply be instruments of the municipality to generate income on a quota system. If an officer failed to do so, failed to conform to the quota of their service, they would be disciplined. Does this not contradict section 1 of the Police Services Act and its declaration of the principles of policing?

There is no need for article 75 in the amendments. Officers have been regularly disciplined under the code of offences for performance issues. A provision of this nature is simply a recipe for abuse.

In conclusion, I would like to take this opportunity to summarize the items discussed in this presentation. In reviewing, if the composition of the police services boards is to be changed, there should be a further amendment to section 39 of the Police Services Act. That amendment should reflect the inclusion of police associations to be allowed to request a budget hearing by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services and that during the interim the present budget be maintained until a finding is made.

Secondly, to strengthen the safeguards and protect the integrity of policing in our communities, section 25 of the Police Services Act should be amended to allow associations the opportunity to request an investigation into the respective police service by the commission.

Finally, section 75 of Bill 105 should be removed entirely as there are more than sufficient measures already in place to discipline members, and any traverse down this road could lead to police services becoming just another financially driven service at the cost of public safety.

We are police officers and we want to continue to be police officers. We want to serve the public in an effective and efficient manner. However, the proposed changes, if implemented as they presently read, will restrict our ability to serve the citizens of Ontario, and the standard of policing in the province will be severely jeopardized.

On behalf of the Durham Regional Police Association and its members, I thank you for the opportunity of making this presentation to you today.

The Chair: There's only about 30 seconds per caucus. Mr Christopherson, do you have any comment?

Mr Christopherson: I have a quick question, if I could, Chair. Thank you very much for your presentation. Under section 75, were you aware that a clause like this was being contemplated? Were you aware at this police summit that there was some concern that chiefs or boards or commissions didn't have enough strength in terms of their control over officers? Did this come as a surprise to you? Were you ready for it? Quite frankly, I find it surprising that it's in here myself.

Mr Curtis: I'll be quite honest. I was quite surprised. I've just been notified of it with the presentation. I'll refer the question to John Moor because he was in attendance during the summit.

Mr John Moor: With regard to it, there was no discussion of unsatisfactory work performance during the summit, that this needed including in the act or the provisions. We felt that the code-of-conduct sections of the act already dealt with just about every type of conduct that somebody could find offensive that police officers could do. Certainly, work performance was in there and neglect of duty, so to put a basket clause like we see in there now came as a complete shock and utterly dismayed our organization as to why it was there and who requested it.

Mr Tilson: Again on section 75, can you tell us how section 75 goes beyond performance review? I assume that you have no problem with the chief of police or a commission looking at performance review.

Mr Curtis: The unfortunate thing, in the way I read section 75, is that there are no guidelines or definitions of what performance review is going to be; it's strictly arbitrary.

Mr Tilson: This section, to me, interprets a form of performance review. I assume you don't have any problem with performance review. You simply say that section 75 should be deleted. Do you have an alternative section that allows performance review?

Mr Moor: Yes. The employer already has that right to do performance reviews. Our problem is that once you take section 75 and grant it the status of a separate provision within the act, it's now dealing with discipline; it's not dealing with performance review. Every police officer in this province undergoes performance reviews and evaluations on a continuous basis. This deals with disciplining the officer if he's not meeting that performance review. We see that as nothing more than a ticket quota system, in which fashion it's going to be used. It's not going to be used to do our evaluations with. It's in fact a provision, a clause now in the act, that will allow for substantial discipline to be meted out.

Mr Crozier: I'll direct this question to Mr Moor because of his provincial affiliation. Can you give us a statistic on how many budgets have been appealed to the commission under the current legislation, as opposed to how many have been passed by local councils without going to the commission?

Mr Moor: I don't know the actual numbers, sir, but I know that the actual budget review requests that have been received by OCCPS are very few and far between. That was what our concern was at the summit when AMO was putting forth to the government that this seemed to be such a horrendous problem, that they didn't control the boards. As you heard yesterday, those who pay should have the say.

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Our response was: "Your boards don't seem to be appealing it to OCCPS now, which they have the right to do, so what is the problem? Why do we need the change? Where did this arise from?" We think that because police services boards, whoever appoints them, are still from the community and are representative of the community, the present system is working, that there doesn't need to be a change to give complete control. We didn't see that there was any great influx of appeals on police budgets going down to OCCPS under the present system.

The Chair: Gentlemen, thank you very much for your presentation.

MARK WAINBERG

The Chair: Our next presentation is Mr Mark Wainberg. Good morning, Mr Wainberg. How are you this morning?

Mr Mark Wainberg: Fine, thanks. You have copies of my brief?

The Chair: Yes, we have received a copy, and I notice we've already heard from the law union group yesterday. Are you representing them?

Mr Wainberg: They've endorsed my brief.

The Chair: Fine.

Mr Wainberg: It was sort of an afterthought. I wrote it and thought I should check with them to see if it met with their approval, and it did.

The Chair: Go ahead.

Mr Wainberg: I'll be dealing strictly with the police complaints process. This has been a pet peeve of mine going back to 1981, when the present system first came into effect in Metropolitan Toronto. I've always had problems with the present system. In my submission, the proposed complaint system in Bill 105 is a giant step backwards.

"General Philosophy of Bill 105" is the first heading in my brief. The bill purports to combine the internal affairs system with the public complaints system. What it does, though, in effect, in reality, is to eliminate the public complaint system and fold it into the internal affairs system.

The office of the police complaints commissioner will disappear, obviously, and this will result in a significant downloading of costs of the police disciplinary system on to the municipalities. With dwindling financial resources, municipal police forces, which will now be assuming almost the entire cost of policing, will have to choose between replacement of vehicles and equipment, buying new helicopters -- Metro force is buying some helicopters, I understand -- maintaining the number of officers on the street or dealing with this new caseload that's being dumped on to the internal disciplinary system.

I think it's obvious where the scarce dollars are going to go. They're not going to go into the disciplinary system. As a result, the disciplinary system will be driven by the very few dollars available, and essentially it will more or less wither away as far as the public component is concerned.

Secrecy: Bill 105 will allow police chiefs to keep the complainant totally in the dark about the progress of an investigation, the results of an investigation and the reasons for the chief's decision for rejecting a complaint. Under the old legislation, there was a requirement for interim reports every 30 days and a final report after the investigation was completed. Now there is no such requirement that any report be prepared at all in the course of an investigation. There's no requirement for the chief of police to give reasons for any decision that he might make, except after a full hearing, and as I'll deal with later in the presentation, those full hearings occur in about one tenth of 1% of cases.

I've done a little statistical research. I've used the annual report of the board of inquiry under the Police Services Act and the annual report of the office of the police complaints commissioner. Both of those are available at the government bookstore. I've been doing this since 1981, so this is old news for me.

In 1995, only 4.27% of complaints resulted in any form of disciplinary action against police officers in Ontario. That includes disciplinary proceedings at which police officers were acquitted, so in over 95% of cases there was no discipline resulting out of a public complaint.

In 1995, only two out of more than 3,400 public complaints resulted in board of inquiry hearings. In 1994, the police chiefs ordered board of inquiry hearings in only three out of approximately 3,500 cases. So the number of hearings that are ordered by police chiefs under the present system has been consistently under one tenth of 1%.

In the remaining 99.9% of cases, which is a fairly significant bulk of the cases, complainants will be entitled, under the new system, only to the following information about their complaints: whether the chief has decided to treat the complaint as one about policies of the force or a complaint about the conduct of a police officer. You're not entitled to know why he has made that decision, but you're entitled to know that he has made that decision.

Similarly, if the chief determines the complaint is frivolous or vexatious, you're entitled to know that he made the decision, but not why. If the chief makes a decision after investigation that the complaint is unsubstantiated, you're entitled to know he made that decision, but you're not entitled to know why, under this legislation. If you compare the legislation to the previous legislation, it's very clear that this omission was deliberate.

As a complainant, you're entitled to know whether the chief, after investigation, has determined that there was misconduct or unsatisfactory work performance but that it was not of a serious nature. You're entitled to know that he made that decision, but not why he made that decision. The current subsection 90(5) is set out in the brief, and it's obvious that the old legislation required reasons for these types of decisions and the proposed legislation does not.

Police investigating police: This has been a concern of mine and of many community groups since the inception of this legislation in 1981. According to a recent academic study by the University of Toronto department of criminology, written by Tammy Landau -- you may be familiar with this -- and from my own personal experience, it's obvious that the overwhelming number of complainants do not have confidence in police investigating police. People don't like lawyers investigating lawyers either. There is not only a perception of bias, but in my experience with police complaints, which is fairly extensive, there is an actual bias. It may be conscious, it may be unconscious, but police officers have a certain way of looking at situations.

I'll give you a recent example. There was a suspect who was shot in a TTC bus at the foot of Spadina a few weeks ago. The next day or two days later, the chief of the Toronto police said that the officer acted properly. Police have a certain way of looking at situations like that. There was a potential situation of danger. The officer could have got off the bus and just waited. Police officers tend not to approach situations like that, and sometimes a little common sense from the civilian side of things would dictate a different approach to things. But police do have a way of dealing with situations, and if you're being investigated by a police officer, they will look at it through police eyes; they will not look at it through civilian eyes. In the real world, that makes a very significant impact on whether your complaint is successful or not.

Police investigations of public complaints are slow. They're very slow at getting statements from the officers. They're very slow at getting officers' notes. They are superficial. They tend not to go for the forensic evidence. They'll interview the witnesses, but that's about it. They go through the motions, but there's no payback for police officers within the police hierarchy for doing a superb job of investigating a complaint. They don't get the same goodies as they do for catching Paul Bernardo. The better the job they do, the less popular they'll become with their peers when they're investigating complaints.

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Under section 88 of the existing act, the police complaints commissioner may conduct an investigation into a complaint for any reason after the 30-day period has expired. The present legislation does not allow the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services to do its own investigation -- to interview its own witnesses, to collect its own forensic evidence -- and that's obviously intentional. You cannot get your complaint investigated by a civilian under this legislation.

Appeals to the commission: An appeal to the commission after a full hearing before the chief of police -- and as I've indicated, that will only occur in about one tenth of 1% of cases -- is the only way a complainant can have his or her complaint adjudicated by a non-police officer. Unfortunately, in practice the appeal remedy is an illusion, because most of these cases involve credibility findings. Your credibility findings are going to be made by the chief or his designate; you're going to have the officer's conduct determined by a police officer. Once that credibility finding is made, if it's made against you, you're dead; you're never going to successfully challenge that on appeal.

The other problem with the appeal process is the cost of a transcript. Some of these hearings are very long. Police lawyers tend to raise a lot of procedural issues. I've been involved in hearings that have gone more than two weeks. Transcripts cost about $500 a day. To get an appeal to the Civilian Commission on Police Services, if you're a complainant and you lose in front of the chief of police, you have to order the transcript and pay the transcript fee of $500 a day or more.

I had a case recently which was very -- it was a good point of law. I brought the appeal, my client couldn't afford the transcript, and he had to abandon the appeal. That's a real, serious obstacle, because even if you win these, you can't recover the cost of the transcript. There are some lawyers who are willing to do the appeals for free -- I was willing to do the appeal for free -- but shelling out $2,500 or $3,000 for a transcript is not something that too many lawyers can do and it's something that a lot of complainants can't afford.

Conclusion: I can't suggest any way to fine-tune this legislation. It's a giant step backwards. It'll essentially eliminate the public complaints system and I think the government should take another look at this.

The Vice-Chair (Mr Ron Johnson): We will move to questions. We've got about one minute per caucus.

Mr Tilson: The existing system has been said to be too costly, too expensive, confusing, all kinds of other adjectives to describe it. You obviously have worked in the process and I'm sure you will agree. I would like you to comment specifically --

Mr Wainberg: Excuse me. I don't agree with all of it. I agree with "confusing"; I don't agree with "expensive."

Mr Tilson: That's fine. My question has to do with the number of deputants, including yourself, who have shown a lack of confidence in the police to deal with complaints against police, that chiefs of police will ignore proceedings, police boards will ignore complaints in favour of the police officers. I suppose that could happen from time to time, but in my view very rarely.

I would like you to comment on sections 71 and 72 -- I know you've read the bill -- which have to do with review of decisions by the commission, in other words, if complainants don't like the decisions of police chiefs or service boards, specifically section 72.

Let me just summarize what it says: At any time during the proceedings, any proceedings, if you don't like what a chief of police is doing or you don't like what a board's doing and you can persuade the commission, the commission can order another police force to investigate those proceedings. Do you find anything wrong with that?

Mr Wainberg: You can't get it investigated by a civilian, and as I indicated, police have a certain way of looking at situations; lawyers have a certain way of looking at situations. You need a fresh look at --

Mr Tilson: So you don't want police investigating anything.

Mr Wainberg: No, I don't. That's been my position from 1981 onwards.

Mr Crozier: We are hearing from practically every group and/or individual who comes before us the concern about the investigation and the way it's handled in this bill. In reference to what Mr Tilson said about not having police investigate police, I'm willing to assume they do a good job in most cases, but perception is reality. If the public doesn't see that police should investigate police, it really doesn't matter how good a job they do. We should do our best to enforce the public's support for the police. Would you agree or comment on that?

Mr Wainberg: Perception is definitely important. The complaints system, to a certain extent, is a lightning rod for public discontent. You have to have that outlet for people who are dissatisfied with the police. The centre for criminology study shows that most people do not think it is a good idea. Of complainants who were interviewed, over 77% felt that the police shouldn't be doing investigations. It's not just me. I've had several clients who have been through the process. They feel they're under attack. They feel like a rape victim in court; they feel they've done something wrong. That's the way police tend to make complainants feel.

Mr Kormos: Reference has been made, not by us, about the fact that lawyers investigate lawyers and doctors investigate doctors. My impression is that the public is as sceptical of that, as often as not, as they are about police investigating police.

Mr Wainberg: Absolutely. I'm no big fan of lawyers investigating lawyers, either.

Mr Kormos: You refer to the centre for criminology study. I know that Ericson has written a lot over at the U of T about the culture of policing, the sociology of policing. Is there research and are there studies which support your argument and the argument that others have made that civilian oversight is preferable to police investigating police?

Mr Wainberg: All the studies that were done in the 1970s -- Maloney and Morand -- recommended a much higher degree of civilian involvement in the process than this bill proposes. I don't think this bill, this approach can be justified by any academic study. I think it's purely a political decision.

Mr Kormos: So this very much appears to fly in the face of all the knowledge that's been acquired.

Mr Wainberg: Oh, for sure.

Mr Kormos: I wonder what prompted --

The Vice-Chair: Mr Kormos, I'm sorry, your --

Mr Kormos: I just asked him, I wonder what prompts this legislation.

The Vice-Chair: I'm sorry. Time has expired. Mr Wainberg, on behalf of the committee, I want to thank you very much for your presentation.

METROPOLITAN TORONTO POLICE ASSOCIATION

The Vice-Chair: The next presenter is the Metro Toronto Police Association. Good morning, gentlemen. You'll have 15 minutes for your presentation.

Mr Paul Walter: Good morning. My name is Paul Walter. I'm president of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Association. To my far right is director Al Olsen, who is also a police officer, with 24 years' experience. To my immediate right is retired detective sergeant George Jackson. George was a member of the public complaints bureau. His knowledge in terms of public complaints and the legislation, I dare say, is on a par with any other person in this province. He, in our view, is considered an expert in the field. He is also employed by the police association to assist our members when confronted with certain situations that require his advice and assistance.

I've sort of limited my response. I've cut it down from about an hour, which is my usual time, to about 14 minutes. If the committee desires, I'll be available for your April dates to answer any questions with regard to the submissions I'm putting forward. I believe the submissions have been circulated, and I'll get on with my deputation.

The Metropolitan Toronto Police Association represents approximately 5,000 uniformed police personnel, up to and including the rank of staff sergeant, and 2,200 civilian members. It is the largest police association in Canada. We, along with the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service, have the most experience in Ontario in the operation of a civilian oversight program.

The Metropolitan Toronto Police Association and the members we represent have very serious concerns with respect to many aspects of Bill 105. However, with the limited amount of time I have to speak before you, I will confine my remarks to how Bill 105 will eradicate the legal rights of police officers in the discipline process and ultimately destroy the morale of police officers in this province.

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Appended to the handouts -- it still hasn't been thoroughly edited -- there's a two-page president's message. We put out a monthly magazine called News and Views, and the areas of concern that we're conveying to our members other than what I'm going to speak about, and including what I'm speaking about, are contained in this president's message. At your leisure, if you want to read that, it will give you a little further insight into our concerns and our members' concerns.

Much effort has been expended over the past year to identify improvements to the Police Services Act. At the policing summit last June, the major stakeholders reached consensus on a number of important amendments, many of which do not appear in Bill 105. In October 1996, the Solicitor General and the Attorney General commissioned Rod McLeod to review the oversight system and advise how it could be made more efficient. This resulted in an 85-page report which is entitled A Report and Recommendations on Amendments to the Police Services Act Respecting Civilian Oversight of Police, which was released in December 1996. Many of Mr McLeod's positive recommendations also do not appear in Bill 105.

In the 1970s a number of studies were conducted on police oversight. There was the 1975 report by Arthur Maloney QC and a 1976 royal commission by the Honourable Mr Justice Donald R. Morand. Mr Walter Pitman authored a report in 1977, and in 1979 Gerald Emmett Cardinal Carter, archbishop of Toronto, released his report.

The most thoroughly researched document was the 1975 Arthur Maloney report, and it's entitled the Metropolitan Toronto Review of the Citizen-Police Complaint Procedure. Subject to some minor editorial revisions, the recommendations in the Maloney report are as relevant today as they were 20 years ago. It is, and consistently has been, the position of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Association that the Maloney report's recommendations must be taken in their entirety. To adopt some of the recommendations and not others would be a result that no one would have respect for.

The recommendations for changes to the present discipline and rights provisions of the Police Services Act ignore most of Maloney's recommendations. Therefore, in our opinion, Bill 105 fails the oversight process and is unacceptable to the members of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Association.

I would like to read Arthur Maloney's comments found at page 207 of his report. This report was not an overnighter; it took nearly a year to complete and involved police forces throughout the world as far as the complaints process is concerned. Maloney, at page 207, said:

"What I had in mind as I formulated my recommendations was that the public feel satisfied that the complaints of citizens were openly, fairly, and effectively dealt with and that the police officer should be satisfied that he too was being dealt with fairly. Also, I was also determined that the police officer should not feel constrained in the performance of his duties in matters of violations of the law or in a potentially dangerous encounter with some suspect for fear that he would be second-guessed later in the complaint department."

In 1981, Maloney's principles were incorporated into the first citizens' complaint act in Ontario, known as the Metropolitan Police Force Complaints Project Act, which in 1983 became the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force Complaints Act. This was the only police complaint act in Ontario until 1991, when the complaint section was introduced into the Police Services Act.

The principles in the Maloney report were the backbone of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force Complaints Project Act. The Honourable Roy McMurtry, now Chief Justice, and the Honourable Sidney Linden, now Chief Judge -- and, by the way, he was the first complaints commissioner in Ontario -- were the government representatives responsible for the introduction of the complaints project act. I might say I worked with both gentlemen, along with many others, on having this act brought into being.

During the development of the complaints project act, it was recognized that there was a need to have a bill of rights for police officers of Metropolitan Toronto. This bill of rights was appended to the collective agreement between the Metropolitan Toronto Police Association and the police services board. In the back of the handout material, you'll see a two-page document which contains the police officers' bill of rights as agreed to between the parties.

There are some very significant issues and topics within that bill of rights that provided the safeguards and normal protections for due process for police officers. This was taken into consideration when formulating sections of the police complaints project act and the force regulations on citizen complaints. The bill of rights was respected by the public complaints commissioner's office and his investigators when they conducted their own independent investigations and reviews. I have attached, as I said, a copy of this bill of rights to the brief.

Changes were made to the 1991 act that started the deterioration of the Maloney principles. These amendments effectively decreased police officers' rights and protections. In the past few years we have seen even more deterioration in these excellent principles. Many of Maloney's concerns have surfaced, in particular the second-guessing of officers' decisions and unfair actions and abuse of the process that have prejudiced police officers.

Rod McLeod recognized this at page 2 in his report. I would like to read his comments. This is the report from Rod McLeod that is dated November 21, 1996. In it, he says:

"Civilian oversight at the provincial and local levels should not be the cause of FIDO (Forget It, Drive On)." Some of our personnel have a different interpretation of FIDO. "People in positions of authority in the cycle of oversight should have the respect and confidence of the whole public, including police officers and minority communities. The overseers should recognize the difficulties and dangers of police work and be champions of and advocates for good policing and the thousands of excellent people we have serving as police officers today." I certainly subscribe to those comments wholeheartedly.

I will now discuss how Bill 105 will produce the final and fatal blow to the Maloney principles of openness and fairness in the complaints process.

This principle was achieved in the original act by the provision of interim reports to the complainant, the subject officer and the public complaints commissioner. These reports were issued every 30 days and gave a continuous update on the investigation. On completion of the investigation, a final report was issued which gave a synopsis of all statements, pertinent laws and a description and analysis of any physical evidence obtained.

The investigations were monitored by the investigators of the Ontario public complaints commissioner's office. Concerns by the PCC on the direction of the investigation were discussed with the investigators of the police force and necessary action was taken to remove these concerns.

Part VI of the current Police Services Act continues this practice. However, Bill 105 contains no such requirement for reports to be produced. The bill simply states that the chief, at the conclusion of the investigation and on review of the report submitted to him or her -- if any -- will decide if there was misconduct. So there is no requirement for a report to be submitted.

The requirement for openness also helps to ensure fairness. To eliminate the need to produce reports removes the checks and balances on the fairness of the investigation. In effect, it is making the police investigation a more secret process.

A need for openness can be demonstrated by two recent high-profile investigations into alleged misconduct by police officers, boards of inquiry stemming from complaints made by Mrs Audrey Smith and by Mr Dwight Drummond. The mandated reports enabled examination of the investigations and decision-making processes that were applied in these cases. These reports revealed flagrant abuses and unfair treatment of the police officers. Without the requirement for these reports, evidence would have been withheld or would not have been disclosed, thereby seriously prejudicing the ability of the police officers to provide an adequate defence.

Other investigation reports have revealed contraventions of the Police Services Act by police management, which resulted in stays of the proceedings against the police officers. The mandated requirement to provide regular reports did not prevent management from committing abuses, but it allowed those abuses to be discovered. The members of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Association are deeply concerned that the elimination of this requirement in Bill 105 will remove any management accountability on how they conduct their investigations.

The removal of the reporting requirements, along with the new powers given to the chief of police to discipline officers in the area of non-serious allegations, where no trial is held, will totally destroy Mr Maloney's recommendation that "the complaints of citizens were openly, fairly and effectively dealt with and that the police officer should be satisfied that he too was being dealt with fairly."

Another Maloney principle was that the discipline process must also be fair to police officers. However, under Bill 105, the concept of fairness is eliminated. The chief, or any one of his 50 or so designates in Metropolitan Toronto, will be given power to impose upon a police officer accused of non-serious misconduct a penalty of up to five days' pay or 40 hours' pay. That amounts to more than $1,000 on a say-so, without a report and without the officer having recourse other than through a process of arbitration, which I'll get into. This doesn't permit a police officer to forfeit five days' work or lieu time as built up. This penalty not only penalizes the police officer; it also penalizes his family by taking up to $1,000 from his paycheque.

The officer has no election of a trial, as is provided for under the current act. The only remedy, as you know, is to apply for the grievance procedure. However, the penalty will have already been imposed and the matter will be recorded in the officer's employment record, notwithstanding that the officer has grieved the issue. The arbitration process may take upwards of two years to conclude, at a cost of thousands of dollars.

I know there was comment made here by some of the administrative staff about section 50 of the Labour Relations Act applying. We have great concerns that police officers' employment terms will be viewed on that level, but if they are, then give police officers the full rights and protections of the Labour Relations Act, because they don't have those now. Give police officers the full protections and rights of the Employment Standards Act, because they don't have those now. Give police officers the full rights of the Health and Safety Act, through which they only have very little protection. Do that now as well. You can't have all of the pie without spreading it equitably among all our members.

A recent case in Metropolitan Toronto involved an officer who was alleged to have committed a misconduct. The Metropolitan Toronto Police Professional Standards Review Committee recommended that he be penalized five days. The officer refused the penalty and exercised his right under the present act for a Police Services Act trial. Although he was found guilty, after trial his penalty was a reprimand.

The Metropolitan Toronto Police Association demands that officers accused of misconduct must retain the right to due process. That's what this is all about and that's why we're here. There is no compromise on this issue.

Under Bill 105, the subject officer is not included in the ongoing status of the investigation process. However, the complainant is notified of every decision and given the right to have these decisions reviewed by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services. Bill 105 only guarantees the right of appeal after conviction at trial if the officer is dismissed or required to resign, whereas the complainant can appeal any decision where the officer is acquitted at trial.

In the time allowed, I have tried to give you an overview of the history of the complaint law in Ontario. I have shown you how, with each amendment to the act, the principles of openness and fairness to police officers have been deteriorating. Bill 105 will completely destroy these principles.

The Vice-Chair: Thank you, sir, for your presentation, and thank you all, on behalf of the committee, for the presentation. The allotted time has expired.

The committee will now recess until 1 o'clock this afternoon.

The committee recessed from 1204 to 1304.

BLACK ACTION DEFENCE COMMITTEE

The Chair: Our first presenter is the Black Action Defence Committee, Mr Dudley Laws, executive director. Welcome, Mr Laws. Please make yourself comfortable. We've provided 15 minutes, including all questions, so please proceed.

Mr Kormos: On a point of order, Chair: Is there a quorum, please?

The Chair: How many do we need for a quorum, Mr Kormos?

Mr Kormos: At least 50%.

The Chair: It seems we are short one person. We'll wait until one arrives. Oh, we now have a quorum. We have seven. Please proceed, Mr Laws.

Mr Dudley Laws: Thank you very much. Members of the committee, I'm the executive director of the Black Action Defence Committee and I'm going to present a brief on their behalf.

The Black Action Defence Committee is a voluntary, non-profit, community-based organization formed in 1988 out of the need for community action against racism and discrimination in the criminal justice system. It was formed particularly to advocate for police reforms and to provide support to the families of victims of abuse and deaths caused by police use of deadly force.

The demand for the services of the Black Action Defence Committee from other parts of Canada such as Quebec and Nova Scotia has made it necessary to broaden its mandate from a provincial to a national scope.

The goal of the Black Action Defence Committee is the elimination of racism because of its damaging impact on the black community and society in general. The BADC advocates for policies and practices that are geared towards the elimination of racism.

In carrying out its work, the BADC operates from a strong commitment to bring a unifying force to the black community and to be an advocate for positive change. The BADC is open to all persons of the black community regardless of age, gender, socioeconomic background, abilities and ideological perspective.

History of police abuse and police use of deadly force: For 20 years police officers in Metropolitan Toronto and other parts of Ontario and Canada have caused the deaths and injuries of the following persons: Buddy Evans, Albert Johnson, Michael Sergeant, Lester Donaldson, Michael Wade Lawson, Sophia Cook, Marlon Neal, a black youth who was unnamed, Johnathan Howell, Kenneth Allen, Royan Bagnaut, Raymond Lawrence, Ian Coley, Albert Moses, Tommy Barnett, Andrew Bramwell, Wayne Williams, Faraz Suleman, Francis Nicholls and Edmond Yu.

This list is included in our submission to make sure that all members of the standing committee are knowledgeable of these incidents and how these shootings and abuses of power have helped to destroy the communities' confidence and trust in the police services of Ontario and Canada.

Over the years various governments of all three political parties have appointed commissions of inquiry to look into policing and into racism in the criminal justice system. The commissions have held hearings across Ontario and have made numerous recommendations to governments. These are some of the commissions: the Morand report, Royal Commission into Metropolitan Toronto Police Practices; the Marin report, Commission of Inquiry Relating to Public Complaints; Pitman report, Metro Toronto task force; Cardinal Carter's report; Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force, 1989; Report on Race Relations and Policing Task Force, 1992; Stephen Lewis's report; K. Liao's report on policing services; Uniform Treatment: A Community Inquiry into Policing of Disadvantaged Peoples; Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism, December 1995.

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Most of these commissions have made recommendations in support of an independent civilian oversight of police and the establishment of an independent complaint system. In recent years we saw the establishment of the police complaints commission and the special investigations unit. These two agencies of government were meant to act as police oversight systems, although these two bodies are ineffective. In many ways, the fundamental principles on which they were formed create a sense of hopefulness.

The present bill, Bill 105, totally destroys the principles of police accountability, accessibility, fairness and impartiality.

The complaint system: At the present time a complainant may file a complaint with the local station of any police force or at the office of the police complaints commission. Bill 105 provides that the complainant can only file a complaint with the station of the police force to which the complaint relates.

Our response: The restriction on where a complaint can be filed makes the system less accessible to people who wish to complain about an officer in their local community. Furthermore, it is well known that complainants who have made complaints at police stations to police officers have been subjected to intimidation and insults and have often been asked to withdraw their complaints against police officers.

At the present time there is a requirement that the complaint be filed by the person directly affected by the policy, service or conduct in question, and the PCC will accept a complaint filed by a third party. Bill 105 requires that a complaint be made only by the person directly affected by the police policy, service or conduct in question. The chief of police will decide whether the complainant is directly affected, subject to a review by the commission upon the complainant's request.

Response: It is the view of the BADC that it is the duty and responsibility of all citizens of Ontario and Canada to make a complaint against any police officer who in the opinion of any citizen has acted in an improper manner in the performance of his or her duty as a police officer. The chief of police should not be given any authority to decide who makes a complaint.

This creates two problems. First, the system will be less accessible for individuals who feel disempowered to file a complaint, and secondly, it makes the system less accountable because it discourages complainants from coming forward.

The extreme power of the chief: Bill 105 gives the chief of police extreme power and authority to determine the validity of a complaint, whether the complaint is about policy, service or an individual officer's conduct. There is no need for the chief to get consent from the new commission although the complainant may ask the new commission to review the chief's decision.

Response: To increase the power of the police chief to classify complaints undermines the principles of fairness and impartiality and renders the system less accountable.

It must be noted and given serious attention and consideration that in all shootings by police officers the chiefs of police have made statements in support of the police officers involved.

Filing a complaint: At the present time, when the complaint is initially filed with a local police station, the PCC is entitled to receive a copy of the complaint. Bill 105 contains no requirement that the new commission will be served copies of the complaints that are filed with the local police.

Response: It is obvious that the commission's role to monitor complaints against police officers is made impossible if it is not even notified when complaints are filed. It therefore has no means of ensuring accountability at the local level. In the past, many complainants have expressed fear and concern about going to any police station to lay complaints. Some have said that they have been discouraged and sometimes asked not to file complaints against police officers.

Conducting a hearing: Unlike the current system, Bill 105 gives power to the chief of police whether or not to hold a hearing and the power to designate someone who could be a police officer to be the presenter at the hearing. There is no provision for the new commission to order or hold a hearing at first instance. The only type of hearing that the new commission can hold is hearing an appeal by the complainant and it is only on the record.

Response: To give the chief the monopoly as an adjudicator of complaints against actions of police misconduct is the ultimate affront to the civilian policing oversight system. It creates an inherent bias within the system in favour of police officers.

The special investigations unit: The SIU was created by a change to the Police Services Act. The change took effect in June 1990. The principles of the SIU are summed up in section 113.3.5 of the Police Services Act, which states that the director of the SIU may, on his own initiative, and shall at the request of the Solicitor General or Attorney General, cause investigations to be conducted into the circumstances of serious injuries and deaths that may have resulted from criminal offences committed by police officers. Also subsection 113(9) of the Police Services Act, 1990 states as follows, "Members of the police force shall cooperate fully with the members of the unit in the conduct of investigations."

Response: Police officers who have caused serious injuries and deaths of several persons in the province of Ontario have refused to cooperate with the SIU. The Black Action Defence Committee will not give a legal opinion on the reasons these police officers have not cooperated or have waited many months or years to do so. We know that legal opinions will be submitted to the committee in respect of police officers' refusal to cooperate with the SIU.

It is the position of the Black Action Defence Committee that it is an affront to the law for police officers to remain silent after taking the life of a person. Many police officers are permitted by their chiefs of police to continue on duty after their refusal to speak to the SIU. These police officers still carry guns, batons, handcuffs, and have the support of the emergency task force, the support of other police officers, the support of the union, the support of the chief of police and the support of the Solicitor General, the Attorney General and the Premier of the province of Ontario. The victims of police misconduct and police use of deadly force rely only on the support of their families and their communities.

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The Chair: Excuse me, Mr Laws, you have used your allotted time. We have your recommendations and conclusions.

Mr Laws: Can I read my conclusions, sir?

The Chair: How long is it going to take you, Mr Laws?

Mr Laws: Another three minutes.

Mr Kormos: It will only take 60 seconds, Chair.

The Chair: No, it's going to take longer than that, Mr Laws. It makes it very difficult for us because we have a schedule of a large number of people. I would suggest if you read your recommendations, it's a lot shorter than your conclusions.

Mr Laws: My conclusions are very important to be heard, sir.

The Chair: I understand that.

Mr Laws: I prefer to read my conclusions.

The Chair: That's not the way it's played, Mr Laws. My problem is that I'm instructed to provide everyone with an allotted length of time. I don't wish to appear rude or anything, but that is the way the rules are drawn up for me. It blocks everyone off, so I'm sorry, I cannot permit you to do that, sir. I regret that and I apologize, but we are now over 15 minutes. Your time is up and we must proceed to the next person. I thank you very much, however, for attending here today. Your presentation has been most valuable. We do have your written recommendations and conclusions and I'm sure the committee will give them due consideration. Thank you very much, sir.

MULTIFAITH ANTIRACISM COMMITTEE OF GREATER TORONTO

The Chair: We may proceed to the next presentation, the Multifaith Antiracism Committee of Greater Toronto, Al Buttnor and Michael Kerr. Welcome, gentlemen. Would you proceed, please.

Mr Michael Kerr: First, we would like to thank the members of the committee, the Chair -- Mr Martiniuk -- and others for allowing us the opportunity, as the Multifaith Antiracism Committee of Greater Toronto, to bring some of our shared concerns before you.

We appreciate the opportunity to address Bill 105 today. I am Michael Kerr. I work with Karuna Community Services, which is the community development and social services arm of the Buddhist communities of greater Toronto. This is Rev Al Buttnor of the Church of Scientology. We represent the Multifaith Antiracism Committee, as I said, with a membership comprised of a wide variety of faith groups, including members of various Christian denominations such as the Lutheran, United and Catholic churches, several Muslim traditions, the Jewish community, Sikhs, Bahai, ourselves and others.

Bill 105 offers an opportunity to address the concerns of the community about policing and the services' accountability to the community. We are not experts in the legislative process nor are we experts on the law, nor indeed in dealing with police services generally. Consequently it is our purpose, rather than addressing specific points of the proposed legislation, to talk in general terms about what we feel is important in such legislation, particularly the complaints process, whether this relates to the actual provisions of Bill 105 or not. We also wish to keep our comments as clear and simple as we can.

The police service is an important and integral part of our society. This cannot be overstated, I think we all agree. They represent a bulwark and protection for the average citizen against those among us who would prey upon the rest through either violence or crime; the breaking of legal codes which the rest of us have agreed to live by in order to show respect for one another.

The courage that is called for by the average police officer to undertake this effort is immense, and they should be rightfully proud in upholding their duty to society and protected from unfair treatment or undue suspicion. However, part of the police duty to society is accounting for the exercise of the extraordinary powers provided to them to do their jobs.

We do have a fundamental assumption in our society that individual freedom is an important concept, that while we must weed out, possibly segregate and attempt to rehabilitate those who would violate the law, we have a long-standing tradition that an individual is innocent until proven guilty, although today with mass media as it is, it is almost that one is innocent until accused, but that is another topic. We hold to this concept of innocence because we have a desire to provide the individual the benefit of the doubt and to protect the freedoms of the many who do not transgress our community standards, to keep them free of undue restraint.

We have found that this kind of freedom is necessary to our society. As no system or individual is perfect, whether police or otherwise, a proper system of police oversight is necessary to correct, when necessary, the wrongful or incorrect use of the power that we have made available to them. Individuals, therefore, who feel they have been wronged by police action do need to have a real and substantive remedy to their complaint. However, this also must be balanced so that police are not unduly hindered in doing their job or made to feel that they do not have the confidence of the public at large. We feel this is equally as important.

Consequently, in discussing legislation designed to renew the partnership between the province, municipalities and the police, and as the bill title suggests, "to enhance community safety," both factors must be taken into account and balanced: the needs of the police and those of the community. I'll depart from the written text here. We were struck that within the titling of the bill, I guess the thinking was being framed that "community" wasn't left out of the partnership. I think that's instructive in terms of possibly some of the thinking that brought this legislation forward.

Speaking as members of diverse faith communities, we must express concern with this legislation. While it may be advantageous to cut costs and make the system move faster, ideas which cannot be faulted, if the perception by the community is that the proposed changes reduce accountability to the community for police actions to the point where an oversight process is viewed as impaired, such changes are not in the best long-term interests of the government, the police themselves or the community at large. Such proposals need to be modified so that the perception of Bill 105 by the community is that such legislation will provide proper and responsive oversight.

Mr Al Buttnor: I'll just continue on. We feel that the following concepts are pertinent to such oversight:

(1) A complaint about policing behaviour should be able to be registered with any police authority no matter where the complaint occurred. An individual in the community should have easy and immediate access to a complaints procedure.

(2) A complainant should receive, upon the filing of a complaint, an information sheet on the complaints procedure so they may be informed of their rights and responsibilities in making such a complaint. This is to protect both the police and the individual. Individuals should be admonished from using the fact of filing a complaint as a media weapon or embarrassment to the police services.

(3) All investigatory notes, memos and correspondence relating to a complaint should be kept in an orderly and prescribed manner so that they may be provided to and reviewed by appropriate review bodies as to the thoroughness of investigation of a complaint. This is to include a civilian body. There is no accountability, only a pretence of accountability, where there is secrecy in a procedure or there is no requirement for the actions taken to investigate a complaint to be available to be reviewed by any oversight body, particularly a civilian board. This paper trail must be available and accessible for civilian oversight purposes to view trends of complaints and their handling.

(4) All reasons for a decision on a complaint need always to be given in writing to the complainant. This is only reasonable. However, police must be protected from litigation for the issuance of reasons, as such threat would inhibit the process.

(5) An official civilian police oversight committee should always have the power to start an oversight investigation on its own initiative. However, such investigation may only be begun based on a specific incident, not on whim or innuendo. This is to protect the police services from witchhunts with no parameters or specifications.

I think Michael has a closing comment.

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Mr Kerr: I just want to conclude by framing some of the thought that had gone on within the multifaith committee in trying to develop our position. Our focus of concern was to ensure the fullest of integrity of the policing service, and the oversight process is a critical element of that. The elements of integrity that we identified were transparency, accessibility, accountability and shared learning.

Within transparency, there are such things as effective documentation and the public accessibility of the documentation.

Within accessibility was the need for third-party complaints. As Al referred to, the station-specific requirement we found to be problematic, and the perception of impartiality, again, the need for civilian independent review.

The third element of accountability is questions of timeliness, the provision of reasons for decisions and the duty to cooperate, both on the part of the chief -- within the current legislation as it is framed, there are many instances where that isn't written into the text of the legislation -- and also the individual officers involved in a given incident, which has long been problematic, as we all know, in various investigations.

The fourth element, which we find to be most important, is shared learning. That's a commitment on the part of the police services to an ongoing process of training which is basically the bedrock of how one goes about developing community-based policing, which is all the rage right now but often rhetoric and not brought to the community at the grass roots. Training in areas of use of force, lethal force, deadly force most especially; issues of diversity -- ethnoracial diversity, but also faith diversity, sexual orientation; there's a long list we could provide; and certainly areas of mental health concern and dealing with homelessness. Several of those elements have intruded into altercations that unfortunately have resulted in severe injury or death. So we would be prepared to help, to be involved in a process of further development of those training programs.

To conclude, whether this proposed bill is more than anything else the legacy of the burden that we all share of the traditional role, the style and approach, the culture that has been adopted over time by the policing institutions, or -- I think there's also a strong case to be made, and this was stated by some of our membership -- of the apparent fear on the part of the politicians of the day of the capacity of the police service itself to mobilize and lobby, I think that's a critical dimension to where we're going with this particular piece of legislation. There's a fear of that lobby. But in whatever way it's motivated, consciously or not, what is being proposed here in Bill 105 we believe unfortunately profoundly compromises, if not largely undermines, the fuller spirit of integrity as I earlier referred to, the four elements of which -- transparency, accessibility, accountability and shared learning -- serve as the four cornerstones of a system of police oversight that best provides for our future, a future of shared interest in having healthy, safe and secure communities.

The Chair: Thank you, gentlemen. Your time has elapsed, but I thank you for your excellent presentation for the consideration of the committee.

MUNICIPALITY OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO ANTI-RACISM, ACCESS AND EQUITY COMMITTEE

The Chair: Our next presentation will be made by Ms Bev Salmon, a Metro councillor. Welcome.

Ms Bev Salmon: Good afternoon and thank you for this opportunity to address you.

I'm before you this afternoon as the chair of the Anti-Racism, Access and Equity Committee of Metro Toronto, which is a committee of elected members of Metro council. At its meeting of January 21, following a discussion respecting civilian oversight of police, the committee unanimously recommended that I present to you the concerns of the committee respecting the proposed amendments to the Police Services Act.

First, let me mention that Metro council has a long history of supporting much greater municipal control over the policing function. In response to the proposed new Police Services Act back in June 1990, Metro council recommended that a majority of the members of the police services board be appointed by Metropolitan Toronto council. Section 18 in Bill 105 proposes precisely that, and I congratulate the government for that initiative. It represents an important step in reinforcing the principles of public accountability and local civilian oversight of the policing function. The police services board functions as one of the most important, if not the most important, civilian oversight bodies.

My only question with regard to appointments to the police services board relates to those who are ineligible. Bill 105 identifies those who are ineligible as "a judge, a justice of the peace, a police officer, a person who practises criminal law as a defence counsel and a person who is a member of a prescribed class of persons." My questions are, why defence lawyers and what is meant by "a prescribed class"?

I want to come back to the principle of public accountability, but first let me offer some comments on section 4 of Bill 105 in which are identified the minimum core services. The list is: (1) crime prevention, (2) law enforcement, (3) assistance to victims of crime, (4) public order maintenance, and (5) emergency response.

I find this list, and the order in which they are presented, of interest. I think this is a critically important section which deserves to be expanded and clarified. This section lays down the foundation of what it is we are talking about. It should open up some creative ways in which the nature of policing can be considered and the way in which the services can be delivered. For example, when we are talking about ensuring the safety and protection of our citizens, we are really talking of a much broader concept of policing than simply the potential functions of the police. In this sense, the police might be considered as just one part of the municipal safety and protection agenda.

In Toronto, a number of policing functions are carried out, for example, by a huge and growing private security industry. It has even been suggested that more resources are now devoted to policing functions by the private sector than by the public sector. Even in the public sector, separate from the police budget, considerable resources are devoted to policing functions by the Toronto Transit Commission, the Metro Toronto Housing Authority and many other such public institutions.

My point is that it is helpful to take this broader view of the policing function in order to gain a better understanding of who is best equipped to provide it. It may therefore require of municipalities in their budgetary process to undertake an audit of policing resources -- not just the police, which can be one of several delivery vehicles -- and match resources to problems.

I therefore think it would be a useful opportunity if section 4 of Bill 105 could reflect these kinds of realities and recognize the need for creativity and flexibility in policing delivery systems. Otherwise, I think we will have to continue to allow the police to control the policing agenda; that the function of policing will continue to be captured -- colonized, if you will -- by the police; and that the function of allocating resources to policing will continue to be merely the allocation of resources to the police.

Following from this, my next point is with regard to terminology. Bill 105 uses the terms "police force" and "police service" interchangeably. I would therefore encourage consistency throughout the bill and recommend that the term "force" be deleted and replaced by the term "service" throughout the document. This is symbolically important in reflecting the name of the act this bill is amending, as well as our understanding of the nature and function of policing.

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My next point relates to section 113 of the Police Services Act, concerning the special investigations unit. It is unfortunate that changes to the SIU are not addressed in this bill. Let me refer you to the Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, December 1995. I really do think this is one of the most critical documents that can guide the agenda in implementing not only a police race relations strategy but also in guiding the community policing philosophy and strengthening the principle of public accountability. That is why I am very disappointed that the work of the commission is ignored in this bill.

While there are many issues in the commission's study of direct relevance to policing that are not necessarily incorporated into its recommendations, let me repeat those that are, which relate specifically to the issue of police shootings. The commission recommends that:

The Police Services Act be amended to require any officer involved in an investigation falling within the jurisdiction of the SIU to be required to turn any requested information and evidence over to the SIU forthwith and, in any event, no later than 24 hours after the request.

The Police Services Act regulations be amended to provide that the director of the SIU be authorized to charge any officer who fails to provide such information or evidence in a timely fashion with a misconduct offence.

The Police Services Act be amended to require that any officer who fails to answer questions from an SIU investigator be suspended with pay.

The Police Services Act regulations be amended to provide that when the director of the SIU informs a chief of police that an officer under the chief's command has failed to give a complete statement to an SIU investigator, the chief shall suspend the officer forthwith without pay.

In order to ensure that the SIU can conduct effective investigations, the legislation requires the full cooperation of all police officers, yet over the years, the SIU has been hampered in its ability to fulfil its role by the lack of cooperation from police services and the refusal of individual officers to be interviewed. This is unacceptable, and it is disappointing that Bill 105 was not used as an opportunity to address some of the present limitations in the effective working of the special investigations unit. I therefore urge that the commission's recommendations should be incorporated into Bill 105.

My last point relates to Part V of Bill 105, the complaint system. When the Attorney General, the Honourable Charles Harnick, announced the review of the civilian oversight process by Rod McLeod, his objective was that it should be "fair, readily accessible, objective and unbiased." I certainly endorse that intention.

However, the proposed amendments contained in this bill appear to do the opposite. While I agree that reform and streamlining of the civilian oversight system is necessary, I certainly did not anticipate that the government's proposed solution would be the reduction of civilian involvement in the complaints process. The proposed amendments revert back to the old system of placing more of an onus on asking the police to investigate themselves. This, as we all know, is inherently unfair, not only to the public but also to the police themselves, who are compromised by an evident conflict of interest.

The present system entails an internal investigatory process that is monitored by external review. The public concern is that it is still inherently unfair because it is still dominated by the police themselves. I would therefore assume that the amendments to the Police Services Act would address this issue and further strengthen the principles of public accountability and civic participation by expanding the involvement of non-police citizens. Instead, however, to my surprise and dismay, the proposed amendments impose most of the responsibility to adjudicate the complaint on the chief of police.

For example, in classifying a complaint, according to section 58(3) of the proposed amendments, "The chief of police may decide not to deal with any complaint...that he or she considers to be frivolous or vexatious." Without clarifying or defining what "frivolous or vexatious" complaints might be, this bill allows considerable arbitrary power to the chief of police.

Section 57(1) directs that "A complaint may be made by a member of the public only if the complainant was directly affected by the policy, service or conduct that is the subject of the complaint," and it must be made to the "station or detachment of the police force to which the complaint relates or to the commission." This section is restricting who can make a complaint and where the complaint can be made. Why? It unnecessarily reduces accessibility for citizens. It ignores the reality of what can be a very intimidating situation for many complainants.

In addition, the proposed amendments provide less right of appeal to the complainant than presently exists, and they also give a more limited, passive mandate for the proposed new commission.

I am not sure if these proposed amendments represent unintentional oversight on the part of the draftees of this bill or whether they represent a purposeful dismantling of the civilian oversight of the complaint system. This bill clearly would be a huge setback to the civilian oversight process. It reduces the democratic principle of civilian involvement and it diminishes the fundamental tenets of public accountability and public accessibility to a major public institution.

In the evolution of attempting to create an independent civilian oversight system in Ontario over the last decade and a half, many others have detailed the improvements and changes that are required, the way forward, including the public complaints commission, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Community Coalition Concerned about Civilian Oversight of Police and many others. Section 5 of this bill, as it presently reads, represents a way backward and should not be permitted beyond second hearing without major revision.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Councillor Salmon. You used basically all of your time, so there won't be time for questions, unfortunately. Thank you for your presentation here today.

AZELIN PHILLIPS

The Chair: Our next presentation, Ms Phillips. Welcome, Ms Phillips. We have 15 minutes set aside for you, so I'd ask you to proceed.

Ms Azelin Phillips: Honourable Chair, Vice-Chair, distinguished members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. My name is Azelin Phillips, and I'm a resident of Peel. I am a member of the United Achievers club of Brampton, which is a non-profit organization established in 1980 to focus and to bring recognition to the role of blacks and Caribbean people in our society. A letter from this organization addressing the issue, I bring to your attention, will be submitted separately along with a list of signatories. I am also a member of the Peel community police race relations committee. This committee will also be submitting a letter addressing this issue.

I am appearing as an individual, not as a representative of any organization, and I wish to make it clear that my motive is not to criticize the undertakings of the government. I wish only to focus attention on the section of the amendments dealing with public complaints.

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I believe the efforts of the government to reduce waste and duplication are worthy of praise and, all things being equal, complaints being handled by police chiefs would be an acceptable alternative to the expense incurred in having a civilian oversight body. However, we exist in a society where all things are not always equal.

The amendment is not fair to the public and it is not fair to the police. The police chief has an obligation to protect the members of his force. He cannot be expected to do otherwise. He also has a responsibility to members of the public. But being who he is, a member of the police, having to make critical decisions involving police and the public, the unavoidable reality is that the public will be at a disadvantage. It becomes a situation of one's own family versus a member of someone else's family, and naturally the question of loyalty and integrity comes into the equation.

The public deserves to be protected. The public needs to know that justice is not a remote concept, that it is real and, more importantly, the public needs to believe there is fairness in the application of justice. Based on past experiences, can we expect any fairness in the handling of complaints against police when the decision-making process becomes the responsibility of the police chief?

If the recent public declaration of support to his officers by Metro Police Chief David Boothby, even before he knew the circumstances of the fatal shooting on an empty TTC bus of a man suffering from schizophrenia, is any indication of the fairness with which complaints will be handled by the police chief, then may God help us all.

The chief of police will have the onerous task of deciding the merits of public complaints, and if he decides that a complaint is frivolous or vexatious, there will be no action taken. Can the public trust his judgment?

The checks and balances embodied in the current Police Services Act protecting the rights of the individual are the direct result of years of study and hard work, not only by members of the general public but by police officers. Eroding these safeguards and replacing them with nothing remotely similar is simply an act of political expediency without any regard for the public.

The black community suffers most from injustices at the hands of the police. It is therefore not unusual to witness an atmosphere of anxiety fraught with a sense of hopelessness within our community when a change of this magnitude occurs in our already biased system of justice. The new amendment is taking society back a number of years. I appeal to your sense of fairness and goodness to look at these changes and take a proactive step towards progress.

While I do not wish to minimize the long history of efforts others have made to effect positive changes on behalf of the black community, for the most part our ongoing plight is never fully understood by the larger community. Our daily struggles to feel we are part of the bigger picture leave many of us with a permanent look of anxiety, frustration, sadness or a combination of all these emotions. People, including the police, often mistake this for anger and quickly judge us.

There are those who believe our reasons to fear the police are imaginary, but only those who have had an imaginary gun pointed at their imaginary head or those who have been pulled over and searched for no other reason than the fact that they bear a resemblance to every other member of the black race can speak with authority on this issue, but I believe I understand.

The larger society will not necessarily see this section of the amendment as intimidating and in most likelihood will believe in the impartiality of justice handed out by the police chiefs. From the perspective of the black community, however, this is almost an impossibility.

A 1987 study revealed that Peel, which has the second-largest multicultural population, was experiencing major problems between the police and the public. What was discovered then was that changes within the police services were not keeping pace with the new demographics. As a result of this, actions were taken to address some public concerns. As well, the current Police Services Act embodied certain changes which have helped to foster working relationships between the police and the public.

I do not for one moment presume to think the government does not have the interests of the public at heart. However, I believe too much is being taken for granted. I cannot believe the government just doesn't care. That would be too difficult to accept. I must therefore conclude that there is a misconception where the relationship between police and the public is concerned.

When a relationship is built and maintained because of the power one party exerts over another, that relationship can hardly be considered healthy. It can best be described as needs-meeting compliance. The relationship between the police and the public, especially the black community, is still very fragile. Continued effort in demonstrating mutual respect, goodwill and trust is needed to enhance this relationship. However, the police chief being responsible for handling public complaints will certainly not enhance this process. It will serve only to create more mistrust. Let's be realistic. It's not simply important to be fair; it is important to give the appearance of fairness.

The amendment combining most of the existing oversight bodies will result in savings of more than $182 million annually. The police complaints commissioner has an annual budget of, I believe, $9 million. This oversight body consists of approximately 55 staff. It has an office in eight cities of Ontario. But $9 million dollars is not an incredibly large budget for the number of communities served by this civilian oversight body. Its effectiveness in maintaining goodwill and a measure of trust cannot be discounted or valued simply in terms of dollars and cents. This oversight body is the most basic, with direct access by the public. It offers assistance in a manner which does not alienate and intimidate. However, only about 50% of police complaints go through this oversight body. The reason for this is probably because many people are not aware of its existence. Therefore, if the rationale behind the elimination of this oversight body is lack of utilization, then the decision might be unjustified due to the lack of public awareness of its existence.

Whereas the new amendment deems that complaints be accepted only in writing and third-party complaints will not be accepted, the office of the police complaints commission accepts verbal complaints, written complaints, as well as third-party complaints.

We need to be cognizant of the fact that an unfortunately large percentage of the population is illiterate. Will these individuals be expected to write their own complaints, even though they cannot read and write? Are they to be punished simply because of their academic limitations? Many people prefer to express their thoughts and report their issues verbally, not because they can't read or write, but simply because it is more comfortable for them. Are we suggesting that they forget about filing a legitimate complaint just because they don't trust their ability to write their complaints appropriately, as the mandate requires?

Some people are fearful of reprisal by the police. Are we suggesting that they get rid of their fear and simply walk into a police station and file their written complaints against police officers? There is nothing simple about this process.

When an individual has a grievance and cannot get an impartial party to listen, this individual is likely to become frustrated, and when his or her frustration builds, a catalyst will be found in order to vent. Venting does not necessarily mean verbal catharsis; it might be expressed in random acts of violence to property or persons. Are we sure we want to take the risk of being targets of such random acts of violence triggered by frustration?

The amendment closes several doors, leaving open one or two restricted doors; for example, the special investigations unit. The amendment also provides a high and narrow window, namely the office of the police chief, to deal with public complaints. The public needs a door at an accessible level, not necessarily a large door but an open door.

I do not believe the amendments to the Police Services Act were meant to create divisiveness. I believe an element of the total picture was inadvertently omitted. The fallout from this amendment will no doubt be felt more strongly by members of the visible minority communities. However, I trust everyone can see the potential for conflict and look at the issue not in terms of how the changes will affect them personally but to understand that there is a real possibility of a rippling effect. Let us refuse to utter or even believe within ourselves that an issue is not important simply because it does not affect us personally. In the long run, it becomes everyone's problem.

My recommendation is that the amendment be changed to include a civilian oversight body to handle complaints against police and police services. The reason for this recommendation is that although I understand and respect the cost-saving efforts of combining several oversight bodies, I also believe that the importance of maintaining a good and trusting relationship between the police and the public and having groups of people eventually getting beyond their differences far outweighs the financial savings.

Thank you for the time you've taken to listen to my presentation.

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Mr Carr: Thank you very much for a very fine presentation. I appreciate your taking the time. With regard to the oversight, as you know, OCCPS is there to be the appeal process, civilian process. What is your concern with that particular body doing the oversight? When you talk about not having civilian oversight, that's what meant to do it. What are your specific concerns regarding that body?

Ms Phillips: My understanding is that when a person has a complaint, you send that complaint into the police station. Isn't OCCPS a further, a higher --

Mr Carr: You could send it to OCCPS too.

Ms Phillips: You can also send it to OCCPS?

Mr Carr: Right.

Ms Phillips: But what has happened with the police complaints commissioner's office?

Mr Carr: It's being rolled into the commission.

Ms Phillips: How accessible is OCCPS? Is it as accessible as the police complaints commissioner?

Mr Carr: Thank you very much.

Mr Ramsay: Ms Phillips, I want to thank you for your presentation. It was very thoughtful and it has made me think about amendments that we would bring forward to try to address some of these concerns you have. We'll be doing that in the next few weeks. Thank you very much.

Mr Christopherson: Thank you very much for your presentation. I thought it was very fair. You clearly went out of your way to try to embrace as much as you could in terms of the police community; at the same time you bring fair criticism.

I was struck by your comments at the bottom of page 5 when you acknowledged: "The relationship between the police and the public, especially the black community, is still very fragile. Continued effort in demonstrating mutual respect, goodwill and trust is needed to enhance this relationship. However, the police chief being responsible for handling public complaints will certainly not enhance this process. It will serve only to create more mistrust." How do you see that mistrust perhaps manifesting itself?

Ms Phillips: If one files a complaint, knowing that the police chief is going to be the person making the decision in that, even though the police chief might not be favouring the police officer, there is going to be that misconception there that favouritism will take place.

Mr Christopherson: How will that show itself in the black community as a result?

Ms Phillips: In the black community there's always mistrust, because as you know -- I'm sure we're all aware of this -- there are identified problems with our young people and the police.

Mr Christopherson: This is just going to make it worse.

Ms Phillips: I think so, yes.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms Phillips, for your attendance here today and your presentation.

URBAN ALLIANCE ON RACE RELATIONS

The Chair: Our next presentation is the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, Antoni Shelton. Welcome.

Mr Antoni Shelton: Mr Chair, I have with me, fortunately enough, a volunteer of the organization, a long-serving board member, Ms Charlotte Chiba.

As executive director of Urban Alliance, I think it's important to tell you that the Urban Alliance on Race Relations has been working in the field of race relations and policing for over 22 years, and before the creation of the special investigations unit and the Ontario police complaints commission, the Urban Alliance was essential in establishing in Toronto the Council on Race Relations and Policing, which was a "partnership" between Metro police and the community. For reasons that I will go into in a little while, that council was overtaken by events essentially that happened in the community and the partnership was unable to withstand the pressure of media attention and pressure from both the community and the policing culture itself.

Having said that, we would like to address what we believe is the central issue in terms of the act and it is the headline of the newspapers this morning: "Police Chiefs to Handle Complaints Against Cops. Police chiefs will be given more power to stickhandle complaints against officers under legislation introduced by the Conservative government, Solicitor General Bob Runciman says."

There will be little confidence, we believe, in terms of the chief's ability to be perceived as objective and fair, because unfortunately there is a widespread perception that the police discriminate against racial minorities. In a survey performed in Nova Scotia for the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr Prosecution, about 60% of respondents agreed that police discriminated against blacks. In a similar survey conducted in Montreal, 53% of respondents agreed that the police mistreat citizens from ethnic minorities. In Manitoba, Ontario and Nova Scotia, aboriginal people have complained that they are singled out for enforcement action and stereotyped by the police. Studies performed in the United States and Great Britain also suggest that blacks and Hispanics are likely to have less favourable attitudes towards the police than whites.

Since the 1960s a considerable amount of effort has been devoted to studying the empirical basis for minority groups' less favourable perception of the police. Academic research performed in North America and Great Britain has examined the influence that racial factors play in decision-making by the police. In several jurisdictions the topic has also been the subject of special public inquiry. Most studies have also found evidence of differential treatment of blacks, Hispanics and aboriginal peoples in North America and blacks in Great Britain in their interactions with the police. We believe, given the multicultural nature of greater Toronto, this includes other diverse and ethnic communities.

As for discrimination against complainants, American studies have found that the race of the victim is an important determinant of decision-making on the part of the police and other actors within the criminal justice system. In one study, the race of the victim was found to be a significant determinant of police decision-making while the race of the suspect was not. In other words, if you bring a complaint the police, chances are your race will be more important than the subject officer's race. A study commissioned by the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr Prosecution found indications that police stereotype aboriginal people as being drunk and violent, but then discount the importance of calls from reserves. In other words, complainants from the reserves were treated differently than citizens off-reserve.

Why have race relations policies and programs made little difference to address this tension between minority communities and the police?

In April 1990, the auditor of the Metro Toronto police force was requested by the police services board in Metro to perform for the first time in Canada, we think, an audit of race relations in the Metro force. Allan Andrews felt that tensions between police and minorities persisted and he found no quick answer. He did say: "Much of the force activity in respect to race relations has been in programs in employment equity, in community involvement, and in other areas in which the force interacts with racial minorities. But most are framed in a form which views the force as an institution which does not require change at the core. Consequently, effort has been directed towards changes around the fringes of the operation or accommodation of differences in the community, without recognizing the fact that the institution, its culture and its values need to change."

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Allan Andrews went on to say: "We found no evidence at all of organized, intentional prejudice or bias against racial minorities." I think this is an important point. "Nor did we find evidence that the force attracts individuals who are covertly racist. We did find evidence that, over time, officers develop strong feelings and beliefs as to attributes of individuals based on factors such as appearance and racial background. These attitudes, when taken collectively, can and do produce a bias in behaviour which produces unequal treatment of individuals of different cultural or racial background."

Here we have perceptions of the police culture, here we have Allan Andrews's analysis and opinions on this culture and efforts undertaken through training and other programs to address the tensions between communities but still not getting at the core values of the force.

We believe then in light of this legislation on the table that the chief's track record in standing outside of the police core culture is perceived as free from bias and able to do fair oversight of police.

In 1992, we believe that there was a very seminal inquiry into exactly this question. The inquiry was into the administration of internal investigations by the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force conducted by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services in August 1992, otherwise known as the Junger inquiry. Junger was a police constable who signed a controversial resignation agreement amid charges he ran an escort service with his then girlfriend. Junger signed the resignation deal with two members of Metro's internal affairs unit. In the two-page document, police agreed to destroy physical evidence related to Junger's personal business dealings with a call girl. The then chief refused in this public inquiry, or was unable, to clearly state to the inquiry whether it was under his responsibility to authorize and sign off on any deal with Constable Junger.

The so-called Junger inquiry also looked at a Jane Doe case where the complaint was that a officer had used his badge to extort sexual favours. These are complaints against the police force in Toronto, only in 1992. Two officers from the highly secretive internal affairs unit interviewed at least one witness in the Jane Doe case after it had been turned over to the public complaints commissioner. The chief was questioned as to who authorized it and why, among other things, Jane Doe's identity was potentially compromised.

We could go on about some of the examples that members of the public have experienced when bringing a complaint against the force, but with the brief time we've been given, I'll move right to what the police services board's response was to the Junger inquiry, because here we have provincial appointees and civilians on the police services board that called the Junger inquiry together and then were forced to act upon those recommendations.

The chair said in September 1992, "A number of significant events have taken place in recent months followed by recommendations that challenge the board to fully exercise its role as the civilian authority responsible for the governance of the police force."

The police services board recommended in section B in the document, attached to my submission, called "Direction to the Chief": "The board agreed with the Junger inquiry finding that an agreement entered into to obtain the resignation of an officer was highly improper in that it purported to provide, in exchange, an undertaking to withdraw a criminal charge, a promise to lay no other charges, either criminal or disciplinary, a promise to destroy evidence and a promise to keep the terms secret. The inquiry further found unacceptable the entering into of an agreement with no intention of complying with it."

Finally, in terms of our submission, we wanted to say that the board brought out a very central point, and that was that the Junger inquiry should not be seen as an attempt to focus on an individual but rather management and a lack of systemic response in terms of the policing service. As such, the police board went on to recommend: "Policies and procedures must be examined and changed...to ensure a higher standard of conduct is achievable. And finally, the board must put in place mechanisms that allow it to monitor the performance of the chief and the force in complying with these standards of conduct."

Even though the Junger inquiry wasn't a race relations inquiry per se, we thought it was nevertheless very important to look at this inquiry in light of, as we say, a piece of legislation that should be really sent back to the minister for amendments to the act because it attempts to transfer oversight power back to the chief without assessing the impact in light of reports such as the Junger inquiry.

Ms Charlotte Chiba: I'll just continue on with that point, sort of administrative law type of points regarding the amendments. We're very pleased to see that the government has decided to, at least on paper, put a large part of the expressed requirements, five core functions for police services, on to the board and to articulate very clearly what their function is and oversight sort of by the municipality, because they have control of the finances. What you're trying to do, I assume, is to put the responsibility of police services on the municipal -- as you say, local -- level.

On the other hand, in terms of those five core responsibilities, your question is, who does what? My question to you is, will it work? On behalf of the Urban Alliance, along with Antoni Shelton, we think that there are some serious problems here. Of course, we focus on the chief of police and the civilian oversight because that oversight function is directly related to a number of the core functions that you have articulated in the bill, namely, crime prevention and public order maintenance. All these things are connected to civilian review.

If you look at civilian review as being a way of checking whether or not the board and the police are doing their jobs properly, then you might have to call question to the fact that you're giving all discretionary authority, you're delegating authority, to the chief of police to oversee the board, which I think is contrary to basic administrative law procedure or process. Clearly, if you're requiring the chief of police to receive complaints from the public regarding the board or a policy of the board, that's like asking an employee to receive complaints about his or her employer. This is not proper. This is improper procedure.

That goes against your five functions and your whole idea of accountability. The accountability is now switched. So it's not reasonable, there's no justification for giving the chief of police all this discretionary delegated authority. I haven't been able to find any. I submit that it's probably opening the way for abuse of power very much like what happened in the Junger situation. There are no proper checks and balances between the board's authority and the police and we're suggesting that there's no reason, in terms of civilian review or the civilian complaints system, for both the board and the chief not to get together to form some sort of group to receive these complaints. That would be more equitable, that would be more a perception of fairness. Those complainants who do not wish -- and it's reasonable for them not to -- to go to the police when they're already complaining about them -- it's like in any workplace. If you have a complaint against your boss, you're not going to go to the boss to complain. Usually, they have human resources or something, a third party to complain to without feeling reprisal, being shot down because you're complaining. This is just human nature. You don't want to go to the person whom you think is causing the problem.

Am I out of time?

The Chair: The time is up. I thank you very much for your presentation. We have to move on to our next presentation. Thank you.

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DON WEITZ

The Chair: Our next presentation is from Mr Don Weitz. Welcome, Mr Weitz.

Mr Don Weitz: Thank you for allowing me to speak. I am here not to represent any group but myself. As some of you may know, I testified before a similar committee against Bill 103, and I consider Bill 105 an additional threat to democracy. Actually, it's a very serious fascist threat on citizen rights.

To go back just a bit, as an introduction, I've been involved with the psychiatric survivor community. I prefer to use the word "survivor" because I survived abuse from the system, along with thousands of others. I've been an unemployed human rights advocate for over 20 years, and I try to be as alert as possible to threats to the rights of people who are already marginalized, already abused, already stigmatized traditionally in Canada and the United States and elsewhere. When a bill such as Bill 105, this bill under consideration, comes along and attacks our rights by further centralizing the power in the hands of one person, namely the police chief, to make extremely fateful and in some cases irrevocable decisions affecting the fate of my people who are already stigmatized, this is extremely serious. As you can see, I am very much opposed to it, which is why I am wearing my No Means No button once again.

I have a couple of things to say about a brother who was killed by the police not quite a month ago. His name has already been mentioned with great respect by the Chinese community and other communities: Edmond Wai Hong Yu, a brilliant, 35-year-old man who was unarmed when he was shot on a TTC bus at the base of Spadina Avenue, I believe on February 21. Along with many others, I was at his vigil. This has greatly upset a lot of brothers and sisters in the psychiatric survivor community who are now, on good authority I can say, in extreme fear that they will be next -- yes, fear, through so-called responsible, so-called justified police action to an unarmed man.

The police officer apparently couldn't make the distinction between a toy hammer and a gun. This is a 22-year veteran by the name of Louis Pasquino. Mr Pasquino has already been mentioned in the press. He already has admitted to shooting. The SIU supposedly is investigating. Don't hold your breath about whether there'll be a thorough report, because it'll be biased, probably because Mr Pasquino has steadfastly refused to cooperate with the SIU. There's nothing, apparently, in law to force him. There's certainly nothing in Bill 105 to force him or police officers to cooperate with a lawful investigation. Why not? Who are you covering up for?

Obviously, if you pass this without any compulsion on the police to cooperate in an investigation of a death, you're actually complicit and a party to a coverup, a phrase that was already mentioned by previous speakers, so I am not saying anything that's new. That's one big thing. Don't expect any justice from an investigation by the SIU or any other into the death by a police officer. You ain't going to get it. When have we had it? When? That was a rhetorical question.

Yes, I am quite upset. And by the way, Mr Yu is one of 15 other people who have been shot and killed by the police within the last five or six years, and over three quarters have been people of colour. As a human rights advocate, as a citizen who is concerned about human rights, I deeply protest, I seriously protest this targeting, yes, targeting of people of colour and those with a psychiatric history. Mr Yu had three strikes against him: He had a psychiatric history, he was a person of colour -- he happened to be Chinese -- and he was homeless, poor. This targeting has got to stop. But the police don't see a problem. "Just an accident."

Let me rattle off the names. With respect, you should listen to these names because I don't want you to forget them. We haven't forgotten them. These are not statistics. These are human beings who have as much right to live as you have, but they were targeted. They were not, in most cases, a direct threat to the officers. Who are these nameless statistics?

Faraz Suleman, killed June 19, 1996; Wayne Williams, a black man, 24 years old, shot dead June 11, 1996; Andrew Rudolph Bramwell, March 14, 1996; Tommy Barnett, another black man, January 10, 1996, only 22; Albert Moses, shot in the face September 29, 1994; Ian Coley, 20 years old, shot twice in the chest April 20, 1993; Luis Vega, 28 years old, shot three times December 26, 1992; Raymond Lawrence, another black man, shot twice by an undercover officer May 2, 1992; Patrick Joseph Clements, 41, shot July 16, 1991; Jules Ernest Cubitt, 59, shot June 23, 1991; Joseph Gerard Boisjoly, 45, shot December 26, 1990; Donald Peltier, 19 years old, shot January 25, 1990. Three others were shot, three other brothers with a psychiatric history died from pepper spray, killed by police officers.

The last one to be killed by pepper spray was Zdravko Pujec from Croatia, on a psych ward, already manacled. Police officers from Durham came up after a call from Big Nurse at the Whitby Psychiatric Hospital. Whitby Psychiatric Hospital makes it a point of calling the Durham police when they need some help to restrain. Apparently, the drugs and the goon squads at Whitby aren't sufficient so they call up the Durham police for extra reinforcements. This was a man already shackled, right? So they come on the ward, ffffft, ffffft, twice; 30 minutes after, he's dead.

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I asked for a report from the SIU. I was refused it once. I appealed in the public interest. It was refused again. So much for openness and accountability by the police or this government. A patient, unarmed, sprayed to death by the so-called safe pepper spray. It has already been seriously criticized, if not condemned, in California and a few other states, but it's legal here. It immobilizes, it stops you from breathing, among other interesting side-effects, and the police are authorized to use it.

There is no accountability, it seems to me, on the part of the police officers to the public to let us know what really is going on. Bill 105 enshrines secrecy, it enshrines coverup. I have a recommendation which echoes Mr Antoni Shelton, others who've spoken on behalf of people, groups who've already been marginalized. Let the process be open. Let the decisions about whether or not there's going to be investigation be made by a civilian oversight committee. I have no trust in police investigating the police. Why should I, after mentioning these senseless, unjustified killings? I have no trust. I can speak confidently for a lot, maybe many hundreds, of people who've been fighting for human rights for people who've already been marginalized, invalidated and intimidated.

I think this whole bill should be scrapped and we should get on with really letting civilians, non-police, conduct the investigations, decide whether there is going to be an investigation or not, because so far the system is stacked against people who've already been stigmatized.

That's all I've got to say. I think you have a copy of my unpublished letter to the Star regarding Mr Yu, where I talk about the stigma, about the targeting on the part of both the police and the media when it comes to dealing fairly with people of colour, with people who have a psychiatric history. I'm very sick and tired of this perpetuation of stigma. I have really had it. I think we need a lot more justice, but we're not getting it. That's all I've got to say about that.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr Weitz. Your time is up. Thank you.

Mr Weitz: No time for any questions?

The Chair: No, unfortunately you used it all up. A most provocative presentation. Thank you.

ROY RAWLUK

The Chair: We'll move on to the next presenter, Mr Roy Rawluk. There is a written presentation by Mr Rawluk that's being distributed. Welcome, sir.

Mr Roy Rawluk: Good afternoon, Chair and members of the committee.

The Chair: I'll remind you, after looking at your presentation, that you have 15 minutes. I assume you're going to condense it somewhat.

Mr Rawluk: I was going to bury myself in the brief and that way I'd maybe be brave to face this committee.

As the Chair has said, my name is Roy Rawluk. I am a police officer and I have been a police officer for the past 22 years in Metropolitan Toronto. I'm a proud police officer, and it's part of my molecular structure. I thoroughly care about the direction policing is going, not only in this city but in this province, and that is one of the main reasons I am here, because I do have some very serious concerns about Bill 105.

I'm not going to follow my brief in order. There's four themes, basically, to my brief. It's 38 pages long, so I'll just get into the meat of it right away. I'll start with my concerns; it's not in the order of my importance to the concerns.

My first concern deals with politicization that I believe this bill is perhaps dragging our police services in Ontario towards in the very near future. That is based on the new funding imperative in Bill 105. I'll quote a little passage from a commissioner who made a report on discretion to prosecute in British Columbia. At that time, I think it was about 10 years ago, the commissioner stated:

"The rule of law in a democracy requires the public's ongoing consent and confidence in order to survive. Any widespread unease with the essential fairness of our justice system can cripple it. Perception becomes reality when suspicion of injustice is allowed to fester. The system must be capable of quickly and convincingly resolving any such doubts.... It is not enough to know...that the system works fairly. The adversarial nature of our political system and its apparent proximity to the administration of justice will inevitably raise questions of potential or other influential figures.... The system itself must be capable of demonstrating its integrity on an ongoing basis."

I'm afraid Bill 105, by allowing the municipalities to dominate by majority, by appointment to the police services board, will politicize policing. It's a predictable consequence of the functional proximity of the local police service to the local government and its dependence upon municipal council for funding and thereby, indirect control for identification and direction of law enforcement priorities. There's just no way around that. It's going to happen.

The amendments as proposed cause the creation of a model of control whereby it will be remotely possible for politicians to have significant influence on the chief's operational independence. This is a real concern because there is almost a subliminal thrust to major change, with little consultation of these implications.

This legislative move is perceived to be direct political control of police priorities, an illusory freedom to manage dependent upon efficiency savings and revenue production. In reality it is an astute shifting of police responsibility.

Let there be no misunderstanding on this point. Municipal politicians will have undue influence on operational police matters. Not safeguarding this fundamental imperative is a blueprint for disaster.

In the final analysis, the legislative scheme for funding police services is a meaningless ritual for the following reasons:

Only police service boards are allowed to appeal directly to the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services for municipal funding allocation review on inadequacy grounds. The chief can't. Police associations can't. The board is the only one, and the board is dominated by the councillors who made the funding decision in the first place. How are you going to get around that?

The second major problem is the chance of an appeal being launched: Again it's very slim. Politicians are not going to overrule their initial decisions.

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The civilian commission -- and I want you to take very careful note of this -- has significant powers over a police force, the chief of police and police services boards. However, the decisions of the commission cannot be directly enforced on a municipal council. There is no legislative mechanism in place to enforce the commission's decisions on municipal councils. So we appeal to the commission because we believe there's an inadequacy in providing services to our communities, and the commission may very well agree with us and make a ruling. But there is no enforcement mechanism to force a municipality to comply with that decision. That's a gap as big as a Mack truck. It has to be closed by legislative means.

The standards for police services are established under authority of the provincial government, yet financial responsibility for their implementation now lies with municipalities. Again, there is no legislative mechanism in place to ensure a municipality complies with the necessary fiscal support needed to maintain these standards. As previously stated, the structure of a municipality, which is majority-controlled by councillors, is a prohibitive factor in meeting this mandated compliance. These are major concerns that the bill does not address. Therefore, I recommend:

(1) That the chief of police and police associations have the right to appeal to OCCPS for an adequacy review.

(2) Municipal appointees declare a conflict of interest and refrain from voting on a policing adequacy motion appeal to OCCPS.

(3) Legislative changes be made so that OCCPS adequacy decisions can be directly enforced on municipal councils.

(4) Enabling legislation be passed that would ensure that municipalities will finance provincial policing standards.

That is my concern in regard to the funding, and I'll move quickly on to the other three areas.

Bill 105 involves a legal analysis and I'm not going to get into it. I went into great detail in my brief about it and I hope you will carefully read it. It's in "An Affront to the Legal Status of the `Office of Constable'," and jurisprudence, Commonwealth-wise, will back that up. The law is clear on this point. The duties of police officers are of a public nature and not owing to the municipality or a board by which a police officer has been appointed. Further, it is concluded on the basis of law that the manner in which the duties are imposed by statute on a member of a police service is a matter of public concern and therefore the relationship of master and servant does not exist in law as between a municipality or a board and a member of a police service.

The distinction between the master-servant contractual relationship found in the private sector and the constable as a holder of office largely makes normal sanction processes under labour law inapplicable to the disciplinary process found in the policing context. This is so because labour law principles are founded on the contractual principles of master and servant.

I brought that up because in Bill 105 the chief can now make a finding of misconduct against an officer without a hearing and can impose a penalty of up to four days off, which is the equivalent of about a $1,000 fine to a police officer, without a hearing. If the officer is not satisfied with that, he has an appeal but his appeal is only to an arbitrator who has a background in industrial relations and who deals with the master-servant type of contractual disputes. How can that be reconciled with the legal status of a police officer? You can't mix labour relations arbitrations with the holding of a public office. My brief goes into great detail about that.

My second theme is that the disciplinary hearing is a procedureless procedure; substantive fairness standards are abandoned. Values must be balanced and reconciled in a legislated discipline policy. The interests of the constable stem mainly from the principles of natural justice. Procedural fairness should prevail and the police officer therefore has the right to be treated fairly. This includes the right not to be subjected to administrative sanctions without the benefit of procedural fairness. The harm of being sanctioned without the benefit of procedural fairness certainly outweighs any gain therein.

As police officers we are not only mandated, I think we have a moral and legal obligation to uphold the law, yet when it comes to disciplining a police officer, that same law does not apply to us. That cannot be allowed to continue or allowed to go without serious thought of the implications. You can't expect an officer of the law to have fidelity to the legislative process if he's not subject to it. Please consider that.

My last point is this ridiculous misconduct rule for unsatisfactory work performance. It's a standardless standard. Just when you thought the government was taking seriously its assigned task of protecting the rights of citizens, this amendment resurfaces like a giant shark in the movie Jaws and attempts to take yet another bite out of the procedural protections afforded police officers in this province.

It's just unbelievable that a rule will be made that's arbitrary and subjective, with no objective criteria to judge that performance. What does "unsatisfactory" mean? There's no definition of it. The chief could make a finding on a rule without a definition and fine that officer and the officer doesn't even know what he did wrong. I just don't understand it. For example, how is good practice defined? What criteria are used to judge good practice? How is good practice measured? The basic questions have to be answered before you could even think of disciplining someone under that rule.

In summation on this point, it is clear that a police officer must have a substantive right to compare his performance with set standards. Without such a relationship between the performance appraisal and performance standards, management will possess unfettered discretion to arbitrarily label any officer's performance unsatisfactory and the officer would have no basis on which to improve their performance.

I recommend this model if you're going to go into a performance appraisal system, and it must include the following substantive rights:

There must be objective standards.

There must be communication of performance expectations in a manner that is comprehensible.

Evaluations based upon the established standards which advise the officer of his or her degree of success or failure.

There must be assistance in overcoming difficulties and an opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance both before and after a performance-based action is taken.

Discipline cannot be sustained in light of a failure to prove that an officer was not provided with one of these performance rights.

You need all of these. It's a package. You just can't isolate and say this is a misconduct rule, without a built-in backup system to justify that action.

Bill 105 must be amended so that solutions can be obtained to the following three critical policing concerns:

(1) How can legislators best integrate systems and operations within police organizations so that it has the capacity to solve the internal problems that could inhibit successfully addressing the community's difficult crime problems?

(2) How can police and local municipalities establish a police work environment in which officials are willing to consider whether ineffective and inefficient work is the product of systemic problems or of policy or managerial or training failures, rather than solely the individual responsibility of police officers?

The Chair: Excuse me, Mr Rawluk, just wrap it up, please.

Mr Rawluk: Yes, sir. My last point is, how can legislative action fashion a work environment that encourages police officers to be creative and gives them permission, within reason, to make mistakes in pursuit of good policing goals?

Without legislators, managers and the community granting police officers the appropriate permission to fail, asking police to take risks in devising better methods to solve community problems and concerns sends a troubling mixed message and becomes a cruel joke. Thank you.

The Chair: I thank you very much, Mr Rawluk. There's no time for questions.

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NIAGARA REGION POLICE ASSOCIATION

The Chair: The next presentation is the Niagara Region Police Association, Mr Michael Pratt, Paul Disimoni, Richard Frayne and Robert Jackson. Welcome, gentlemen.

Mr Michael Pratt: Good afternoon, Mr Chairman. You're certainly running a tight ship today. You're right on time and I commend you on that. I certainly know you're not going to let me delay these proceedings, so I will make sure I don't go beyond the 15 minutes.

I believe that you and the members here are just about to receive a report or a presentation that I've put together. While that's being handed out, maybe I could take a moment -- the names were mentioned, but I'd just like to take an opportunity to introduce the people here.

I am the administrator of the Niagara Region Police Association, Mike Pratt. To my right is the president of our association, Richard Frayne, a serving police constable; to the far right is a member of our board of directors, Bob Jackson, also a serving police constable; and to my left is another director of our board, Paul Disimoni, also a serving police officer.

What I would like to do in my presentation is take you through a brief history of an event in order to show you the need that the present Police Services Act be amended, specifically that section 25 of the act be amended to include police associations in the list of those who can request an investigation under section 25. As I've indicated on the front of this package, the contents are our documents showing an unsuccessful attempt by the Niagara Region Police Association to have the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services and the Solicitor General address serious shortcomings in the delivery of police services in Niagara.

I will at the outset suggest to you that the shortcomings that are highlighted in this document are serious shortcomings that should be investigated and that have not been investigated, even though we have attempted to have them investigated, and that is really why the legislation needs to be changed.

If I might direct your attention, first of all, please, to tab 1, you'll see that this is a letter addressed by me to Mr Murray Chitra, who's the chair of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, dated May 7, 1996. In the very first sentence I highlight that it is the opinion of our association that, in Niagara, the services board is not "providing an adequate and effective police service for the region of Niagara." I then go on to ask that the commission investigate this matter and schedule an adequacy hearing so that our allegations can be looked into.

I attached to that letter two press releases, the first one starting at page 1.3. Attached to that press release that I circulated to the media was a letter directed by me to the chair of the services board pointing out the deficiencies, and then there are two pages, pages 1.5 and 1.6, which are descriptions of events that occurred in Niagara. The dates are there. The locations are there. The names of the citizens are withheld to protect their confidentiality.

I want to assure you right at the outset that all of these things are factually correct and at no time has any of this information, any of this material put in the press releases, ever been challenged. It could not be challenged inasmuch as we have the tapes that back up all of this information. The press release, starting at pages 1.5 and 1.6, highlights a variety of calls where members of the public, in our view, had to wait far too long for a response by the police service. For example, I'll just highlight very quickly two of these.

Towards the bottom of page 1.5, dated March 2, Fort Erie. There was an assault that was called in at 6:12 pm: "Citizen in bar calls to report he has been assaulted. Tooth broken. No ambulance required. Suspect has left the bar." That call came in at 6:12 pm. It took until 7:24 pm before officers arrived on the scene.

The next one, the same date but in St Catharines, at 6:57 pm: "Complainant says she refused to let a man stay in her house. He left saying he would be back with a gun. She knows he owns a gun." I would think that's a pretty serious matter. That call is approximately 7 o'clock. It took us almost two hours before we have an officer out at the scene. The press release describes a variety of incidents like that.

The second press release that we put out which was attached and submitted to the OCCPS is at page 1.7, dated March 19, and we have another list of lengthy delays attached. If I could just direct your attention, please, to the top of page 1.8. In Niagara Falls, on March 10, a sex offence, a 911 call at 3:02 am. "Caller at a motel says her girlfriend just been sexually assaulted by two males from California. Happened 20 minutes ago." At 3:44 am officer arrives. Frankly, this is, in our view, substandard police response to a serious call like that, to have the victim waiting around with that kind of complaint that length of time.

I just direct your attention to a more common type of complaint, if you will, on the next page, page 1.9, the top of the page, March 17, St Catharines, a motorcycle complaint. At 2:12 pm: "First female complains. Ongoing problem with kids on dirt bikes. They are there again right now." At 2:20 pm: "Second female complains." At 6:15 pm: "We advised" -- that's the Niagara Regional Police -- "the first caller of further delay. She does not want to wait till tomorrow."

That was the standard procedure at that point. In order to put these people off, we were suggesting to them that maybe they could call back tomorrow. The expectation of course is that they wouldn't call back tomorrow, and that would be nice because that's another call solved. But this lady, "She wants to see an officer tonight." At 7:09 pm the officer arrives. That was five hours and I take it -- I'd put money on this -- that the kids on the dirt bikes were no longer there at 7 o'clock that night.

The next document that I would just direct your attention to, please, that I submitted to OCCPS is at page 1.12, a letter to the honourable Solicitor General from a member of Parliament talking about undertaking the promise of the present government.

Then there is a response from the Solicitor General to myself, which is interesting, and then perhaps even more interesting, particularly since the member of Parliament who asked these questions is in attendance with us today, starting at page 1.15, are selections from Hansard in which Mr Peter Kormos asked questions of the Solicitor General and the Solicitor General asserts that there's no evidence that any of the transfer payment reductions have impacted on front-line policing. I would like to inform the committee that that statement was not true at that time and it is not true today. The evidence to that is being put before you right now.

The response from OCCPS in terms of our request for an adequacy hearing, having put all of that information before them, is contained at tab 2. Page 2.1 is the letter in which the commission simply says that they don't think it appropriate at this time to conduct any sort of hearing. In fact, they prefer to wait until the ministry itself advises them that they should conduct a hearing.

I then am forced to write to the Solicitor General and I attach virtually the same material. It has the media releases with all of the lengthy delays described in detail.

I also add some additional information because there are a couple of incidents that have happened in the meantime, one that you may have seen on CBC television. It was made the national news at the time and we felt extremely embarrassed. It was a disgrace frankly, but there it was on the news, showing that a motorcycle gang came down to Niagara and was able to push their way around. They could not be stopped by the police because we had an inadequate number of police officers on the scene. The reason for that is that the budget has been cut back so low that now, whenever they plan any sort of activity, they have to decide on how few officers they can get away with having at the scene because it cuts into the overtime budget. That's exactly what happened in the situation in Niagara Falls.

The chief had already warned the motorcycle gang, "Come on down to Niagara and we will take care of you." It was sort of an open challenge to the motorcycle gang. They responded to that open challenge and came down. We couldn't handle them because we had too few officers, and that was what was shown on national television. That is what I have referred to in the material here as the biker gang debacle. I submitted that to the Solicitor General.

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My letter to the Solicitor General is dated June 25. I get a response from the Solicitor General on August 13, and he says simply, or really the essence of this is, "Your service was identified earlier in the year as one of several due for an inspection in the upcoming months"; no real concern shown whatsoever with regard to all of the details that have been raised.

I wait a little bit longer and finally on September 13, I write to the Solicitor General and say: "Look, I haven't heard further from you. There's been absolutely no investigation taking place or audit of the service." I then get a letter back from the Solicitor General dated October 17, which is at tab 6, in which he indicates, "The audit will be taking place, and you'll be hearing further about it." Let me assure members of this committee that in March 1997, no employee, no member of the policing services branch, has set foot in Niagara in reference to this matter. No audit of the force has been started and we have no firm commitment from the ministry in terms of when that audit will take place.

Two speakers ago, while I was sitting here, there was a gentleman making a very impassioned plea, and one of the things he wanted to happen is that the police start telling the truth about what's going on. What you have before you, I suggest, is a perfect example of the lack of response when in fact the police do tell you what is going on. We put it out in press releases, we write to the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, we write to the Solicitor General. I would have thought that an association representing some 700 members of the police force, when they are whistleblowing, when they are blowing the whistle and saying that the employer is not providing adequate police service for the citizens in Niagara, I would have anticipated there would have been some interest shown in that. Frankly that interest has not been forthcoming whatsoever. We have been rejected by OCCPS. No hearing was held. We have on a very practical level, I suggest to you, been rejected by the Solicitor General. It's nice to have assurances, and I'm sure that he is an honourable gentleman, but someone must be letting him down because we still have not had anyone show up in Niagara.

At the end of the day, we are extremely frustrated. We don't know what more we can do to bring this to the attention of the public. Frankly, going public was not an easy thing for our members. The traditional approach has been to keep quiet. The theory was that we ought not to disclose these matters because the criminal element would then understand how short-staffed the police force is in fact. That's the very traditional approach. Our members directed the elected officials of this association to change that approach because we came to the conclusion that the only people in the community who did not realize how poor the police service was and is were in fact the good citizens of the community, because those are the people we're hiding the information from. The criminal element know it full well. They are the people who will easily and readily sit out in their cars if need be and count the number of police officers as the shift changes. It's the good citizens that this information is being hidden from. So we have come out in an attempt to bring this forward, yet no action has been taken.

We would urge you, therefore, to please amend the Police Services Act so that an association, if it makes an application to the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, can obtain a hearing; that a hearing will have to be held so that evidence can be adduced. My assertions are simply not good enough. I recognize that. This is just paper information at this point. What we need is a hearing so that we can call witnesses, or maybe there could be an investigation take place by OCCPS even before the hearing, but at this point we have received absolutely no response, and we aren't going to, frankly, and other associations aren't going to until the act itself is amended. Please do not think this is a problem unique to Niagara. This budget problem is going on right across the province, and it's having a significant impact, particularly in the larger services.

The Vice-Chair: Mr Pratt, I do apologize. You have used up your entire 15 minutes and we do have to move on. Thank you very much for your presentation.

INTELLIGARDE INTERNATIONAL

The Vice-Chair: The next presenter is Intelligarde International Inc, Ross McLeod. Good afternoon, sir. You have 15 minutes for your presentation.

Mr Ross McLeod: My name is Ross McLeod. I am a former tenured professor of sociology at a Canadian university and have been for the past 15 years the president of Intelligarde. Intelligarde is a leading example of the positive aspects of privatizing law enforcement in Ontario. Our corporate raison d'être is to protect the assets and personnel of our private and public clients and to assist the police in protecting these client assets.

We have worked very hard and with considerable success to craft a smooth interface with local police forces by doing the tertiary policing that is below their current interest and resource threshold and outside their focus.

Bill 105, in renewing the partnership between the province, municipalities and the police, with the possible exception of subsection 5(5), has largely left out the private sector. I would respectfully submit this to be a serious flaw. I believe the calculus of this act contains an inner logic that propels examination of the possible role of private industry. With the cost of police services being defined to the penny, shouldn't serious thought be given to the issue of the most cost-effective way to deliver community safety?

The commonsense approach that has been taken to the delivery of all other services in the community must now be applied to police services. It is common sense to have the police focus on core competence issues of major crime, armed interventions and Criminal Code investigations, but common sense also tells us that it is the relatively low police priority items that irritate the public and degrade the quality of public life in our communities: car break-ins, vandalism, break-and-enters. Prioritizing by police departments and the raising of theft-over thresholds have relegated public police forces to merely collecting data for the insurance industry with regard to such minor crimes against property.

Loitering by prostitutes, johns, drug dealers, drug users, use of stairwells, parks and recreational centres as places to purchase illegal substances and perform illegal acts, this is the basic nomenclature of a disorderly society, that stops when police make a brief appearance and then resumes its illicit commerce as soon as the police cruiser turns the corner.

However, the constant uniformed presence that can be so effective against these minor property crimes and disorderly conduct that so irritate ordinary citizens can be efficiently and cost-effectively delivered by the private sector. There is already a market in community safety services, as evidenced by the burgeoning private sector security officers who outnumber their public sector police counterparts by three to one.

Make no mistake: There is enormous support and goodwill for the police throughout this province, but common sense and public and private organizations are choosing with their dollars to purchase their basic lower-echelon community safety services from private sector suppliers. Bill 105 should recognize this fact and support this trend to the privatizing and outsourcing of basic community safety services. This would further free the police to focus on core competence Criminal Code policing.

Many of us have lived through the golden age of policing, which is generally construed as 1945 to 1985. In a generation, we saw the introduction of the portable radio, the cruiser, the 911 rapid response system. The logic of these developments led to the model that still dominates delivery of police services, namely reactive call-taking and rapid response intervention. However, that rapid response intervention service is only relevant to about 20% of all calls upon police services. What the public seems to want is a more personalized, community-based uniformed presence that is always there with them or nearby when needed.

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The public may well be ahead of their governments in their evident willingness to mix private and public services. They know their private sector source service has limited authority and powers. They understand this and they appear to like it that way. The public know how to get a real police officer when they really need one: by dialling 911. They also increasingly know how to source the private sector for the more mundane services that are important to them. Bill 105 could go further to create a competitive market for these basic services by explicitly allowing municipalities to source from the private sector.

Quietly but profoundly, changes have taken place on the leading edge of the private sector industry. Community colleges have been graduating vocationally oriented two-year law enforcement diploma students for years now. Young, sincere, energetic, and with a law enforcement education that is only now becoming a prerequisite for public police forces, these graduates are finding few opportunities in the downsizing public forces. Over 80% of Intelligarde's employees come to us with this background. To define these people out of Bill 105 would be an unfortunate underutilization of Ontario's human resources.

An example of how a market can develop quickly to the benefit of both police and the public is the recent case of burglar alarm response. Steadily growing alarm sales and a false alarm rate of over 90% frustrated a stretched police department and led them to introduce a billing rate of $73 for each false alarm they attended. In less than six months this has moved more than half the alarm response business into the private sector where a competitive service is offered for about 50% of the police billing rate. During the next six months much of the remaining alarm response will follow. Now, in the very small number of cases where there has been an actual break-in, the police are called by the private sector responder to a verified crime scene -- an efficient use of skilled police resources. Those who still wish police response can have it if they pay something approaching its actual cost. This is a market in basic services that benefits the public and the police. The inclusion of the private sector in Bill 105 would be a win-win situation.

There has been much discussion recently about some difficulties perceived to be inherent in the police complaints procedures and investigations of incidents involving serious violence. We don't have this negative perception on the private side, for a couple of good reasons. First, the private sector doesn't have the weapons and the powers of the public side so the incidents, even despite the 3 to 1 ratio of individuals, are insignificant. Second, and more important, the public appreciates that the private sector oversight system has worked effectively.

This oversight system has basically five highly effective levels:

At level one, the public can refer any perceived Criminal Code violation to the police. The police are quick to lay a charge where they feel illegality has occurred, and an individual who has charges pending or criminal convictions cannot hold a licence in the private industry.

Level two sees the registrar of private sector agencies and individuals policing the guidelines established in the industry by the Solicitor General's ministry through the policing services division. In the event of documented breaches, action is taken against individual and agency licences through fines up to and including cancelation of licence.

At the third level, the market comes into play, as a company tries to maintain its compulsory insurance and bonding. Companies that attract trouble quickly find that rates become punitive and are eventually withheld altogether by the insurance industry.

The market is still in play at the fourth level, as companies that attract negative publicity through inappropriate activities lose their customer base. Once again, the public votes with its wallet and purchase orders.

Finally, at the fifth level, the private sector is open to civil litigation, and that has a much more galvanizing effect than a citizen trying to sue city hall.

Thus, the civilian oversight and remedies for perceived and actual wrongs in the private sector are certainly more various and probably more effective than they are in the public sector.

I'm asking you today to take a second commonsense look at Bill 105 and to ensure that there is room for the private sector to create a market for the cost-effective and efficient delivery of lower-level but essential community safety services. Thank you.

Mr Ramsay: Thank you for your presentation. This is a very different approach and very unexpected since Bill 105 deals with public sector policing, so you've given me a lot of new things to think about in this bill. You talked about the checks and balances through people's pocketbooks that regulate your industry. In law, what are the regulatory requirements of your industry?

Mr McLeod: It's a heavily regulated industry. The regulator is the Solicitor General's department through the policing services division in the person of the Ontario Provincial Police. They have an investigation unit. It's heavily staffed here in Toronto. They handle all the licensing, they do criminal record checks, they investigate any complaints from the public or other companies or end users. They have all police powers. They can come in, seize records, take them away. They hold inquiries. Their inquiries are adversary proceedings. The ultimate decision as to the viability of a licence of an individual or an agency, a corporate entity, is up to, first, the registrar himself, and then, on an appeal basis, to the commissioner. So the regulatory apparatus falls squarely within the purview of the apparatus that we're talking here with Bill 105.

Additionally, we're just ordinary citizens and we're subject to the Criminal Code of Canada and all the enforcing and investigating procedures of the local police force.

Mr Christopherson: Thank you for your presentation. Before I comment, to be fair, I'm not real keen on the idea of the proliferation of private policing as we're seeing in the States. I offer that up front, before I ask my questions.

You said that it's cost-effective. The first question is: Are you proposing that these officers would have the full powers of a police officer?

Mr McLeod: No. You can have a range, from the powers we have largely now, which are no additional powers to the average citizen of the age of majority, right up to special constable status. The special constable status can be a warrant limited to a time, a place, while in uniform, working for a named company, and only for a listed number of offences, for instance, noise bylaw, environmental, stoop and scoop, that sort of thing. It can be delimited to a very, very set number of low-level offences.

Mr Christopherson: It can be similar to a security guard, so clearly not offering private policing per se, which is the impression that was certainly left with me.

Mr McLeod: I think "private policing" is an unfortunate name that summons up all sorts of different images with different people. What we're talking about here is a sort of value-added security service; it's a bylaw enforcement service; it's community-based patrolling. I'm not talking about a totally privatized law enforcement effort, as we see in some small American communities where the police force is totally privatized. I'm talking to a para-police function that assists and segues into and is used by the public police who still maintain their exclusive access to all the Criminal Code enforcement.

Mr Christopherson: I think the concern is that it's a slippery slope.

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Mr Carr: Thank you very much for your presentation. As you know, if you are to expand into other areas, there are a lot of people who now want to have more regulation of your particular industry. What are your thoughts on the present regulation? You touched on it a little bit with Mr Ramsay. Do you feel your industry has enough regulations now? What would you say to some of those people who are saying that we need to have some more regulations in your present industry?

Mr McLeod: It's like many areas of law enforcement. We have enough laws. In certain areas, they could be a little more vociferously applied. I thought it was unfortunate when the registrar's branch stopped personally interviewing applicants for licences and left it up to the agencies to put together the photographs and the applications and send them down as being endorsed. I felt that was a bit of a slippage in control, but that could quickly be gained back.

I think we have enough regulations, guidelines and laws out there. It's just a question of the degree of enforcement that you want to put into it. I think the registrar's branch has been cut back a little, as has everybody.

The Vice-Chair: Thank you, Mr McLeod. I'm afraid your time has expired. On behalf of the committee, I want to thank you for your presentation.

COALITION OF AGENCIES SERVING SOUTH ASIANS

The Vice-Chair: The next presenter is the Coalition of Agencies Serving South Asians, Ram Jagessar. You have 15 minutes for your presentation.

Mr Ram Jagessar: Chair and members of the committee, on behalf of the Coalition of Agencies Serving South Asians, I am pleased to make this presentation. My name is Ram Jagessar, and I am the coordinator of the Coalition of Agencies Serving South Asians, which is an umbrella organization for the South Asian community of greater Toronto and 55 of the organizations that serve this community of over 300,000.

Our mandate is to advocate for and support existing, as well as emerging, agencies to ensure that the social service needs of the South Asian community are met and to play an active role in eliminating all forms of discrimination in society.

Our concern with Bill 105, the Police Services Amendment Act, is with the fundamental nature of some of the changes, which we believe will take the oversight of police activities in a backward direction rather than towards the future.

For this presentation, we will focus on three areas covered in the amendments: the proposed new structure, the complaints system and the special investigations unit.

We have very serious concerns about the proposal to merge the police complaints commission, the board of inquiry and the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services into a single new commission, with a reported 50% cut in its budget. Secondly, changes to the complaints system will mean that essentially the police will police themselves, with an extraordinary range of powers being given to the chief of police. The power of the new Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services with respect to investigation of civilian complaints will be considerably restricted as compared to the powers that the current civilian complaints commission has now.

The special investigations unit remains in place to look at serious incidents involving the police and civilians. But the SIU will not be able to compel a police officer to give evidence or to punish an officer for refusing to do so any more than it can now. As a result, the widespread dissatisfaction with the SIU will continue.

In the name of efficiency, the amendments plan to merge three agencies into one super agency, the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, the so-called new commission. On closer examination it seems to be considerably less than the sum of its original three parts, with a reported budget of 50% of the original three and sharply reduced discretion in the handling of complaints about the police.

While the new commission will appear to enjoy expanded powers, will it have enough resources for accessible, effective and efficient operations? Will it have the linguistic and cultural resources to be able to handle complaints from a population estimated to be 53% racial minorities by the year 2001? Further, will it have a presence in all parts of the province to ensure that citizens can have easy access to it?

The committee should not need to be reminded that today greater Toronto has a population that is more than 50% non-English and non-French. A study done for the Metro Access and Equity Centre estimates that the racial minority population of Metro was 41% in 1996, last year, and is growing to 53% by the year 2001, just a few short years away.

This is a significant portion of those who will be interacting with the police, and we will need a prompt and efficient response when there is abuse by police of their considerable powers. When they have a problem, where will these people go to complain with the assurance that they will be heard, believed, supported and provided with linguistically and culturally appropriate services?

Like other members of the Community Coalition Concerned About Civilian Oversight of Police, we take the view that the police should be accountable to an independent, standalone civilian body. Especially in cases of misconduct involving the public, the police should not be investigating and disciplining themselves. Yet this is precisely what the amendments are proposing. The new commission will be standing powerless in the background while the chief of police makes all the decisions.

With the proposed complaints system, the complaint goes directly to the chief of police. He decides how to classify the complaint, whether it is serious or it's frivolous, whether it should be taken up or dismissed. He can resolve the matter informally if he likes. The chief of police does not have to get consent from the new commission for his actions, he does not have to submit monthly reports, he does not have to inform the new commission about complaints filed or how he has resolved them or give reasons for his decision.

The new commission may review the decision made by the chief of police, but the chief does not have to produce any documentation. We are being charitable in calling this a new commission, because it is obviously no commission at all. The authority to investigate complaints of police abuse will rest directly in the hands of the chief of police, and that is not acceptable. This is a system that has not worked before and will not work now.

Our community has grave doubts about the willingness or the ability of the police force to investigate police complaints and, in particular, systemic discrimination within the police service. We therefore recommend that a civilian agency investigate complaints against the police, with the entire process being separate from the police force. This agency shall report to the Legislature and not to the Ministry of the Solicitor General.

We are at least relieved to see that the special investigations unit was not disbanded and that there will still be a hands-off group to investigate serious incidents between police and civilians. However, the bill does not give the SIU the power to compel police officers to testify before it, meaning that the SIU will still be kept waiting months and years to complete investigations.

In most serious incidents between civilians and the police, the most important evidence is that of the police officers directly involved. At the present time, the SIU does not have the power to make a police officer give evidence immediately about the incident or to penalize the officer for refusing to speak. Police officers can and do refuse to talk to the SIU, which is the only body mandated to investigate such incidents. For example, the officer involved in the shooting death of Faraz Suleman in June 1996 has yet to speak to the SIU, and there are others who have been longer.

This is simply not acceptable. The SIU must have investigative powers to allow it to perform its job promptly and effectively, as well as sufficient resources and staff. The amendments make no provision for changing this position, thus perpetuating a glaring weakness in the accountability of police for their actions.

These examples simply serve to show the philosophical directions of the major amendments to the Police Services Act, which is to move back from greater accountability to the public and the taxpayers. It is something we must oppose in the strongest way possible.

Mr Christopherson: Thank you for your presentation. Like a number of other representative groups today and yesterday, we've heard real concern, particularly in the visible-minority communities, about the watering down of the commission's role, the watering down of civilian oversight. You also have explained carefully why you think that is.

Would you comment for the benefit of the committee on what you think the result will be in terms of the reality of complaints. Do you think there will be fewer complaints? Do you think people will give up on it and the stats will be lower and someone will claim that things are better or do you see some other vision? Second, with the lack of trust that appears to exist in many parts of our community, how will they react over time to this perceived watering down, the reality of the watering down of civilian oversight?

Mr Jagessar: We expect that even at the present time there is a low level of complaints because many people are, quite frankly, scared to complain to the police, to give their name and address. This is why some people have been saying that there should be anonymous complaints and that there should be second-party complaints. We expect that if the changes are made, this will only get worse. You may possibly see the result of no complaints at all, or very few, especially from the racial-minority community.

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To answer your second question, we expect that if this is the case, the popular conception in many people's minds is that you can't get any justice there. If something is done to you, nothing can be done about it. That will be strengthened. You will see a wall being put up. People will simply say that you can't get anything there; this is a closed wall. What you have in a sense is alienation of a large section of the population from the police. If people are alienated from police, they don't believe them, police become ineffective.

Mr Carr: Thank you very much for your presentation. With regard to the power of the commission, you have concerns about the powers. In what way are your concerns that they won't be able to fulfil the function of civilian oversight?

Mr Jagessar: It appears to us that the commission seems to have been shoved way back to the background and that its ability to influence the process has been severely restricted. As now, the police initiate the investigations, but with the proposed changes the police chief and the people he delegates to do the investigations don't really have to tell anybody what they're doing; they don't have to inform the commission in many areas, they don't have to give explanations. So there isn't another body to look over the shoulder of the police who are investigating the police. This is a severe weakness.

Mr Crozier: Sir, do you think that a Canadian citizen should give up their right to remain silent to protect themselves the minute they are sworn in as a police officer?

Mr Jagessar: I thought there was a trick question coming. I know what you're talking about. You're talking about the SIU?

Mr Crozier: Yes.

Mr Jagessar: I know the argument that the police should not incriminate themselves. We believe this is a special situation. The police are armed agents of the state who are interfacing with members of the public. When there is an incident, especially a death or a serious shooting, this is a special situation. The police officer must explain his actions to somebody. He cannot take the position that he's not incriminating himself and refuse to say anything.

Mr Crozier: If somehow we can force a police officer to do that -- and I don't know yet how it can be done -- if a police officer then is reluctant to use their firearm to defend themself when they're being threatened and is killed in the line of duty, the criminal doesn't have to give up that right.

The Vice-Chair: Mr Crozier, I am sorry, we've run out of time and we're going to have to move on.

Mr Jagessar, I want to thank you very much on behalf of the committee for your presentation.

CHAI KALEVAR

The Vice-Chair: Moving on to our next presenter, Chai Kalevar. Sir, you'll have 15 minutes for your presentation.

Mr Chai Kalevar: I didn't know the previous presenter, I still don't know him, but I agree with him 100%. I think police investigating police just doesn't carry credibility in the eyes of the public; that's the short story. Let me put it slightly differently. Let's say the police have a complaint against one of the members of this committee. Would you decide that if the complaint is against an NDPer, the NDP caucus will decide on the fate of that member, or would you decide that the Liberal caucus will decide on the Liberal member and the Tory caucus will decide on the Tory member? Certainly not; you would ask for an all-party committee. Why in God's name, then, would you allow police to investigate themselves? It just doesn't make sense.

Civilian oversight is a must, is the bottom line on which this bill will be judged. Everything else is just crossing the t's and dotting the i's. So please make sure that civilian oversight is provided in this bill; it doesn't matter how.

Having said that, I don't want to repeat the sort of things that have been said about the bill. I would like to relate a personal incident which I thought couldn't happen in Toronto, but it did. It also perhaps reflects on the complaint process we presently have.

I don't know how or where to start. It's a very complicated situation. Very simply put, I have a civil court judgement in my hand. I'm trying to collect that from somebody. I'm also trying to persuade people who were involved previous to the complaint, previous to the judgement in the process, that he or she should pay up the judgement. When that is being asked of these people, a family, trying to get a civil judgement made good, somebody from that family complains, "He's asking for civil judgements to be made good," and what happens? The police jump up, knock on my door, arrest me and charge me with criminal harassment. Just imagine. Of course the charge was thrown out. But criminal harassment for trying to collect a civil judgement? What is a civil judgement worth? It's already not worth the paper it's written on. If you start charging somebody with criminal harassment for trying to collect a civil judgement, I must say there is something awfully wrong. What is wrong? I don't know. Maybe it's the thinking of the police, that people like me are always wrong or that we don't have the right to even collect civil judgements.

Anyway, this happened with me. I just think that's something I would rather see not happen. I have submitted some of the letters of complaint I wrote when I got the decision that the complaint against the police officer was dismissed. That speaks for itself. I hope some of you will have time to read it and see how I feel about the police complaints process.

The police complaints process has a requirement that every month they report to you. What do you get? You get basically the same report with a change of date. That's all you get, a change of date and where he made the phone calls. There's nothing of substance in the report. It's really a waste of paper.

I had to complain against another police officer in the same context, and the complaint was dismissed because they said the police officer had retired and it was out of their jurisdiction. I don't understand this. How can my complaint be dismissed just because the officer retired? There is always an officer ready to retire, and in my opinion -- it's my suspicion -- if this is the way jurisdiction works in this area, then he's always willing to oblige the other police officers with any dirty work that they have to do. It just doesn't smell good when you see these things happening. I can go into detail and this can take hours, but I would just say that this is just not acceptable as it is going on now and it won't be acceptable if Bill 105 goes the way it is worded now. It will probably be worse, as many have already said.

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In addition to that, I would like to take this opportunity to bring to your attention, since this is the committee on justice, as I understand, that section 16 of the Ontario Evidence Code in my opinion violates the charter in terms of section 2, section 15 and section 27 of the charter. By the way, section 16 of the Ontario Evidence Act is the section which allows courts to use the Bible in the courtroom. It is very interesting that courts have said, "No Lord's Prayer in the schools, but we will keep our Bible." I really do not see how that jibes. It seems like a blind spot in the eyes of the court, and I urge members of this committee to remove that blind spot and establish religious equality and religious freedom in Ontario courts. Thank you.

Mr Tilson: You've raised a comment that has been raised by a lot of deputants, and that is the issue of the independence of the police officer; in other words, that it's impossible for them to investigate complaints against themselves. There have been a lot of deputants who have come and said that.

If you look at the overall package of what the bill is trying to do -- because even in my own constituency I've had people come and they say they haven't a clue, that the current process we've got is too complicated, it's too expensive, it's a zoo. That is of course what this government has been trying to do: provide a more simplified process, making it easier for people dealing with civilian complaints against police.

If you look what goes on beyond that, and yes, I agree it's possible for a chief of police to make false -- or not make any position at all. But there are different things which an individual has the right to do. You can go to a police services board, particularly on issues of policy. You can go to a hearing and to the commission, and ultimately to the Divisional Court. In other words, those bodies don't have any police officers. I look at those early levels and if complainants aren't satisfied, you can go beyond that. Are you telling this committee that doesn't satisfy your concerns?

Mr Kalevar: Yes, for a number of reasons. Firstly, to the extent that the bill is trying to simplify the process, I think it's still moving in the right direction. It is very complicated; there is no doubt about that. But simplification doesn't mean giving up control of police investigation to police. If that's simplification, I think that's giving up. Simplification to me would mean, just like the previous speaker said and I'm sure many have said before, an independent civilian body with the power of calling police officers as witnesses to investigate. Nothing short of that will do.

Mr Tilson: You don't think the police services boards or the commission are independent enough?

Mr Kalevar: As a matter of fact, during this process I went through -- if you want I can give you all the documentation I went through. I kept the chair of the Metro Police Services Board informed of what was going on and basically she said, "We can't deal with it." That's what she said. I don't know why.

The Vice-Chair: Mr Kalevar, can we move on to the next question? We are running out of time.

Mr Kalevar: I'll be happy to.

Mr Crozier: Good afternoon. I share your concern and that of almost every other presenter who has touched on the complaints system of the step backwards it would appear we're taking, notwithstanding the fact we might be attempting to make it better understood by everyone. Even to that point, I think on the very few -- only two that I can think of myself -- where I've had constituents come to me and ask how they make a complaint to the police, we had a brochure we gave them and as far as I know it was completely understood from that point on.

But what does happen, I suspect, because it did in these two cases, is a reluctance to have to report it to the department against whom they're making the complaint. I wonder if you'd comment on that, where under this legislation, it's my understanding you'd have to complain to the department in which the department or the officer or whatever the complaint was about. You couldn't go to the next jurisdiction and make your complaint. Did you feel any intimidation or would you think you would feel any intimidation that way?

Mr Kalevar: Definitely. Personally, I may not because I would just go ahead and do it and find out what happens next. That's the sort of attitude I take. But I think generally I would say people would. Yes, I definitely think so. Maybe I shouldn't give too much credence to that, I don't know if this is how it is, but at least one of the lawyers I was talking to who is involved in these kinds of things said it is not very uncommon, he actually said it has happened to everybody, that if anybody complains to the police complaints commission, especially if he succeeds any further and presses very hard, he is in some way or another shadowed by police.

Having heard that, I must tell you that on Friday I phoned in here for making a presentation, and Sunday morning at 6:30 there was a knock on my door. I got up and I went to the door, going to the peephole and saying, "Who is it?" sort of attitude, half asleep. To my surprise the guy had his thumb on the peephole. I said, "What?"

The Vice-Chair: Mr Kalevar, again I'm sorry to interrupt. We have to move to Mr Kormos.

Mr Kormos: I'm going to let him finish. Go ahead, finish, sir.

The Vice-Chair: If you want to give him your time, then that's up to you.

Mr Kormos: Go ahead, finish. You relax, Chair.

Mr Kalevar: The guy had his thumb on the peephole. Obviously I said I'm not opening the door for this jerk --

Mr Kormos: As it ends up, who was it?

Mr Kalevar: When he moved away -- I waited till he moved away and the police badge flashed.

Mr Kormos: But you don't know why he was there?

Mr Kalevar: No.

Mr Kormos: Fair enough. I understand your submission, Mr Kalevar. I understand it very clearly. As was pointed out, at the end of the day, whether you deliver, mail or fax your complaint to the commission or to the police station, it ends up at the police station that you're complaining about.

Mr Kalevar: That's right, and it gets there faster and their replies don't come to us for a long time.

Mr Kormos: The other interesting thing, though, is that if I observe something happening on the street that causes me great concern, that causes me to believe that a police officer may be misconducting himself or herself, and I'm standing on the other side of the street, I'm not entitled to make a complaint because this bill eliminates third-party complaints. It denies me the right as a citizen to relate my concerns about the conduct of public servants. Do you have a view about that?

Mr Kalevar: Yes. I think that's not fair. Firstly, there's no reason for this bill to reduce the rights of citizens, and secondly, I have myself observed many times police officers, for no other reason than maybe getting a doughnut, parked in a fashion which if we were parked in we would get a ticket right away. I really wonder, why is getting a doughnut an emergency for the police officer?

Mr Kormos: But if you want to talk to a ticked-off police officer, talk to one who did get the parking ticket.

The Vice-Chair: Mr Kalevar, I am sorry, but your time has expired. On behalf of the committee, I want to thank you for your presentation.

Mr Kalevar: Thank you very much.

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The Vice-Chair: Before we move on, there have been a number of documents, three in fact, that have been handed out to committee members at the request of members. These are from the ministry, answering some of your questions. The first one is Investigating and Hearing Powers of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services; another one, Filing a Complaint about a Police Officer; and one more, Compellability of a Police Officer at a Disciplinary Hearing. Those three have been circulated by the ministry at your request, and you have them now.

KIRAN FOLEY

The Vice-Chair: We will now move on to our next presenter, who is Kiran Foley. Welcome, Mr Foley.

Mr Kiran Foley: I had an assault in October 1994 in 52 division, and I just put it through last month through the police commission, and it's been turned down because of the six-month waiting period or whatever.

Also, I got assaulted February 19 by the Quinte-Madoc OPP three times in one night while my cuffs were behind my back in the back of a cruiser. I got it on the side of the road, in the parking lot of the Quinte-Madoc station and in my cell. I've got the ribs and all the injuries, and I'm still going to the doctors, and I've got the X-rays and all that. I'd like to know, what's going on? Where's this serve and protect? Is it they serve people by injuries and they murder them and all this, and then they protect themselves? That's what it seems like.

Also, because I've been in this city for almost 30 years and I've lived with black people and native people, I'd like to see the government stop the police from murdering and beating up blacks and natives in this province. I think it's about time, and I denounce the government's inaction on black and native complaints, concerns and issues.

I know it's going to take a bit of work. A small amount of progress has been made already, but there is a long road ahead. A better understanding of the past will guide us along this road in the future. Thank you.

Mr Ramsay: Kiran, thank you very much for your presentation. Do you want to give us any details about any of these incidents that you were involved in, what in your mind --

Mr Foley: I got arrested for intoxication on Queen Street. I was taken to 52 division and I was put in my cell with two other police officers on both sides of my arms. When I was in the cell I was standing up and they were both holding me on each side, and one guy popped me in the side of the brain and I passed out. They let me out early because I was still a bit intoxicated, but I was out and I came back two hours after. I walked in with a broken shovel handle, about two feet long, and I had it down by my side. I went in and asked the guy at the desk for a coffee. This is about 5 o'clock in the morning, maybe two hours after I had been released.

Anyway, the next thing there was about eight cops coming down the stairs and around the counter and everything, so I backed out the front door and they all came out and I dropped the stick. So I go back in -- anyway, I go through court and everything else. I get charged with a dangerous weapon and I get convicted because the cop lied. I get convicted with a dangerous weapon. That's the one.

The other one I'm going for with the OPP. That's something else, man. I don't know what kind of police force they have in that OPP. I don't know if they're just mad dogs and Englishmen or what, but I got sticks in my heart, my ribs, my shoulders, my organs, down between my nuts, between my knees, my ankles, my wrists. My face was all covered in marks from being banged into the snow bank. My coat was rolled over in salt. All I had was my joggers and socks when I got arrested, and my cuffs were always behind my back. I might have a little bit of an Irish tongue or whatever, but it's no reason to beat some man three times in one night.

I'd like to see something. I don't trust no OPP or any police force in this country. I don't trust none of them. All you get back is papers and denials, because they're serving it out and protecting themselves, and that's wrong. You need civilians in on this. You need changes, man. All these kids in this country, they know what's going on. They see this stuff going on in this country.

You people here in the government, you're the people who are supposed to set an example for my kids and other kids in this country. I think it's about time you guys do your job. You're getting pretty well paid for it -- you know, take the short cuts and do it right. You've got all the funds. You've got everything.

Mr Kormos: Mr Foley, I join in thanking you for bringing some personal experience. I've got to tell you, it sounds very much like things have gone awry and off course. Gary Carr is the parliamentary assistant to the Solicitor General. He is here on this committee, and I am hoping that before you leave, Mr Carr will give you his business card and make a commitment to see you in his office so that he can personally find out what went wrong in the processes that you got involved in. Madoc, you say, is one of them?

Mr Foley: Quinte-Madoc.

Mr Kormos: Okay, and down at 52 division here. I know Mr Carr would -- he's the person. We're only in opposition. He's the person who is as close to the Solicitor General as anybody. I'm hoping that you, Mr Carr, would give this man your business card and commit yourself to meeting with him so you can review this in the privacy of your office and follow up on it. Is that fine with you, Mr Foley?

Mr Foley: Yes, thank you.

Mr Kormos: Would you expect anything less from him?

Mr Foley: No. Just a simple explanation.

Mr Kormos: Thank you, sir. Stick around, because Mr Carr is going to want to talk to you, I'm sure.

Mr Carr: Thank you very much for your presentation. Your procedures have been through the complaints process now under the present system?

Mr Foley: The one has. The police commissioner denied the other one. He says there was a six-month waiting period and all this, and he denied it because I was seeing my psychiatrist since then. But I've been seeing my psychiatrist for three and a half years because I got beat up, assaulted, seven times in BC. I went to the police brutality commission, Supreme Court Justice Wallace T. Oppal, and diddly-squat came out of that, and I was the first one up. Diddly-squat, and then he went all around the country for about three months, and diddly-squat came out of it. All he gave me was a card and that was it. Nothing.

Mr Carr: Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chair: On behalf of the committee, Mr Foley, to thank you very much for your presentation.

ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE ASSOCIATION

The Vice-Chair: The next presenter is a little bit early. We had the 4 o'clock cancellation, so we'll move to our 4:15 slot, which is the Ontario Provincial Police Association.

Mr Brian Adkin: Thank you very much, Mr Chair and members of the committee. My name is Brian Adkin and I'm president of the OPP Association. I am a detective staff sergeant with the OPP anti-rackets branch. With me this afternoon are Jim Drennan and Mr David Brown. Jim is on my left. He is the administrator of our association. Jim is a former police officer with the RCMP, Barrie and Halton regional police, and has extensive experience in the field of education. On my right is Mr David Brown. Dave is the vice-president of our association. He's a sergeant stationed at the Kawartha detachment.

The OPP Association is the collective bargaining agent for all uniformed members of the OPP. We represent 4,600 men and women who are stationed throughout Ontario. Our members provide front-line municipal policing service to 576 municipalities, as well as provide specialized traffic patrol, criminal investigation and special assistance to the public and police forces throughout Ontario.

We are extremely concerned about the welfare of our members and how they will be affected by Bill 105. Our colleagues from the other police associations have spoken on a variety of subjects involving Bill 105 and as a result we will confine our comments to specific subjects.

Our paper and presentation will address the following subject areas: discipline and appeals; oversight; equity funding; police service boards and the OPP probationary period; SIU, duty to cooperate, investigations and mandate; unsatisfactory work performance; consultation with crown attorneys; auxiliaries; and OPP civilians.

Discipline and appeals: The proposed discipline process must be changed to allow for members to have the right of trial for less serious matters rather than an assigned penalty. While there has been some attempt to use employment matters as a reason to justify this action, we cannot accept it. Our members can be assessed a penalty of up to five days' pay without any type of hearing. This is wrong and cannot be accepted.

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Imagine this scenario: Any one of us is stopped by a police officer on the side of the road. The police officer says: "You have committed an offence and the fine is $1,000. Pay now and there is no trial. If you want to get your money back, you can file a grievance." It's totally unfair. Even in the lofty wages that are made by the members sitting around this table, $1,000 is a lot of money. There's no doubt about that. Even dealing with a traffic ticket, a member of the public has a right to a hearing, and the same process is necessary for our members. A thousand dollars is one week's pay and this penalty is too severe.

The grievance process is not an effective method to use as an appeal process. This can be an incredible area of power for a chief of police. It can and will be the subject of abuse. This area will be used in a punitive fashion against our members. The quick and speedy method of dealing with less serious offences is not proper or fair. It is a draconian power that will result in inconsistencies, fear and high costs. Morale will be driven into the ground.

The OPP Association has approximately three grievances a year that go to an actual hearing. This results in very positive results for our members and management. Let me assure you that if this type of grievance procedure is implemented for discipline, our grievances will increase astronomically. This is not what you want as legislators or we want as police associations.

We ask that this committee maintain section 59, with the right to trial for those less serious matters, to ensure that our members have the right to a fair and impartial hearing. Our right to appeal a conviction must also be maintained for this process to be seen to be fair. We urge you to place the appeal provisions of sections 63, 64 and 65 of the current act into Bill 105.

Oversight: We are very pleased with the draft legislation streamlining oversight. It is time that the amount of money expended on complaint investigations has been recognized. The proposed handling and classification of complaints by the chief of police or the OPP commissioner is an improvement over the existing method. A chief of police or the commissioner is quite capable of ensuring that complaints are assessed accurately and investigated properly.

To be quite frank, the old medley of the police not being able to investigate themselves has worn out. This statement is not appropriate for the times. Police officers are quite capable and competent to conduct their own investigations and in fact do most of these investigations now. The old line of police being incapable is something advanced by people who hold the police in contempt now and who will always feel there are many police officers out there waiting to cover up whatever they can to protect the fraternity. This is not true, and the professionalism of police officers will not allow it to occur. It is quite refreshing to see the pendulum swing back from general mistrust of the police to a system which we believe the public has great faith in and will support.

It seems most unusual that we entrust the police to investigate the most serious crimes in the Dominion, to utilize the most invasive procedures when heinous crimes demand it -- and they are authorized when police pursue a criminal who could even be one of their own off duty -- but we buckle at the knees when we think of police officers investigating complaints or offences involving police officers, most of which are unfounded or not sustained. We believe the public will support the proposed system of dealing with complaints. In most cases apologies will solve problems and save investigations. Many victims and officers are both pleased with this action.

The rights of our members, however, must be protected. We need this committee to replace the rights which our officers lose with the new act by ensuring that they are notified about a complaint against them and about each step thereafter. Our members are in an unpopular business. They take enforcement action which people do not always like. As a result, people lodge vindictive complaints to support their own positions. Protection is paramount for our members. Balance, fairness and natural justice must be provided for our members in dealing with complaints.

We are most pleased with the implementation of equity funding for those municipalities not currently paying. We believe this will result in better service delivery.

Police services boards and the OPP: With the OPP providing the policing service to a total of 15% of Ontario's population, we are supportive of the proposed amendments which treat all taxpayers fairly. Along with equitable financing comes the governance of police services. The OPP is encouraged and supportive of the amendments dealing with the creation of community policing advisory committees in areas policed by the OPP but not directly under contract. This type of community involvement has been in place for some detachments across the province for some time, for example our Kawartha detachment, which has had policing advisory committees within Peterborough county since 1991. The 14 townships form five committees which provide community involvement and feedback into the service delivery in their communities.

Probationary period: Subsection 44(4) of the act is being amended to remove the need for a second probationary period to be served for police officers who join a municipal police force from another municipal service, the Ontario Provincial Police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or a prescribed police force outside Ontario. This change removes the redundant need for fully trained and competent police officers to be evaluated as if they were new recruits.

Even with this progressive amendment, the Public Service Act still requires amendment. These officers who join the OPP are still forced to serve a probationary term to comply with the Public Service Act. This is embarrassing and degrading to these experienced and fully qualified officers. Following with the intent of the proposed amendment, we request that amendments to section 44 of the act or 6(2) of the Public Service Act be made to remove this totally unnecessary process, making the movement to any police service for fully qualified officers equal and fair for all.

Special investigations unit -- duty to cooperate: We've heard a great deal about the application of the Charter of Rights as it relates to the right to remain silent. In fact, there is no entrenched right in the charter to silence. Section 2(d) of the Canadian Bill of Rights deals with self-incrimination. As Delisle and Stuart write in Canadian Criminal Procedure, "Protection against self-incrimination is narrowly confined to the right at a criminal trial not to be a witness against yourself." Even the Law Reform Commission commented on it when they said that the police shall not question a suspect with regard to any offence for which a person is suspect unless the officer has given to that person a warning, including the right to remain silent.

The Ministry of the Solicitor General's office has stated it will continue to discuss the issue of the duty to cooperate under the mandate of the special investigations unit, but this issue is not being considered in Bill 105. There is no doubt, given the ongoing pressure from special interest groups, that this issue will remain at the top of the agenda of the special investigations unit and others who seek to punish police officers whom they feel have done wrong. It is for this reason that this committee should understand clearly the position of the OPP Association and our unwavering determination to stop such senseless discussions. Our association will stand with all others of like mind to ensure that the rights of police officers to fairness and equal treatment under the laws of this country will never be sacrificed in the name of expediency.

Let's call it what it is: It's not a duty to cooperate that we are really talking about, but the right of the state, through legislation, to remove the most basic of all citizens' rights, the right to remain silent. To remove one's right to remain silent in the face of charges would bring disrepute to our system of justice, jeopardize our right to a fair trial before the law and the right to be presumed innocent. There should be no doubt about the importance to all citizens, not just the police, of the right to remain silent.

Our position on the SIU investigators and the SIU mandate is enumerated in our paper, and we won't further discuss that.

In relation to unsatisfactory work performance, we feel this is a totally inappropriate section to be codified within the new act. This is a section that should deal with performance improvement and is at best a labour relations issue that should be dealt with through performance reviews and monitoring of work performance. It is inappropriate for it to appear in an area where it can be a disciplinary offence.

The balance in what police officers do from day to day should be determined with several principles in mind. Those principles are identified on page 16, and the key one is, "What does the community want from their police officers?" This is critical in determining work performance.

OPP civilians: During the policing summit and post-summit discussions, there were unanimous recommendations from the OAPSB, AMO, OACP, OSOA, and the PAO that the OPPA should represent the civilians and uniformed members of the OPP. The amendments within Bill 105 did not address this recommendation. The OPP Association is the only police association in Ontario that does not represent both the uniformed and civilian members of the police force.

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The Ontario government only allows strike disruptions at OPP locations, not at municipal police services, as illustrated with the last general strike of the Ontario Public Service Employees Union. Members of the public as well as uniformed members of the OPP had to wade through picket lines to deal with the policing issues of the day. A large number of OPP civilians want to be represented by the OPPA but due to the current legislation and the makeup of their union locals, they have no option but to stay within their current bargaining agent. Their only option for change would be with amendments to the definition section 2 of the Police Services Act or amendments to section 26, the definition of association, in the Public Service Act.

Inequities with amalgamations occur when civilian employees are not allowed the same opportunities as the uniformed employees to join the new employer. This creates hardships with the employer to try and find work for these employees or release them from employment altogether. The amalgamation process would be greatly streamlined if all potential employees were given the same level playing field. The government is standing silent on this issue, which does not alleviate the stress, uncertainty and abandonment being felt by employees who are not getting a fair shake. This is an extremely difficult issue for people to deal with.

In conclusion, as association members, we have worked through the Police Association of Ontario. The PAO has raised many concerns for this committee to act on and provided you with the appropriate resource material. Our colleagues from other associations as well have made presentations to alert you to their concerns. We caution you to listen to what they say and to act upon their recommendations. We are concerned about our members' rights and protections. This will be the most significant change to the act that has ever occurred. The amendments should be fair and should look to the future to ensure that all of policing and the public derive benefits. We ask that you consider these choices carefully. They will be around for a long time.

Thanks very much, Mr Chair, for the opportunity to present today.

The Chair: We have about 30 seconds per caucus, enough to make a comment. Mr Kormos is first -- or Mr Christopherson.

Mr Christopherson: You caught me off guard. I thought Peter was going to cover that one.

It's good to see you again, guys. What I was struck by was your real concern about the issue of the disciplinary action and the arbitrary nature of the powers that, in your case, the commissioner is now being given. If they don't make those changes, what do you plan to do? Do you plan to document cases where you think there's been abuse so you can then reapply pressure down the road? This government's not known for doing a lot of listening during these hearings, so I'm just curious.

Mr Adkin: What will happen, Mr Christopherson, is the number of grievances will rise astronomically, penalties that have been meted out will be appealed and things will be just totally bogged down in the process. We see that as having an impact not only on ourselves and on other associations but also on the operation of the force, and then the general fall of morale will take place as well and the inefficiency of the whole system will be very apparent.

Mr Carr: Thank you very much for a fine presentation. Thirty seconds doesn't give us enough time, so I do appreciate that. On page 3 you talk about the discipline and appeals and the fine of $1,000. Is there any amount, if it was a lesser amount, that you feel you could live with in that process?

Mr Adkin: No, there isn't, Mr Carr. The whole situation, exactly like the example, is that a person has a right to trial, they have a right to a hearing. Many of these things become principle issues. The officers should have the right to say, "This is what happened," or should have a hearing before any kind of penalty is assessed. It's so arbitrary to bring someone in and say, "You're going to have to face this," or, "My opinion of this is that you should be fined $500." That's a lot of money in this day and age, it's a lot of money any time, and there's just no amount. A person should have a right to a hearing.

Mr Ramsay: Thank you for your presentation. I'm certainly going to be prepared to move some amendments to bring some fairness to your side of the equation here. I've been quite struck by many comments by the police associations as to the arbitrariness of what the chief can find and not have a police trial. I accept that.

On the independence of investigation, in a way, I agree with you. I would say 99% of the time we could probably get a fair and independent investigation, maybe 100% of the time. What I do know, though, is that I don't think a great portion of the public would perceive it as being so, and that's the dilemma we have. We've got to design a system that the public has confidence in, not just legislators, and that's our dilemma.

Mr Adkin: I can appreciate your dilemma. It's a difficult one. The question is, what percentile of the public are you listening to? When you look at the public at large, does the public really understand what the complaint system is all about? Do they understand the millions of dollars that are being spent by people to investigate complaints when they think perhaps it's just maybe a short investigation that takes a few hours and they don't understand just how complex it is? I think if you were to speak to most people in the public, they feel that police officers are professionals, and I can assure you that the people who carry out those roles as complaints investigators are professionals as well, because their actions are also governed and looked at and assessments are made on those and they want to do their job appropriately.

If you looked by and large at a large segment of the population and said, "Do you feel this is fair?" they would say yes. Policemen can come to our house, they can investigate murders, they can investigate robberies, they can investigate assaults, they can investigate break-and-enters; we're quite confident they can also investigate complaints against their own. As I said, I think the time has turned. People will give you that mark and they will say, "Yes, we have confidence in them."

The Chair: Gentlemen, thank you very much for your presentation.

TORONTO MAYOR'S COMMITTEE ON COMMUNITY AND RACE RELATIONS

The Chair: The next presentation is by the Toronto Mayor's Committee on Community and Race Relations, Ms Cidalia C. Faria. Welcome. In case you haven't been told, you have 15 minutes, including all questions. I ask you to proceed.

Ms Cidalia Faria: It was a good thing I came early. Good afternoon. As was said, my name is Cidalia Faria and I'm a member of the Toronto Mayor's Committee on Community and Race Relations. I'm here to provide a perspective from the committee and from those who work with the committee.

Essentially, when looking at the amendments to the Police Services Act before you, the perspective we'd like to offer is in terms of who we're dealing with, what we're dealing with and why we're dealing with it.

In terms of who, the police force is an organization like any other, as you all know. To put it bluntly, it is an organization that is licensed to kill. Therefore, because it has the authority of the state, as it should, to protect and serve all members of the community, it also requires that the standards by which they exercise that authority be thoroughly and competently reviewed so that the public that entrusts its liberty, its safety to the police force can trust that police force. So it's about accountability, it's about trust and it's about the tremendous amount of authority the police officers and the police force have to protect and to serve the community.

In terms of the people who are before you and the people I represent, the police force is paid by taxpayers. In this day and age when the deficit and money and economics are high priorities, it's quite imperative that everyone understand the extent to which the police force is funded by the taxpayer and the extent to which the taxpayer has every right to demand accountability. The performance of the police force must meet the standards of the community that pays for that service, that is subjected to that service and that counts on that service to protect it. Therefore, such competence and such monitoring and such control demands not that some officers be competent and professional, not that many officers be competent and professional, but that every officer be competent and professional.

If that is so, when the occasion arises that a police officer is alleged to have misbehaved or behaved not in accordance with policy and procedure, then the public has the right to have account of that behaviour. It has to have a body that is independent, that can investigate such allegations and have confidence in the results of the body that does that investigation.

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Why are we doing this? Essentially because we live in a democracy. That's a pretty simple statement. But if the public doesn't have confidence in the police force, then the authority of the police force is diluted. I don't think anyone, either before you or in this room or in the community at large, wants a society or a community that does not trust its police force, because then we're on a slippery slope to a different kind of society that no one states is the objective.

There are also some basic rights in question. In so far as police officers have rights, and they certainly do, and as a lawyer I certainly believe they have rights, so does the public at large. One of the things that has confused some of the debate is the complications between labour law, constitutional law and employment law. One may use one area of law to mislead, and another may use another area of law to strengthen their own position. However, bandying about Charter of Rights or employment law or labour law without delineating the actual complexity of the situation misleads both the public and the police force in terms of their rights.

In order to deal with specifics of the amendments, it is inappropriate for a person complaining or making an allegation of misconduct to go to the source of the misconduct that they are alleging happened. It would be inappropriate to have a colleague of yours subjected to your own judgement. We all know, for example, that in party discipline the party line must be toed, regardless of what happens in caucus. If I allege that a colleague of a politician lied, you're obligated not to either confirm my allegation or deny my allegation. A police officer is a police officer is a police officer, and the chief of police is a police officer. It is inappropriate to place that person, whoever he or she may be, in a position to judge their own, particularly when the trust of the public is in question.

The person just before me stated that the majority of the public doesn't understand the public complaints system or may not understand the amount of money involved in properly investigating an allegation. The fact of the matter is that over the last 20 years we know very clearly that significant portions of the population have serious concerns about the policing services being provided to their communities and in this city and in the Metropolitan area. The Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System documented such concerns. There have been numerous studies that have actually proven that there are problems with the system. That means that improvements have to be made, not dilution of public confidence or accountability.

It is inappropriate for the new commission that is being organized to only review allegations. Their review is dependent on the documentation provided to them by the complainant and by the chief of police by whom the decision is being made. That means the documentation is already limited.

In the amendments there are, to my mind, no substantial resources given to the commission in order to investigate independently what constructs the allegations. Actually, at one point the amendments state that the commission can be one person, which really brings the point home. There is also no mention of the extent to which any investigation conducted by the commission has authority to do so. Again, in terms of law, there is no legislative authority to compel anyone to speak to an investigating commissioner. This bill doesn't actually deal with the SIU at all, and everyone is quite clear, I would believe, that the SIU has encountered several obstacles in trying to obtain information during its investigations because of lack of cooperation.

How can the public trust a system when that member of the public who has a complaint has to go to a police station, has to make the allegation and the complaints to a police officer, which will then be investigated by another police officer, whose decision will then be rendered? If that person disagrees with the decision rendered and there actually is ultimately a hearing held, the prosecutor can be a police officer, according to these amendments; the person who is hearing the allegation can be a police officer, according to these amendments. How can a member of the public have confidence that their allegation is being independently investigated when all around them are police officers? Without denying the objectivity of many police officers to conduct a professional job, the point is not "many," the point is "every."

Over the last 20 years, several organizations and communities have advocated for an independent civilian body to review policing services. "Civilian" means "non-police." It's pretty elementary in that case, which means you can't have the police chief making the decision at first instance. Whether it's about something being vexatious and frivolous or whether it's about an unsubstantiated allegation, it's still a police officer making that decision.

There is no denying that the present system is bureaucratic and has duplication and doesn't work as efficiently or effectively as it should. However, to throw away the baby with the bathwater doesn't leave us with much. To change the dirty water into other water that is still perceived to be water still leaves the public with the sense that they are being policed by people who are unaccountable.

In so far as police officers have the right to hold a gun and to pull that trigger, that officer must also meet a higher standard of accountability for when that weapon is drawn. If you picture yourself in a situation where you are isolated with a police officer, at that moment, when that police officer may inappropriately search you, stop you, detain you, abuse you, you have no power. However, our system depends on the fact that every individual, if such an incident occurs, then has a backup system. That means they have a body to turn to, that they have confidence in, with the authority to investigate their allegation.

Now, if it's you or I in such a situation, because of who we are and because of what we look like because that is the reality, our credibility will not be challenged as much as that of other members of other communities. If it is a black youth, if it is a sex trade worker, if it is a homeless person, if it is a single mother on welfare, if it is a person who resides in a high-crime area, if it is a person with a criminal record, that person has no more rights and no fewer rights than you or I. However, if you or I make a complaint regarding the conduct of a police officer, you and I will receive more credibility, more respect and more accountability than those persons. That is inequality, that is unacceptable, and I think that is unacceptable to every one of us and to every member of the public, regardless of their political persuasion.

In terms of trying to deal with the objective of this legislation, the objective of the legislation, which is to provide civilian overview, in effect eliminates the word "civilian," because more power is given to the police forces in order to investigate their own. That may have been appropriate had there been a consensus that that's the option that the society is choosing to take. But the fact of the matter is that this bill arises from several consultations with those stakeholders on one side of the equation. The fact of the matter is that it is well known that in the summer of 1996 several police organizations were consulted by this government in preparation for this bill. That's correct and as it should be. Those organizations have legitimate interests to be voiced and to be heard.

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However, on the other side of the equation is the fact that this bill comes from a process that lacked consultation with community members who have the concerns that I speak of. At several points, the government of the day stated that it was willing to listen to community submissions. The fact is that the legislation was drafted and presented prior to such consultation.

This bill reflects, again, legitimate concerns of one side of the balance, which are police forces and their associations and those stakeholders. However, the other side of the equation, the community served by the police force, was not consulted in any meaningful, substantial or thorough way. Again, how can the public be confident that their allegations will be impartially investigated if the bill that designs the process did not take their positions into account?

A coalition of over 25 organizations presented a report to the Solicitor General with some of their concerns. The responses to those recommendations were inadequate. What we have here is a situation where those most disadvantaged and those most subject to possible abuse have the least resources and the least voice to participate in this process.

My submission, then, is that this committee take into account the fact that taxpayers pay for the police. Therefore, it is not a request, it is a demand that they perform competently and that they be accountable. Competence and accountability can only be reflected by an independent investigation body, which has the confidence of the public, with the authority and the resources to conduct those investigations properly and which has the confidence of the public and the police force in order for everyone to be able to work together.

It is inappropriate for a police officer to be vindicated by one of his or her own when he or she knows that the public will not perceive that as vindication. It is also improper for a member of the public to have their allegation judged by someone they perceive not to be independent. Both sides lose, because there is no confidence in the result nor the body that reaches that result.

In terms of taxpayers, in terms of democracy, in terms of the fact that unless we trust those who are authorized to protect us, there will be no one to protect us, it behooves each and every one of us to take a look at who we are, how much power we have, how many resources we have, what kind of credibility we have and how not all in our community have that same credibility, resources and privilege to be able to defend themselves.

Mr Ramsay: Thank you very much for your presentation. It was very well given and very thought-provoking. I think you're right that this bill doesn't strike a balance between community rights, if you will, and police rights. I think there's a lot that needs to be improved about this bill, and I'm almost wondering if it can be improved. Maybe we should be starting over. But you bring up a lot of good points, and I'm going to be considering them for amendments.

Mr Christopherson: Thank you for the presentation. Could you expand a little on the lack of consultation on the part of the government. One of the things it committed to in the pre-election period was lots and lots of consultation. Are you aware of any consultation, outside the police stakeholder groups, that took place prior to the tabling of the legislation?

Ms Faria: No, I am not. The clearest I have was that on December 17, 1996, the coalition held a meeting to discuss the McLeod report and how to respond to it. The coalition decided to produce an alternative report and submit it to the government by the week of January 13, 1997. They wrote to the Solicitor General and the Attorney General regarding the submission of such an alternative report during the week of January 13, and on December 19 both ministers said they would be willing to listen. They did the same on December 20. However, between December 20, 1996, and January 14, 1997, the legislation amending the Police Services Act was drafted. So they never looked at the report, although they stated publicly that they would listen to members of the community.

There was no consultation coming anywhere near the kind of consultation the government had with the stakeholders on the policing side. There was a two-day summit in July. There were meetings over four months. There were several discussions over what those particular organizations felt was necessary and important and advocating on behalf of their interests. However, none of the groups represented by the coalition -- actually the report was written by the African Canadian legal clinic -- were contacted or consulted with. To my mind, there was none.

Mr Tilson: The majority of complaints on police officers now are adequately dealt with by chiefs of police today. You speak about an independent civilian investigation body, which would require a substantial amount of financial resources and which would require a certain amount of education of such a civilian group to be capable of making investigations that the public would be confident in and rely on. Is the city of Toronto prepared to put forward the amount of money to construct a bureaucracy and administration for such an independent civilian body?

Ms Faria: If it is the responsibility of the provincial Legislature to enact the Police Services Act, then it is the responsibility of the province to ensure that every officer abides by that act, and since that act is the one that defines what misconduct is, then the financial obligation to ensure that every officer abides by that act would lie with the province.

Mr Tilson: What you're suggesting is that there would be a provincial civilian body, as opposed to individual civilian bodies around the province to deal with local issues.

Ms Faria: That's right.

Mr Tilson: You'd want one large civilian investigation body that would investigate problems from Kincardine to Ottawa, Hamilton, Toronto. Is that what you're saying?

The Chair: I'm sorry, Mr Tilson, our time is limited and your time is up. Thank you very much for your presentation here today.

CATHY HOLLIDAY

The Chair: Our last presentation of the day is Cathy Holliday. Welcome, Cathy. We have 15 minutes set aside for you, which includes any time for questions. Please proceed with your presentation. Everyone has received Ms Holliday's written presentation.

Ms Cathy Holliday: As background, I'm a registered nurse and a full-time employee at Toronto General Hospital. I'd like to say at the outset that I understand what a difficult job the police do and I have always thought it's somewhat like ours in that we have an enormous amount of responsibility and are expected to rise to the occasion on all occasions, and that's very tough sometimes.

I'm a member of the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty and the Toronto Coalition Against Racism. I offer the following criticisms of the proposed legislation on the grounds that it will exacerbate existing social problems of systemic racism, sexism and classism.

Essentially, I believe the abolition of the office of the public complaints commissioner will eliminate civilian oversight of policing, leaving the police to control the whole complaint process. Recent history has demonstrated that the police organizations are no more immune to these systemic prejudices than other institutions in our society. I would ask you to consider the following facts which support this.

On racism: Although black people constitute only 7.5% of the population of Metropolitan Toronto, 25% of police shootings since 1991 were of black people.

Between 1990 and 1995, three out of every 100 homicides were police shootings. By comparison, in 12 American cities, including New York, that figure would be one in 100. That's from a press release by Clayton Ruby on September 29, 1996, Toronto Star, page A6.

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I include as an appendix the compilation of police shootings of Afro-Canadian and other people of colour since 1978 by the Black Action Defence Committee, and I leave you to read that. It's kind of a sorry record. I would add to this several other deaths where class and race prejudice on the part of the police force could be a factor and those are as listed on page 2. Also, following that is a partial list of suspects and prisoners who met their death in custody, either police custody or in jail. Three of these were suicides, one was a murder by a fellow prisoner, but to my mind that reflects a lack of trusteeship of the human beings who are in the jail by the police system.

The purpose of listing these events is that, even with the existing checks and balances, none of the families or communities of these victims were satisfied by the investigation process. The proposed legislation will widen this exclusion of whole sectors of the population. The Police Services Act should certainly be amended but in the opposite direction, to extend democratic rights to all the people, regardless of race, gender or class. I would ask this committee to totally rethink the proposed amendments and suggest serious consideration be given to the following:

(1) Implementation of the report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System issued June 16, 1996.

(2) Retain civilian oversight of complaints against the police. Stop the undermining of the special investigations unit; give the SIU power to conduct fair and impartial investigations.

(3) Screening of recruits to the police force; training in anti-racism; instruction in labour history, economic causes of social problems. Restructuring of police forces to eliminate militaristic hierarchies and authoritarianism. Training of officers in control of suspects without using deadly force.

(4) Stop the use of hollow-point bullets. These are adding to the fatality rate in police shootings.

(5) Stop high-speed car chases. Since February 1989, at least nine teenagers have been killed in attempts to recover stolen property or to make traffic charges. Protection of property above human life is not justifiable.

(6) Implement the suggestions of police complaints commissioner Gerald Lapkin regarding strip searches.

Finally, I would draw your attention to recent international criticism of Ontario's judicial system. Conditions in the Don Jail have been quoted as violating human rights of prisoners. Cuts to legal aid have been criticized by the Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers in Geneva. The proposed changes further deny our democratic rights.

Mr Christopherson: Thank you very much, Ms Holliday, for your presentation. If the amendments go through as proposed, what do you think the implications will be within the various communities in Ontario?

Ms Holliday: I think there will be a further decline of trust, as the previous speaker said, and that government is only by consent. If distrust grows among the population, the population becomes ungovernable, so I would think it would be a serious concern for the current people in power.

Mr Christopherson: You're suggesting that you think there may even be an increase in lawlessness, as opposed to the opposite?

Ms Holliday: Yes. Also, the police themselves have made statements that if they are not allowed immunity, I would call it, and are allowed to behave with impunity, they will refuse to go into certain areas. I think it's already been seen that this happens in the US, where police services have been refused to black people.

Mr Carr: Thank you for your presentation. As you know, the process under the proposed changes is that there will be the OCCPS commission to go to. If somebody is upset or doesn't agree with the findings through the process, they can appeal to the commission. What's wrong with that system that does have the checks and balances of having a civilian commission to appeal to if you are not satisfied with the process? Why do you want to see that expanded beyond having this civilian commission that you could go to if you weren't satisfied with the outcome of the hearings with regard to the police? Why would that not be satisfactory?

Ms Holliday: As I understand it, the legislation is folding the civilian complaints commission into another body which is controlled by the appointees by the Lieutenant-Governor and by the government. I don't see that as the same as the old civilian commission into police complaints. Not that it was being very effective, but I don't see that as a reason to do away with it all together.

Mr Carr: In what way was the present system not effective, then, in your mind? You say the present system doesn't work. In what way?

Ms Holliday: I think it was a matter of not giving the people on those bodies enough authority to do what they were supposed to do. I have filed a complaint against the police and the final answer I got from that commission was that apparently there was a lack of evidence. The evidence had all been compiled by the police in the first investigation and the other side was not -- there were no witnesses. If that commission was not empowered and given the money, the finances, to carry out an investigation of the other side of the story, they would not be able to build a case.

Mr Crozier: Good afternoon. When you refer to the implementation of the report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, were there specific recommendations in that which you could remind us of that you feel should be a part of this bill and that would address some of the concerns you've brought to us today?

Ms Holliday: I have to admit that I haven't read it for a while and I couldn't be specific about it now.

Mr Crozier: I'm going to admit something to you: I haven't read it at all. But I thought even if you haven't read it for a while, you might be able to help me.

Ms Holliday: I don't think it's a difficult thing, but cutbacks are eating into democracy. I think money has to be set aside so that democracy can work.

Mr Crozier: I guess my point is that I would like to think in Ontario that most of us are not racists. Nobody's going to come out in an interview and say "I'm a racist," so it's difficult to get what they call for in the act, which is that to be appointed a police officer, one of the four or five qualifications is good morals. I'm paraphrasing a bit, but the word "moral" is used. That's difficult to get at, isn't it?

Ms Holliday: That's what?

Mr Crozier: It's difficult to know whether an individual has good morals or doesn't, isn't it?

Ms Holliday: I'm sorry. Who says they should have good morals?

Mr Crozier: Well, the police act. I'm paraphrasing, but it's "good morals and community principles" or something like that to be appointed police officer. Well, how do you know that? I'm asking you.

Ms Holliday: Psychological testing can be done and in fact it's been suggested for people who work in the prison system by Mr Runciman, I believe. "Good morals" is kind of a Victorian formulation.

Mr Crozier: I just thought you might have an opinion.

Ms Holliday: It's more a sense of justice that you would need to have.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms Holliday, for assisting us here today.

For the purpose of the record, I'd just like to read in -- I'm not going to read the whole thing, but in regard to questions made by various members there have been legal opinions tabled, and you should have a copy, all dated March 18, 1997, one dealing with the compellability of a police officer at a disciplinary hearing, the second dealing with the filing about a police officer, and the third, investigation and hearing powers of the OCCPS. You should have that.

We will be adjourning today until 10 am in Ottawa at the Citadel Ottawa Hotel tomorrow. On Thursday, again I remind you that the meeting at the London Westin Hotel does not start till 10:40, rather than 10.

If there's no other business, I hereby adjourn.

The committee adjourned at 1651.